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Abstract 
The current global and competitive environment in which companies within the 
oil and gas (O&G) sector find themselves requires a greater degree of 
information that allows users to have a better understanding of the companies’ 
economic situation and risks they face. For that reason, there is a need to 
mitigate negative impacts that affect their activities. The objective of this 
research is to perform a comparative study between the quality of risk 
disclosures in shareholder and stakeholder reports of O&G companies, 
headquartered in developed (Canada, the UK and the US) and developing 
countries (Colombia, Brazil and Argentina) listed on their local stock exchange 
for the period 2016-2017; their size and its propensity to follow IPIECA (2015) as 
a voluntary industry guide to produce stakeholders' reports. Using the quantity of 
risk keywords as indicative of risk quality disclosures by following Bareta and 
Bonzolan, (2004) approach. The following findings were encountered: (a) 
companies based in developed countries tend to disclose high-quality risks in 
their shareholder reports, however the difference compared to developing 
countries is not significant due to the accounting globalized principles used. 
Stakeholder reports quality is highly associated with the adoption of industry-
specific voluntary guidelines in both developed and developing countries. 
Additionally, the findings show that the quality of risk disclosures can also be 
influenced by stakeholder pressures that cause companies to change their 
reporting approach, in both developed and developing countries; (b) the size of 
the company in terms of total assets is not a determining factor that influences 
the company quality of risk disclosures nor for shareholders or stakeholder 
reports of the companies in developed or developing country; (c) The use of the 
voluntary guidelines of O&G (IPIECA), develops and improves risk disclosures 
quality in the shareholder and stakeholder reports of companies within the 
industry to enable good practices. 
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Chapter I 
Introduction 
 
The growing complexity of strategies, operations and commercial regulations in 
the corporate context has fostered new trends that emphasize the need for 
companies to provide a greater volume of information to promote transparency, 
improve the quality of disclosures and reduce information inequalities. In this 
sense, the increasing changes in the risk management practices have been 
helping businesses to reduce these asymmetries and to identify how financial 
operations affect business performances. Solomon et al. (2000), define risk 
management as an essential practice to maximize shareholder value, based on 
the premise that reporting to the market gives companies greater chances of 
success and supports investment and shareholder decisions. Hence, its 
importance to reduce information asymmetry between shareholders regarding 
the company's commercial risk, financial situation and stakeholders about the 
way in which social responsibility problems are addressed and measured, which 
generates a broad vision of weaknesses and strengths that allow a more efficient 
allocation of resources between economic agents and the market. 
These changes have meant that the usefulness of the information provided 
regarding risks to its potential users is increasingly valuable, which entails a 
greater demand for relevant information and an effort from the regulators to set 
standards. These, guide companies in how to disclose properly the risks to which 
they are involved in their business operations. In this way, companies in the 
O&G sector do not escape from this situation, where opportunities are 
continually examined to meet the growing energy demand around the world, 
while mitigating negative impacts that affect their activities. Thus, the need to 
address the potential risks which have become an essential part of the corporate 
governance of these organizations and basic elements of the business sphere.  
Currently, the growing demand for risk information originates that companies 
within this sector look to communicate risk from a systemic view, either in 
voluntary reports or in a mandatory manner; which requires providing transparent 
and reliable information that involves all levels in the organization, which makes 
it a key variable to understand the strategic position of the company. That is why 
risk communication is one of the main information needs in companies (AICPA, 
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1987; Solomon et al., 2000 and Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). Stakeholders want to 
understand and participate in the dialogue with these companies about the 
effects of their activities: the impacts, benefits, risks and compensations. These 
is done through the annual report to their shareholders and through the 
sustainability, or corporate social responsibility (CSR), or environmental reports 
to their stakeholders, which is an important way for companies in the O&G sector 
to promote informed dialogue between their shareholders and other related 
parties in the business. 
Hence, accounting bodies have issued norms that regulate the presentation of 
these reports, along with other associations that also have emerged, which guide 
the dissemination of information in companies, including the G4 Sustainability 
Reporting Guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) and for the specific 
O&G sector the oil and gas industry guidance on voluntary sustainability 
reporting (IPIECA), issued by the World Association of the Oil and Gas Sector, 
specialized in environmental and social issues, which aim to guide companies to 
shape the structure and content of their annual and sustainability reports. It can 
be said that through risk communication, reports become a reliable sources of 
information for firms' stakeholders, transparently describing the greatest 
challenges, and representing the values of the company by providing to these 
groups with strategies based on a systemic vision, highlighting the challenges of 
performance and progress of the company. Also, for shareholders allow 
assertive decision making and strategic guidance for investors. Both shareholder 
and sustainability reports provide relevant aspects for their most important 
stakeholders. While in the United States the focus is on shareholders, countries 
such as the United Kingdom are reporting to stakeholders, directing them to all 
groups that affect or are affected by the organization (Freeman, 1984; Klumpes 
et al., 2014).These reports communicate transparent and timely information 
regarding the long-term viability of the business (Rossouw, 2015). In this sense, 
information on risks can help to manage changes (Abraham and Cox, 2007), 
reduce the cost of capital (Linsley and Shrives, 2001, Linsley and Shrives, 2006), 
informs about the future trajectory of the model of business (Cabedo and Tirado, 
2004) and allows companies to communicate the message that they fully 
understand their own risks and have developed practices to manage them 
(Abraham, Solomon and Stevenson, 2007). 
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As highlighted by Cabedo and Tirado (2007), there is a certain degree of 
unanimity regarding the need to report corporate risks, although this consensus 
disappears when discussing whether the publication should be mandatory or 
voluntary. Nowadays, except for the regulations of financial risks, most of the 
disclosures are voluntary and according to agency theory, disclosures of 
voluntary information are essential factors in the decision-making process and 
can be utilised as a control system over the managers’ activities on behalf of 
shareholders and stakeholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In this line Dobler 
(2007), analyses the issues related to the credibility of information, which cause 
a lack of motivation for disclosure. He argues that there are three potential 
explanations for a more restricted report on risks: (1) executives may not report 
because they do not have enough specific information about their risks; (2) 
cannot reveal them with credibility; (3) may retain information due to threats of 
commercial damages. On his investigation, Dobler (2007) found that more 
precise risk reporting practices in companies do not necessarily depend on the 
level of accessible information that executives might have. This is also linked to 
the commitment of managers with companies’ shareholders and their personal 
incentives to perform a god job, as suggested by the stewardship theory.  
On the other hand, Miihkinen (2013) evidences that there is little research on the 
usefulness of risk disclosures in mandatory annual reports for investors. 
Although it has been argued that corporate disclosure reduces the asymmetry of 
information between management and shareholders, it is not known whether 
investors benefit from high-quality risk information. In its findings is showed that 
in a highly regulated risk disclosure environment, the disclosure of risks has a 
direct negative influence on the asymmetry of information, which causes non-
assertive decision making. 
Regarding stakeholder reports, Deumes (2008) found that the information on 
risks is relevant for potential investors, insofar as it helps them to predict the 
future risks of the company where they plan to invest. Now if this Information is 
not adequate in a transparent and quality way according to the findings of 
Campbell et al. (2014), Kravet and Muslu (2013) and Cabedo y Tirado (2014), 
the risk information does not allow users to make future projections of the impact 
of the risk. Therefore, supplying quality information is a determining factor that 
allows a successful decision making to stimulate the profitability of the 
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investment as well as being useful for shareholders and stakeholders. In addition 
to the inherent unreliability, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England 
and Wales (ICAEW, 2011) also noted that in some circumstances, costs may 
exceed perceived benefits, leading to non-informative disclosures. However, 
some studies (Linsley and Shrives, 2005; Schrand and Elliott, 1998 and Solomon 
et al., 2000) have shown that companies do not provide sufficient information, 
characterized by a lack of coherence, brevity and a focus excessive in past risks 
(Linsley and Lawrence, 2007; Abraham and Cox, 2007), and with a main focus 
on financial risks. In the measurement on the quality of the information made by 
Kalev (2014), on the risks in the financial report, it presents empirical evidences 
in which the asymmetry of the information and the problem of the agents lead to 
increase costs whereas when the quality of the information is high, the cost of 
capital can be reduced. Dobler (2007) argues that disclosure the right 
information of cost, is aligned with mandatory risk reporting and manager would 
report what is necessarily strict necessary disclosures in order to comply with 
regulation and showing the best result for the business.    In contrast to the 
above, it is believed that a better understanding of commercial risks by investors 
and other users of corporate reports should lead to better companies' 
management and a more efficient allocation of resources (ICAEW, 2011). This 
information can be useful for investors to assess the amount, duration and 
certainty of future cash flows and determine risk profiles, market value and 
accuracy of the companies in stock price forecasts (Abraham and Cox, 2007; 
Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Helliar and Dunne, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 
2001).  
In what refers to the quality of risk disclosures, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) 
propose a methodology for measuring the quality of information by companies. 
The proposal of Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) establishes that the quality of the 
risk information depends on the quantity of the information disclosed and the 
richness of its content. On the other hand, Cabedo and Tirado (2009) present a 
methodology for measuring the degree of disclosure of risk information based on 
its informative content for the user, rather than on the quantity. 
Both proposals have been applied on different companies, the first of the Beretta 
and Bozzolan (2004), to analyze the quality of the information on risks disclosed 
by Italian companies was related to corporate variables such as the size in which 
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in its findings. They find a positive relationship with the level of presentation of 
information on financial and non-financial risks. In the present study, it is 
contrasted, if the size is related to the risk information presented by oil 
companies listed on the stock exchange. 
While the risk disclosure index proposed by Cabedo and Tirado (2009) has been 
used to study the disclosure of risks in the Spanish capital market, the results 
obtained show that there is no statistically significant relationship between the 
level of risk information disclosed by companies and their profitability, and what 
does exist between that level and size. (Cabedo and Tirado, 2014). These 
studies show that the corporate variable size is a determining factor in the quality 
of the information provided. 
On the other hand, Bravo (2017) in his study on risk disclosures as an effective 
tool to increase the value of the company, found that risk disclosures on the 
value of the company are positively associated with the value of the company. In 
addition, its findings highlight that this partnership is mediated by corporate 
reputation, which improves the improved practices of disclosure of risks. 
This consulted literature is particularly important to understand the quality of the 
disclosure of information on risks and with it the need for dialogue between the 
company shareholders and its stakeholders, which is an essential factor to 
maximize wealth and reduce the chances of sudden changes in revenues, which 
in the case of oil companies in developed and developing countries highlights the 
relevance of the value of the reports of shareholders and stakeholders to 
manage risks successfully and thereby minimize uncertainty. 
It also helps to understand the importance of a higher quality in the 
dissemination of information on risks, information asymmetries are reduced, 
allowing assertive decision making, while providing useful and transparent 
information to evaluate the managers performance and adopt economic and 
political decisions in potential investors. In general, the disclosure of risk 
information increases financial stability by facilitating the measurement and 
management of important indicators to achieve the objectives of sustainable 
development, causing a positive impact on the perception of corporate risks by 
stakeholders. 
In the case of oil companies in terms of stakeholders and shareholders in 
developed and developing countries, it is required that, given their business 
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objective, they provide greater accountability regarding the impact of their 
activities on economic development, social concerns and the environment, 
instead of just addressing the financial aspects (Noked, 2013), which must 
provide relevant aspects for its main stakeholders. These reports should 
communicate information about the long-term viability of the business (Rossouw, 
2015), which promotes high-quality corporate governance. 
In the last decade, attention has focused on the way in which companies prepare 
reports for their stakeholders, especially in the field of CSR and its various 
aspects (Ballou et al., 2005). On the other hand, previous studies show that the 
predominant model of corporate governance has been applied as a practice 
mainly for developed countries, where companies seek balance of power using 
best practices to achieve their objectives (Aguilera et al., 2012, 2014; Muller and 
Kolk, 2009). 
The stakeholder report is a common practice in large companies that seek high 
visibility and impact on society, improving the communication process of its 
highlights on specific objectives (Kolk, 2004 and Daub, 2007). However, despite 
the benefits for investors and the company itself when producing reports from 
stakeholders, this has not become a common practice in developing countries 
(Foro de Inversión Social, 2008). 
The review of recent developments in national legal systems and relevant 
international regulatory frameworks is likely to be related to recent surveys of 
current trends in the form and content of notifications to stakeholders by MNCs. 
While the KPMG (2013) survey provides evidence that 71% of all MNCs now 
produce sustainability reports, PCW (2013) states that MNCs are increasingly 
adopting integrated reports to better meet the information needs of a series of 
actors. The review of recent developments in national legal systems and relevant 
international regulatory frameworks is likely to be related to recent surveys of 
current trends in the form and content of notifications to stakeholders by MNCs. 
While the KPMG (2013) survey provides evidence that 71% of all MNCs now 
produce sustainability reports, PCW (2013) states that MNCs are increasingly 
adopting integrated reports to better meet the information needs of a series of 
actors. These trends highlight a trade-off between the dimensions of relevance 
and reliability of the information produced by companies to meet the needs of a 
wide range of likely users. On the one hand, the preparation of a separate report 
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stakeholders can provide to the related parties with more detailed information on 
social, economic and environmental areas, including many disclosures that may 
not be important in the integrated report. Alternatively, the elaboration of a single 
integrated report is likely to focus on the content of the impacts of the various 
forms of natural, human and economic capital, improving the perception of the 
different MNCs on the various economic, social, governance and economic 
activities.  
The purpose of the research is to determine the quality of risk information of 
shareholder and stakeholder reports in developing countries such as Colombia, 
Argentina and Brazil, taking into account that these Latin American countries are 
in an early stage of adoption of voluntary guidelines, compared to developed 
countries such as Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom.  
From this theoretical framework, taking into account this perception of the need 
of risk information, and the consequent effect on companies and that these do 
not provide sufficient information on risks and their management, despite the fact 
that there are organizations that guide the preparation of these reports to 
improve the quality of disclosure, for the benefit of stakeholders, it is generated 
the following question: How will be the comparison of the quality of risk 
disclosures in shareholders and stakeholders reports in developed and in 
developing countries in the oil companies listed on the local stock exchange, 
during the period 2016-2017?. 
This question originates the objective of this study which is aimed at conducting 
a comparative study of the quality of risk disclosures in shareholders and 
stakeholders’ reports in developed and developing countries in oil companies 
listed on the stock exchange, during the period 2016-2017. 
In order to commit with this general objective, the following specific objectives 
were designed: (a) to analyse the relationship between the quality of the risk 
disclosures and the companies listing status (location of the O&G companies in 
developed or developing countries); (b) to examine the relationship between 
O&G company size and the quality of risk disclosed in shareholders and 
stakeholders reports; (c) to determine if the quality of risk disclosures of O&G 
companies that follow the voluntary guidelines IPIECA (2015) for the preparation 
of stakeholder reports if of higher quality of the ones that do not follow such 
guidelines.  
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In order to comply with the proposed objectives, regarding shareholder reports, 
the framework of Kelliher et al. (2012) was used as a reference, as its provides 
an integrated classification system for financial risks. In relation to stakeholder 
reports, the requirements of the IPIECA guide (2015) are analysed, as updated 
guidelines for O&G sector sustainability risk disclosures. All these in order to 
determine if there is a high quality and relevant risk information disclosed in both 
type of reports for O&G companies based in developing countries such as 
Colombia, Argentina and Brazil; taking into account that these Latin American 
countries will be compared to developed countries like Canada, the USA and the 
United Kingdom where exist norms, regulations, guides and along institutions 
that encourage good quality of risk reporting.  
In general, the improvement in the quality of risk disclosures by investors and 
other users of the shareholders and stakeholder reports should lead to better 
management of companies and a more efficient allocation of resources (ICAEW, 
2011). This information can be useful for investors to assess the amount, 
duration and certainty of future cash flows and determine the risk profiles, market 
value and accuracy of the companies in stock price forecasts (Abraham and 
Cox, 2007; Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Helliar and Dunne, 2004; Linsley and 
Shrives, 2001). All these considering that this issue has received more attention 
in other countries, such as the United Kingdom (Linsley and Lawrence, 2007; 
Linsley and Shrives, 2000; Linsley and Shrives, 2005, 2006; Woods and Reber, 
2003), the United States (Linsmeier et al., 2002; Roulstone, 1999), Germany 
(Kajüter, 2001; Kajüter and Winkler; 2003) Italy (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004) 
and Canada (Lajili and Zeghal, 2005). 
To carry out the research after the introduction, empirical studies were analysed 
in chapter II that help to understand the problem under investigation; the 
institutional antecedents referring to the management of risk information, 
characteristics of developing and developed countries and regulations on the 
management of risks disclosure. Chapter III review the literature on corporate 
governance and its relevant theories, that seek to assess why MNCs’ managers 
face incentives to report sustainability information, as well as empirical literature 
that examines trends and practices in the reporting of Corporate Social 
Responsibility (CSR). 
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The proposition system has been designed in chapter IV, which allowed to 
contrast them based on the arguments of the theories of corporate governance, 
stewardship, stakeholders, institutional and neo-institutional in terms of quality of 
information, size of the company and the orientation of companies to use IPIECA 
as a voluntary guide, are determining factors in the quality of risk reports in 
developed and developing countries. Chapter V describes the qualitative 
research methods that have been implemented to evaluate propositions, 
procedures for selecting the samples used to carry out this research, sources of 
data collection used, variables used in this research and the construction of the 
risk disclosure matrix to carry out the content analysis of the reports of 
shareholders and stakeholders; and finally, the methods used to verify 
propositions are explained. The primary data was collected using the companies' 
websites and the secondary resources were collected through online file data 
and official websites.  
A content analysis was carried out, creating a disclosure index that compiles 
both the volume of information disclosed and its quality in relation to a set of 
risks that Kelliher et al. (2012) considered to be a shareholder risk, given that its 
classification evidences a financial bias and relevant disclosures of IPIECA 
related to environmental, health and safety, and social and economic factors 
were made to stakeholders. In addition, the study identifies the best practice 
cases of risk reports that may be of interest to other organizations. This 
promotes high quality corporate governance, and the findings can be useful in 
adopting a better approach to risk communication practices among shareholders 
and stakeholders. Chapter VI report the analysis of the results obtained of the 
evaluation of the quality of risk disclosures of 10 MNCs in the O&G sector 
headquartered in developed and developing countries for the period 2016-2017. 
Chapter VIII contains the discussion of the results previously analysed and 
finally, chapter VIII the conclusions of the investigation. 
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Chapter II 
Institutional Background 
 
In recent years, substantial changes have been made in the way that risk 
exposures, its management and monitoring, affect financial operations in the 
multinational corporations’ accountability to their stakeholders, with respect to 
their financial position and performance. Accounting professionals and risk 
managers are focusing their attention on the nature of the quality and quantity of 
risk disclosures. On the other hand, governmental authorities have focused their 
attention on regulatory aspects and the issuers of accounting standards are 
increasing the requirements in the way that companies should produce their 
reports. They are demanding more specific risk and emerging disclosures that 
are facing actions and abilities to control them to report quality information that is 
relevant, transparent and useful for their stakeholders. For this reason, different 
countries and supporting organisations promote regulations and guidelines to 
encourage companies to report and disclose their various risks in their 
shareholder and stakeholder reports. 
So nowadays in O&G organizations risk disclosures are more focused in 
developed countries, in contrast with developing countries of LATAM, hence it is 
interesting to analyse antecedents that are useful to answer the research 
question: What is the quality risk disclosure information in shareholder and 
stakeholder reports in developed and developing countries in oil companies?. In 
this chapter historical background in terms of reports are analysed in section 2.1; 
section 2.2 provides a brief description of the characteristics of developed and 
developing countries and their regulations regarding the management of risk 
disclosure; section 2.3 discusses the legal regulation aspects on risk disclosures; 
section 2.4 comment on the common accounting standards applied at 
international level. Finally, section 2.5 explains the main voluntary suitability 
guides utilised for disclosing risk. 
 
2.1. Historical background on reports 
The first indications regarding the implementation of sustainability reports in 
companies were born in the United States of America and in Europe in the 
sixties and seventies, due to the state's concern about the responsibilities that 
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were not fulfilled in the organizations. The first experiments in terms of reports 
arose with social responsibility reports Sozialbilanz or Bilan social French legal 
requirement that is practiced since 1977 in France and since 1960 in Holland. 
This requirement paved the way for the introduction of the environmental report 
or Ökobilanz in countries such as Germany, Austria, Denmark and Switzerland 
(Andrew et al., 2011). 
In the 1980s, investment funds in the United States and the United Kingdom 
began to project companies based on their ethical and social performance. In 
1989, after the Exxon Valdez accident, the United States Coalition for 
Environmentally Responsible Economies (CERES) developed the CERES / 
Valdez principles on behalf of the Social Investment Forum. These principles 
introduced a strong group of environmental guides to report. 
In the early 1990s, UNEP carried out a global comparative assessment of the 
environmental reporting aspects. Also, in those years the use of this type of 
report increased. This is summarized in the 1995 report of the company The 
Body Shop International: "The Body Shop International's first values report, 
which reported on environmental issues, animal protection and social issues 
(Haro et al., 2016). 
In 1996, CERES and UNEP launched the Global Reporting Initiative to develop 
guidelines to prepare the report in three lines of action: economic, environmental 
and social performance. The objective was to raise the level of the sustainability 
report to the level of an annual finance report. GRI emerges as a multi-
organizational organization for those who have an interest in the environment, 
social and governance aspects and for those organizations that work in the field 
of accountability, the GRI guides are continually developing the latest version 
was published in the year 2018. 
Some surveys in the nineties, in the Anglo-Saxon world, showed data related to 
the fact that human resources reports had a greater preponderance than those 
related to the environment. The foregoing, given that it was mandatory, the 
environmental report increased due to the fact that more governments focused 
on industrial pollution and the inclusion of the hazardous materials register as a 
form of green accountability, as well as the inventory of toxic substances 
discharges and the control of risks. 
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Likewise, the development of environmental management standards such as the 
European Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS), motivated the increase 
in accountability that gave rise to the birth of the corporate sustainability report in 
the nineties, this decade It was known as the decade of transparency, when a 
series of major accidents forced the preparation of sustainability reports. 
The first decade of the 21st century increased transparency and accountability 
through the reporting of information. However, the second decade has become a 
moment of mistrust given economic crises and financial scandals which has 
generated fear in the ability of organizations to self-regulate in terms of 
accountability. Therefore, the general public has demanded a greater 
participation of the state in the mandatory accountability through the 
sustainability reports. That is why there has been a substantial change in the 
way companies report their financial operations to their various interest groups. 
In addition, several theories have been developed on management incentives 
faced by multinational companies to manage their relationships with their 
stakeholders and their control over sustainable practices and shareholder 
reporting (Brown and Fraser, 2006). 
Different standards and procedures have been created in terms of accountability 
guidelines and risk information that have been followed by companies around the 
world, in order to accurately provide fair, understandable and balanced evidence 
to all parties involved in the process and comply with government regulations 
(Perrini and Tencati, 2006). In the United Kingdom, the "Companies Act of 2006" 
established by the Government as part of the regulations of companies, 
establishes the way in which companies should be constituted and carry out their 
operations. Likewise, the Public Limited Companies Act of 2001 in Australia, the 
Companies Act of 1993 in New Zealand and the Commercial Code of Chile, 
Mexico and Peru regulate the creation and operation of companies. On the other 
hand, to support this legal basis in order to guide companies in the promotion of 
high-quality reports, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), body in charge of 
establishing the Management Codes and Corporate Governance, (Council of 
Reports Financial, 2014). 
While in the United States the focus is on shareholder reports, countries such as 
the United Kingdom are focused on reporting stakeholders, addressing them to 
all groups that affect or are affected by the organization (Freeman, 1984) and in 
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the developing countries are taking their first steps. That is why, since 2013, the 
G4 framework has been implemented for the GRI as an international guide to 
give companies the issues that must be addressed in the stakeholders' report on 
a voluntary basis. In addition, several countries are beginning to adopt a new 
form of reporting that takes into account other parties involved in the business 
process, such as the supply chain, employees and the environment (GRI, 2014). 
According to White (1999), the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), creates a global 
framework for voluntary information about the economic, social and 
environmental impacts of companies and, gradually, of other organizations. In 
this line, Larrinaga and Moneva (2002) argue that globalization, the lack of eco-
efficiency and the need for comparability and reliability are the main reasons that 
drove the process of standardization of sustainability reports through an 
integrated international report In order to help organizations prepare their 
sustainability reports and risk communication, their last recommendation was 
published on October 19, 2016 and valid until June 30, 2018. 
Other organizations, such as the International Finance Corporation (IFC), have 
prepared a series of tips that must be taken into account to develop the 
stakeholder participation strategy of the corporation. These include methods and 
frequency for preparing reports and recommendations for the writing of 
information in terms of format and language. 
Among these standards, it is worth mentioning the one selected for the purposes 
of research and the oil and gas industry guide, guidance on volunteering in 
sustainability reports (IPIECA). This association was founded in 1974, after the 
creation of the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP), and is the main 
communication channel of the industry with the United Nations (UN), having 
produced more than fifty documents and reports on good practices for the oil and 
gas sector. 
In collaboration with the American Petroleum Institute (API) and the International 
Association of Oil and Gas Producers (OGP), IPIECA developed guidance on 
voluntary CSR reporting, resulting in the publication in April 2005 of the guide for 
the voluntary sustainability report of the oil and gas industry (Oil and gas industry 
guidance on voluntary sustainability reporting), its latest version being published 
in 2015. The application in the drafting of sustainability reports in the gas and oil 
companies in the IPIECA guidelines to issue their sustainability reports has been 
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governed by the general requirements established by the GRI for the submission 
of sustainability reports (Haro et al., 2016). In this sense, IPIECA has been 
aware that the oil and gas sector is a key industry that must be exploited and 
managed in a sustainable manner, so it was necessary to make a specific 
supplement for the sector in oil companies in developing countries and 
developed. 
The guide refers to the recommendations on risk communication and its 
management that stakeholders must know, because oil and gas companies face 
various risks to their viability through their communication on the most important 
sustainability issues, those of a reporting company becomes a reliable source of 
information for their stakeholders. By transparently describing its greatest 
challenges, reporting underpins the commitment and represents the values of 
the company in action providing a robust platform to describe the environmental, 
health and safety impacts and risks of operating in different locations. Once this 
information is published, it allows for greater communication and commitment 
with the company stakeholders. 
In addition to these guidelines in developed and developing countries, legal 
regulations have been created that regulate economic and social activities and 
thus guarantee the efficient functioning of the markets, which generates legal 
certainty, imminent damages are avoided. 
 
2.2. Characteristics affecting risk disclosures in developed and developing 
countries 
The qualification of developed, developing or underdeveloped countries is 
determined through the Human Development Index (HDI), a measure used by 
the United Nations that takes into account five fundamental elements in all 
countries: life expectancy, the mortality rate, literacy, education and the standard 
of living in relation to purchasing power, hence there are developed, developing 
and underdeveloped countries. 
The term developing countries refers to the economic development of a country, 
although it can affect all aspects of the same political, social. Kamal 2009, 
comment that there are certain country’s characteristics that might affect risk 
disclosure practices which are listed below: 
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a) The economy of the country: in what refers to developing countries is in a 
state of transition, between underdevelopment and fully developed economies, 
also tend to be in a situation of dependence within the panorama of international 
division of labour. The consequence is that commercial exchanges are subject to 
the rules of richer countries. 
As a consequence, an important part of its resources is usually used to pay 
interest on debts. This is because the reforms imposed to maintain financing are 
not adequate to promote sustained growth of the local economy. 
b) The commercial relationships: this are usually export of raw material and 
import of industrialized products. The lower the dependency of foreign industries, 
the higher the level of development of the country. In the case of the O&G sector 
crude petroleum and refined petroleum are one the principal resources exported 
in the sample of developing countries.    
c) Country policies: their subsequent development is seriously compromised. In 
these cases, financial markets are underdeveloped and there are fixed currency 
exchange rates, public deficit financing that generates inflation, and generalized 
indexation of both wages and prices. 
The policy tends to be unstable, due to its economic dependence on central 
countries. The internal struggles between different ideologies can prevent a 
stable and lasting project. On the other hand, if this trend is interrupted and the 
political situation stabilizes, decisive measures can be taken that benefit or harm 
economic development. That is to say that economy and politics affect each 
other, and their interaction is vital for the development of a country. 
d) Social factors: poverty is always a central problem in developing countries, 
because even when development is under way, the economic benefits are not 
evenly distributed throughout society. In other words, an important sector of 
society continues to live in conditions similar to those of an underdeveloped 
country. These sectors may suffer hunger, social exclusion, limitations in access 
to health services and education. 
On the other hand, some of the characteristics of the developed countries that 
might affect risk reporting are listed below: 
a) Elevated Industrialization: Most of the developed countries are highly 
industrialized; its industry is technologically advanced, thanks among other 
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things to large investments in the development of technology, which are 
implemented by both the private and government sectors. 
b) Finance: They have stable financial systems, with a prosperous bank that has 
ample economic resources; this bank invests in different branches, inside and 
outside the country itself. It seeks to ensure that public and private finances are 
healthy.  
c) High economic development: The developed countries have a high economic 
growth; this is intimately related to the flow of both domestic and foreign trade, 
which is quite high in these countries, which is reflected in per capita income, 
that is, in per capita income that is high compared to income from developing or 
underdeveloped countries, with an income of more than $ 10,000 per year. 
 
d) High level of life of the population: Consequence of economic and financial 
development, as well as trade and industry, and having basic services and 
others, the income per person is quite high, which allows the population to have 
of money to make certain expenses buying products or acquiring services, in 
addition to those that are indispensable for life. 
As for the oil industries, in developed countries they are supported by 
governments for the exploitation of the resources they invest in other countries 
and exploit their resources, this production being an important part of the income 
of several of the developed countries. In the case of Latin America, the beginning 
of the oil industry was in the hands of American and British multinationals during 
the 70s. The industry had already been nationalized, however, this did not imply 
losses for the multinationals, because they controlled the technology and the 
market and maintained a certain presence in the productive process through 
their participation in joint ventures with governments (Haro et al., 2015). 
Based on this division, this research selected to carry out the general objective of 
the research, 3 developed countries and 3 in development, below it will make a 
brief description: 
The following table illustrates the main country characteristic that affect risk 
disclosures in developing and developed countries in the sample selection: 
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Table 2.1 
Country characteristic that affect risk disclosures  
Developing Countries  
Country characteristic Argentina Brazil Colombia  
Economy $103,445 GDP per 
Capita; Inflation of 
42.2% 
$360,486 GDP per 
Capita; Inflation of 
2.7% 
$79,347 GDP per 
Capita; Inflation of 
3.3% 
Legal System Civil law Multifaceted system Civil law 
Cultural Factors Mainly Western/ 
Mixed 
Mainly Western/ 
Mixed  
Mainly Western/ 
Mixed  
Developing Countries 
Country characteristic Canada United States United Kingdom 
Economy $340,166 million 
GDP per Capita; 
Inflation of 2.4% 
$5,381,455 million 
GDP per Capita; 
Inflation of 2.4% 
$553,251 million GDP 
per Capita; Inflation of 
1.8% 
Legal System Common law Federal system Common law  
Cultural Factors Western Mainly Western/ 
Mixed  
Western 
 
 Taylor et al., (2010) comment on the importance of understand the social and 
political environment that link a firm with its different stakeholders. Thus, all these 
previous characteristics define the companies’ decision to report their relevant 
risk disclosures, as firms consider themselves to be part of the society and look 
to ensure their survival and growth in the different political and socio-economic 
environments of each country (Elshandidy et al., 2015). In this sense, DiMaggio 
and Powell (1983) and Scott, (1995), states that the legal system and political 
factors are key elements that are likely to affect the firms’ choice of disclosure 
mandatory risk information. Therefore, company’s responses to these factors, 
define whether the company should disclosure mandatory or voluntary 
information.  
Khlif and Hussainey (2016) state that civil law and common law countries have 
different accounting system attributes and information, including transparency 
and professionalism for common law countries and secrecy for civil law 
countries. Additionally, Hooi (2007) on his study found that in banking companies 
the level of secrecy affects negatively the risk disclosures. Also, Dobler, Lajili and 
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Zeghal (2011) also argue that the country legal system influences the quality of 
risk disclosure and its determinants in civil and common law systems.  
On the other hand, Chambers et al., (2003) argued that western systems have 
higher economic wealth than Asian countries. Furthermore, they claim that CSR 
in western countries have a substantial capacity. This is due to the countries 
earlier development and is also associated to the ability of companies and 
governments to generate economic wealth that are used for founding activities 
related to CSR.  
In this line, it can be said that legal systems structure organisations in what 
matter to voluntary and mandatory risk disclosures in developed and developing 
countries. While western or developed countries have higher capacity to provide 
risk disclosures due to the economic and cultural factors that shape 
organisations. 
 
2.3. Legal regulations on disclosure of risks 
For the fulfilment of the purpose of the research, the mentioned developing and 
developed countries have been selected which carry out oil activities and where 
the importance of corporate disclosure on risks is vital, which has recently 
increased due to the current business context, characterized by globalization and 
the presence of constant changes that lead to greater uncertainty about the 
future evolution of companies. In addition, financial crises have meant that 
different stakeholders increasingly demand disclosure of risks. 
Therefore, the presentation of risk reports obliges managers to face this 
information requirement. Despite the duty to disclose these risks, these 
regulations only require the disclosure of financial risks, and the disclosure of 
other types of risks, such as strategic, commercial and environmental risks, are 
discretionary, however, these are also important and their knowledge is essential 
for shareholders and stakeholders, helping to obtain a greater degree of 
confidence and improve the knowledge of the company. Therefore, both groups 
can make more precise decisions and mitigate uncertainty. 
Hence, the countries of the research sample and the key regulations that norms 
economic, social and environmental activities have been listed below, followed 
by regulations on risk information in the sample selected for the research: 
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Table 2.2 
Key regulations in developed countries   
Developing Countries  
Country Law / Regulation Field 
Brazil Law No. 11638/2007 Accounting Practices 
Brazilian Accounting Norm (NBC) T 
3.7, of 2008 
Accounting practices  
Federal Law N6938/1981 Improvement of the environmental 
quality 
Law Project No. 3613/2008; GHG emission reductions and 
associated cost and benefits   
Instruction 480, 2009 from the 
Securities and Exchange 
Commission (CVM) 
Stock Markets 
Law n° 123/2006 Taxation 
Law No. 12,187 of 29 December 
2009 
Climate change 
Argentina  Law on Industrial and Service 
Activities Waste Management (Law 
25,612) 
Waste Management 
Law on National Environmental 
Policy (Law 25,675) 
Environment 
Law No. 27,007, (2014) Oil and Gas exploration 
Law No. 27430, (2018) Taxation 
Law No 26,831 Stock Markets 
Colombia Law-Decree 2811 of 197 Renewable resources and protection 
of the environment 
Law 1943, (2019) Taxation 
Law 964, (2005) Stock Markets 
Law 99, (1993) Environmental and climate change  
Law 1333, (2009) Environmental crimes 
Law 1314, (2009) Accounting principles  
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Table 2.3 
Key regulations in developing countries   
Developed Countries  
Country Law / Regulation Field 
Canada The Canadian Environmental 
Protection Act, 1999 
Pollution prevention and Environment 
protection  
Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing 
Act 
GHG emission 
The Income Tax Act (1985) Taxation 
United 
Kingdom  
The British Companies Act, 2006 shareholder engagement 
The Climate Change Act, 2008 Climate Change 
The carbon reduction Commitment 
(CRC) of 2010 
Energy 
The Environmental Protection Act 
1990 
Waste and pollution 
United States  The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002) Auditing and financial regulations  
The EEO-1 survey Equal employment  
Securities Act of 1933 and Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 
Stock markets 
Clean Air Act, (1963) Air pollution 
American Clean Energy and Security 
Act of 2009 
Energy efficiency  
Global Warming Solutions Act of 
2006 
Global warming 
 
 
Given the conditions of the oil activity, it carries out numerous processes that 
generate direct consequences on the environment, especially atmospheric 
emissions, liquid effluents and solid and dangerous waste, where its main 
processes generate an important destruction of biodiversity and contribute to the 
degradation of the environment. general, for this reason, the need for guidelines, 
which contributes to the prevention of risks by improving public and private 
information, and by facilitating the response to situations of crisis and 
uncertainty. 
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2.4 Common accounting standards applied at international level:  
 
2.4.1 International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 
The IFRS are born in the European Union, these are the answers to the need of 
capital markets to have a common financial language, product of the 
globalization of the markets and to be used in 2005, initially applied to listed 
companies in a stock market. Following the regulations of the European 
Parliament and its Council, from January 1, 2005, all companies that make public 
offer of their shares in any stock exchange of the European Union, are required 
to apply IFRS, this requirement not only applied for the 27 countries of the EU 
but also to the countries of the European economic zone. 
The main objective of IFRS standards is to homogenize worldwide accounting 
activity through international standards so that all are governed by a single 
acceptable manual, all in order to obtain information, measurements and 
recognition requirements related to all the business and economic events that 
the financial statements have. 
These rules should apply to all financial statements in general. As well as any 
other accounting information that a for-profit institution has. These may have 
industrial, financial, commercial or other area activities. In this way, customers, 
investors, the general public and any related person can serve to make the right 
economic decision. Within IFRS, there are two different rules depending on the 
length of time that each one has in terms of approval, the interpretation will be 
different, all the rules that were created and adopted within the time period 
corresponding to 1973 and 2001 are called NIC (International Accounting 
Standards). At the same time, they were established by the International 
Accounting Standard Committee (IASC), which comes from what is now the 
IASB, whose year of creation was in 2001. From that moment, this entity took 
over of all NIC standards and developed them under the new name of 
International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). In summary, all the 
accounting standards between 1973 and 2001 are titled NIC and the current 
NIFF. 
These standards are accepted in different parts of the world. Currently, regions 
such as the European Union, Hong Kong, Australia, Pakistan, Malaysia, 
Panama, India, Guatemala, Peru, Russia, Brazil, Argentina, Colombia and South 
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Africa, among other countries, use this accounting methodology in 2008, 
approximately a number of 75 nations adopted these regulations (Rivero and 
Lemus, 2014). The NIIFs are based on principles such as a series of specific 
guidelines that manage to establish the general or the particular. For this, the 
NIIF are comprised by the NIIF norms, the NICs and the interpretations of both. 
The benefit of using IFRS is to improve the financial information to be compared 
under the same parameter. In turn, it improves the analysis of credit risk and 
optimizes business competition, among other actions. IFRSs include: 
-International Financial Information Standards (IFRS), International Financial 
Reporting Standards (IFRS), which range from No. 1 to No. 13. 
-International Accounting Standards (NIC), International Accounting Standards 
(IAS), which range from No. 1 to No. 41; there are some that have been 
eliminated later. 
- IFRS Interpretations Committee (IFRIC), International Financial Reporting 
Interpretation Committee (IFRIC), which ranges from No. 1 to No. 21. 
-Standing Interpretations Committee (SIC), Interpretations Committee of the 
NICs, which are only valid number 7, 10, 15, 25, 27, 29, 31 and 32. 
-Normally the IFRS Standards issued by the International Accounting Standards 
Board as of December 31, 2017 and required as of January 1, 2018, include 
extensive cross-references, additional explanatory material and the agenda 
decisions of the Interpretations Committee of the IFRS issued until December 
31, 2017. 
IFRS has two models, based on the European Union's IFRS (IASB) and US 
GAAP's US (FASB) NICs.  
US GAAP are the accounting principles generally accepted and used by US 
companies. to keep the accounts. They are equivalent to the International 
Accounting Standards (NIC / IFRS) adopted by the European Union. The 
generally accepted principles (US GAAP) are explained below. 
 
2.4.2. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (US GAAP) 
US GAAP is the name commonly used to refer to mandatory accounting 
standards for issuers of securities listed in the United States of America. These 
norms, which continue to constitute a normative frame of reference for many 
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entities, are currently in the process of convergence with the international 
standard. 
Knowledge of international standards is essential for the auditor because they 
form the basis of accounting used for the preparation of consolidated information 
by listed entities, and because as we have said before, it is a basis for 
interpreting the provisions of the General Plan of Accounting, which to a large 
extent is conceived as a summarized version of those. 
US GAAP are generally accepted accounting principles; they are standards 
applied to US companies listed on Wall Street. They cover a massive volume of 
standards, interpretations, opinions and bulletins and are prepared by the FASB 
(Financial Accounting Standards Board or Financial Accounting Standards 
Board), by the accounting guild of the American Institute of Certified Public 
Accountants (AICPA) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). 
It is a combination of regulations authorized by regulatory organizations and 
accepted accounting methods, so there are many similarities between United 
States GAAP (US GAAP) and IFRS in terms of the presentation of financial 
statements under both frameworks. Components of a complete series of 
financial statements include balance sheet, income statement, other general 
income basis (OCI); for US GAAP or the statement of recognized income and 
expenses (SORIE) for IFRS. In addition, the two frameworks require, except in 
exceptional circumstances, that the financial statements be prepared according 
to the accounting basis of causation with the exception of the statement of cash 
flows. The two regulations have similar concepts regarding the requirements on 
materiality and coherence that entities should consider when preparing their 
financial statements (Warren Reeve, and Duchac, 2014). 
GAAP's objective is to standardize the different financial reports, thus improving 
the credibility of the same, facilitating the protection and analysis of the investors 
as well as ensuring compliance with the different accounting principles. The use 
of GAAP provides uniformity, neutrality, comparability and verifiability to the 
accounting results presented by the companies, thus helping to analyze them, 
when presented under homogeneous criteria. 
They cover a large volume of standards, interpretations, opinions and bulletins 
issued by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Although they were 
born with the purpose of being guiding principles, they have become a very 
extensive set of rules that give a very precise orientation to the users, being 
characterized because they are very detailed. For this reason, they are much 
more determining, giving few options, but increasing the comparability of the 
financial statements. 
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The similarities and differences that exist in US GAAP and IFRS (IFRS) are very 
distinctive. In addition, when comparing US GAAP and IFRS it can be 
determined that the basis of one is determined by rules and the other is based 
on principles. On the other hand, with respect to the treatment of the transition 
under IFRS, the rule based on principles, provides less information and contains 
fewer details compared to rules based on rules. 
It can be mentioned that US GAAP relies on three aspects and these according 
to Rivero and Lemus, 2014): (a) Legal, (b) Economic and (c) Social Accounting 
System. By contrast, IFRS (IFRS) is an accounting standard based on principle 
and as such responds to the economic and social needs of a country. As a 
result, the main differences and objectives between US GAAP and IFRS (IFRS) 
are economic, legal, political and social. 
Regarding the technical differences established between US GAAP and IFRS 
(IFRS) are indicated as indicated by Rivero and Lemus, 2014): 
-The way in which the financial statements are presented in each of the 
accounting standards, 
-Evaluation of the financial position in the Balance Sheet, and Record of the 
accounting differences in the accounting books. Therefore, the IFRS (IFRS) 
offers a more accurate judgment and provides an extensive requirements report 
unlike the US GAAP standards. (Warren, Reeve, and Ducháč, 2014). 
The differences between US GAAP and IFRS (IFRS) are associated with the 
behaviour of financial reports. In addition, the NIC (IAS) 1 refers to the 
presentation of the financial statements but does not prescribe specifically the 
presentation of the same. On the other hand, several reporting formats have 
been created to evolve the practice of reports in the configuration of the two 
accounting standards. 
In terms of the disclosure of the information in the financial notes, IFRS (IFRS) 
requires that the data related to the currency must be included in the financial 
notes. On the other hand, US GAAP does not require that public trading 
companies in the United States include the currency in financial reports, since it 
is understood that the company reports in US dollars. 
In a globalized world, being guided by the parameters of international financial 
management is one of the challenges that successful companies assume, 
because they make their finances understandable, no matter what country it is 
developed or not developed, because it allows achieve an increase in reliability 
in the investors. 
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2.5 Voluntary Sustainability guidelines  
2.5.1 G4 Sustainability Reporting Guidelines (G4 Standards) 
The G4 standard is a suggested international integrated report developed by the 
GRI with the purpose of helping organizations to prepare their sustainability 
reports, published on October 19, 2016 and valid until June 30, 2018. This guide 
has been developed by a stakeholder process that involved the participation of 
business representatives of companies, auditors, workers, civil society, financial 
markets and experts in different fields together with several government 
agencies and regulators in several countries. 
In addition, in the G4 the standards have been prepared in accordance with 
documents related to internationally recognized reports (GRI, 2016). The 
sustainability guide is presented in two parts. The first part is constituted by the 
principles and standards. This includes disclosures of standards, principles and 
reporting criteria that companies must implement to prepare their sustainability 
report in accordance with the guidelines. This guide includes the following 
sections: 
1. The first section explains to readers how to prepare and structure the 
sustainability report using the guidelines in an interactive way. The preparation of 
this report focuses on the identification of material aspects based on the 
materiality principle. 
2. The second section refers to the criteria that the company must apply. It offers 
two options to help companies prepare their sustainability report according to the 
guidelines. The core option includes the fund against a signature of 
environmental disclosures, governance, social and economic performance. 
On the other hand, the integral option requires developing disclosures of 
additional rules on the governance structure, strategy, analysis and ethics and 
integrity of the company from the central option, as well as informing all 
indicators of material aspects. 
3. The third section indicates the standard disclosure reports through reference 
use, indicating how the information already disclosed in other reports prepared 
by the company has to be informed. 
4. Section four defines and explains all the principles that the organization must 
apply when preparing its sustainability report. The principles that define the 
content of the report include the inclusion of the stakeholders; content of 
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sustainability, materiality and completeness. The principles that define the quality 
of the report encompass balance, comparability, accuracy, timeliness, clarity and 
reliability. 
5. The fifth section describes the different disclosures of standards that can be 
used to produce the sustainability report. This includes disclosures of general 
rules and disclosures of specific rules. Table 2.4 shows the general and specific 
disclosures described in this section: 
 
Table 2.4 
General and specific G4 disclosures 
Disclosure of general standards 
Strategy and analysis G4-1 and G4-2 
Organizational Profile G4-3 to G4-16 
Material aspects identified and borderlines G417 to G4-23 
Stakeholders engagement G4-24 to G4 27 
Profile report G4-28 to G4-33 
Governance G4-34 to G4-55 
Ethics and integrity G4-56 to G4 58 
 Disclosures of specific standards 
Disclosures on Management Approach  G4-DMA 
Economic G4-EC1 to G4-EC29 
Environmental G4-EN1 to G4-EN34 
Social  G4-LA1 to G4-LA16  
Human Rights G4-HR1 to G4-HR12 
Society G4-SO1 to G4SO11 
Product Responsibility  G4-PR1 to G4-PR9 
 
6. Section six explains the quick links in relation to the different areas that need 
to be informed. This includes the relationship between the integrated reports and 
the sustainability report; external assurance; standards related to risk, strategy 
and opportunities; sector disclosures; Principles of the United Nation, 2000; 
guidelines for MNEs, 2011; links with the guiding principles of the UN for human 
rights, 2011 and process to define the content of the report. 
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7. The final section defines the key terms used in the guide. 
On the other hand, the second part of the sustainability guidelines explains how 
to apply the reporting principles to prepare this sustainability or stakeholder 
report, as well as how to interpret the guidelines. This includes defining the 
content of the report and the quality of the report. In addition, this G4 standard 
includes the description of general standard disclosures and specific standard 
disclosures, explaining the appropriate use; description, relevance and link of 
each standard. 
 
2.5.2 Guidance of the oil and gas industry on voluntary sustainability reports 
(IPIECA) 
The global association of the oil and gas industry for environmental and social 
affairs (IPIECA) is a non-profit organization that encourages industry-related 
companies to continue to improve environmental and social problems. This 
organization together with the International Association of Oil and Gas Producers 
(IOGP) and the American Petroleum Institute (API) developed a voluntary guide 
to support oil and gas industry companies to achieve their goals while working to 
improve energy, climate and environmental issues (IPIECA, 2015). The main 
objective of this guide is to help companies improve the structure of the report of 
their stakeholders by addressing voluntary initiatives, as well as mandatory 
sustainability reports in certain countries. 
As the oil and gas sector is essential in today's world, since it provides 
fundamental raw materials and energy for global development, it is an industry 
that constantly seeks for innovative solutions to adapt to new challenges. This 
implies continuous changes and improvements that require investment and 
changes in the infrastructure, processes, technology, health and safety of the 
local community and the environment. The orientation of oil and gas in voluntary 
sustainability reports lead companies to the benefits to communicate the industry 
risk most relevant sustainability issues, becoming transparent and reliable. 
As a dynamic and innovative sector, the industry constantly seeks to adapt to 
new situations and challenges. It invests not only in the search for new oil and 
gas, but also in facilities, infrastructure, technology, local communities, health 
and safety, and the environment. The sector continually examines opportunities 
to meet the growing demand for energy worldwide, while seeking to mitigate 
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impacts of its activities, as well as addressing the potential risks associated with 
climate change. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that many people and organizations around the 
world want to understand the oil and gas business sector and participate in 
dialogue with companies about the effects of their activities: the impacts, 
benefits, risks and compensations. In addition to the annual reports on financial 
performance and other communication initiatives, sustainability reports also 
known as corporate citizenship, corporate responsibility or environmental, social 
and governance reports (ESG): it is an important form of companies in the sector 
to get involved with the stakeholders and help foster informed dialogue. 
The guide has been developed to share good practices throughout the industry 
and to encourage companies, both current and new, to keep their stakeholders 
informed and thereby obtain business benefits. Through communication in its 
most important sustainability issues, the report becomes a reliable source of 
information for its stakeholders. 
The IPIECA guide presents a detailed description of all the indicators, providing 
information on the purpose, scope and how the indicators should be obtained, 
and also describes the various terms and expressions related to the sector, is 
based on general principles of reporting They include the relevance, 
transparency, coherence, integrity and precision that all informants must provide 
as a basis for good practice at the time of reporting. The second section of the 
guide describes the information process and explains the different steps to follow 
when producing the reports and that are listed in Table 2: 
 
Table 2.5 
Steps to follow to generate reports from stakeholders 
Step one 
Articulated strategy and 
strategy 
 
Define the concept of 
sustainability of the company, 
the state of the company's 
vision and explain the strategy 
to be followed by the company 
Step two 
Describe governance and 
management systems 
Describe the governance of 
boars, including roles, the 
frequency of meetings and the 
relationship of any member with 
sustainable problems. 
Additionally, this step describes 
the management systems 
 38 
 
applied in terms of principles, 
values and commitments of the 
company's policy. 
Step three 
Determine and prioritize 
material problems to 
inform 
Identify and prioritize 
sustainability issues based on a 
materiality assessment. This 
step also confirms the coverage 
and review of the problem and 
reflects the materiality process 
in the context of sustainability. 
Step four Select indicator 
Selection of indicators based on 
identified materiality problems. 
These are customized 
indicators relevant to the oil and 
gas industry that inform key 
issues. In addition, this stage 
defines the data that will be 
gathered within the 
organization. 
Step five 
Analyse data and 
incorporate them into the 
narrative 
Evaluates the data obtained 
from the previous section and 
explain the progress of the 
company based on the 
established objectives, as well 
as any possible variation related 
to performance. 
Step six Provide Assurance  
Provides opinion of the 
sustainability content, showing 
the quality of the information 
reported and the general 
reporting principles application. 
Companies generally have 
internal and external audit 
mechanisms in order to assure, 
verify and enhance the 
credibility of the reporting 
process.  
 
In addition, the guide suggests companies that explain their greatest challenges 
to involve their stakeholders in the reporting process, as well as advising 
companies on how to manage their environmental, safety and health risks, and 
their socio-economic impact (IPIECA, 2015) and establishes the guidelines that 
should be considered in the preparation of reports in a more complete and 
detailed than the GRI guide. 
Regarding the differences with the GRI, it can be pointed out that IPIECA's 
mission is the development and promotion of efficient technical solutions, social 
and economically acceptable practices, in relation to the environmental and 
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social aspects of the petroleum industry. The current version of the guide is from 
the year 2015 it has been found that there are several similar indicators in the 
environmental issue in the two methodological proposals of the GRI report, 
IPIECA. 
However, the proposal of the GRI is broader, on the one hand, there are the 
general indicators for all the companies and on the other the sector supplement, 
but the IPIECA guide establishes the guidelines that should be considered in the 
preparation of the reports in more complete and detailed than the GRI guide. The 
IPIECA guide also presents a detailed description of all the indicators, providing 
information on the purpose, scope and how the indicators should be obtained, 
and also describes the various terms and expressions related to the sector. In 
summary, the two guides are complementary and essential to help oil companies 
in the disclosure of their sustainability information. 
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Chapter III 
Literature review 
 
The objective of this chapter is to analyse and critically evaluate the relevant 
theories in the disclosure of risk applied in the context of corporate governance 
and corporate social responsibility (CSR), to generate reports of multinational 
companies (MNCs) of shareholders and stakeholders to inform businesses about 
the prevention of risks in your reports. This chapter is divided into four sections. 
The literature review begins with section 3.1, which focuses on Mandatory and 
voluntary disclosures and its principal theories. Section 3.2 of this section 
explains risk as a form of communication, providing evidence about research on 
quality determinants. Section 3.3 argues the different forms of risk reports that 
can be elaborated by MNCs. Finally, section 3.4 analyses the empirical studies 
that discuss the quality of risk disclosures and the different companies’ 
characteristics studied.  
3.1 Mandatory reporting and voluntary disclosure 
Mandatory reporting and voluntary disclosure of information has become an 
important and frequent way for companies to inform their stakeholders of the 
administration of available resources. In recent years, a growing number of 
companies have voluntarily disclosed information on environmental, political, 
risk, social and governmental aspects. Even when they are not obliged to do so, 
many companies choose to disseminate useful information to evaluate their 
future prospects, thus avoiding that they consider that they hide unfavourable 
information and differentiating themselves from companies that do not manage 
this information well. However, disclosing information can be costly, so 
companies only disclose private information when they believe that the benefits 
they extract, exceed the direct and indirect costs of disclosure. 
With the publication of the main organizations of norms or specific 
recommendations in the area of information disclosures, there have been several 
the authors who worry in studying the degree of fulfilment with the exigencies of 
spreading contained in the norms, or with the impact caused by the obligation to 
adopt a certain standard. Thus, Alves (2005) conducted an analysis of the 
degree of compliance with the recommendations of the Basel Committee on 
operational risk, relative to the largest banks in Brazil and nine US and European 
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banks, identifying an increase in the level of disclosures in the years 2003 to 
2004, to both in Brazil and abroad, and the US banks, as well as the Europeans 
disclosure more information than the banks in Brazil. 
One of the main debates on CSR revolves around whether public or private 
companies should be obliged through laws to prepare sustainability reports or 
reports, so that they report on their impacts, practices and commitments in 
matters of governance, environmental care environment and social impact. In the 
public sphere, engaging state companies in the preparation of sustainability 
reports implies, on one hand, assuming a leading role on the road to good 
corporate governance, caring for the environment, zero tolerance for 
discrimination, good treat of staff, decent wages and possibilities for sustainable 
development 
On the other hand, it supposes adopting, on the part of the States, an exemplary 
role, implementing a policy that promotes transparency and accountability in the 
private sector. In both cases, it is a matter of thinking about final products as 
goods or services, not as the results of economic processes that lead to covering 
other needs, but rather the ways in which that productive process takes place, 
and the social qualities that are being developed that from they depends. 
In the private sphere, more and more are the countries in which annual 
sustainability information is mandatory. In Denmark, large companies must issue 
sustainability reports or account for why they do not. The same happens in South 
Africa with the companies listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange is one of 
the countries that requires mandatory reports on the risk of the stakeholders. In 
this respect Ntim, Lindrop and Thomas (2013) conducted a study to analyse the 
disclosures of corporate risks in South Africa in the pre and post global financial 
crisis (2007-2008) and obtained as a result that there is a significant positive 
correlation between the diversity of the board (ethnicity and gender) and the 
extent of disclosures of corporate risk. They found that some companies are 
more diverse than others. In addition, the empirical results support the 
implications of institutional theories and legitimacy in relation to the reputation of 
the company and its legitimacy before the stakeholders (Ntim and Soobaroyen, 
2012). 
This obligation to deliver sustainability reports aims to stimulate the integration of 
social responsibility to the regular management of companies, through reporting 
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economic, social and environmental management, social variables, such as 
good relations with unions, customers, suppliers, as well as respect for the 
environment, are important issues for investors, decision makers and society in 
general. 
However, in relation to the above, there are contrary positions that ensure that 
CSR policies should not be imposed by legal means but arise from a natural 
evolution of ethics and practices of social responsibility. The consensus is 
growing in around the idea that the implementation of active public policies and 
the demand for social balances will cause firms to increase their sustainable 
awareness and separate it from an attitude that depends only on the good 
predisposition and consideration of entrepreneurs. 
An empirical study carried out by Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey (2015) 
comparing sustainability reports in Germany, the United States and the United 
Kingdom. According to the predictions of the neo-institutional theory of cultural 
and legal values (characteristics of the country) they have a significant effect on 
the mandatory notification of risks. They also found that Germany, which has a 
code law that requires significant levels of mandatory reporting compared to the 
United States and the United States reports are more specific. In addition, 
Elshandidy, Fraser and Hussainey (2015) concluded that the legal and cultural 
values of each country should be taken into account to minimize divergence in 
efforts. In addition, researchers should consider the implications of agency 
theory, as they should be considered in their voluntary disclosure. Elshandidy, 
Fraser and Hussainey (2015) predicted and found a positive association 
between the variations in the mandatory and voluntary risk reports associated 
with the risk levels of the companies. According to the neo-institutional theory, 
they suggest that the implementation of accounting standards is more flexible 
than disclosure risk. 3.1.1. Corporate governance theory 
Corporate governance is defined by Brennan and Solomon (2008) as the 
accepted business practices of public and private organizations that can help 
them to establish rules to govern their relationship with business owners, 
managers and investors. In light of this statement, the definition of corporate 
governance can be derived as the set of rules and other practices that the 
boards of directors carry out in organizations so that they can contribute 
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transparency, responsibility and impartiality in the existing relationship between 
organizations and its stakeholders. 
Hence, the rules of good corporate governance can be a key element to increase 
the value of companies, reduce capital costs and expand the bases in terms of 
investment. A good and healthy governance structure will create the necessary 
conditions for making strategic decisions to increase competitiveness and 
generate value, thereby enhancing the company's attractiveness in the markets. 
In this regard, Said et al. (2009) explain the fact that corporate governance 
policies differ among companies, and also point out that improving the 
effectiveness of corporate governance can lead to a better report and / or 
performance that demonstrates the value and importance of corporate 
governance practices in the preparation of shareholders and stakeholders 
reports, regardless of their different patterns in different companies, hence it can 
be said that corporate governance plays a dynamic role in the disclosure of risk 
and in the presentation of reports, because when organizations do it in terms of 
quality, it leads to productivity, which makes it possible to achieve organizational 
objectives successfully. 
In this way, the best practices in corporate governance in risk management and 
in reporting, point out that in addition to serving the interests of shareholders, 
maintaining a permanent and effective dialogue and encouraging their active 
participation in company decisions and in satisfying the needs of the 
stakeholders such as customers, suppliers and employees, among others. 
On the other hand, it is found that a good corporate governance is responsible 
for the integrity of the financial reporting system of the corporation, where 
managers are responsible for putting in place and supervising the operation of 
systems that allow the company to produce financial statements that represent 
truthfully the financial condition of the corporation and allow investors to 
understand the soundness of its administration, its finances and the risks of the 
corporation (Buendía, 2004). 
In this regard, in relation to risks, it encourages corporations to achieve 
profitability, which satisfies shareholders and stakeholders, because the 
changing risk landscape originates how corporate governance principles should 
evolve in order to respond more effectively and appropriate in relation to 
uncertainty and risk management, to monitor how they are managing and 
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responding to failures to avoid errors, hence the need to adopt a broader 
approach towards the principles of corporate governance to adapt to more 
diverse situations ( Price, 2018). 
Affirming the above the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) noted that in relation to corporate governance, practices in 
regard to risk management should be a new approach to the development of 
corporate governance principles particularly with respect to reputational risks and 
that current corporate governance principles have not proven to be reliable 
during severe financial crises. 
Making the change means that the administration would play a supporting role 
and be involved in the coordination of efforts towards risk management, and 
would encourage employees to report the risks in their workplace to the 
managers, who will communicate and coordinate the information that they must 
address in the reports, which affects their credibility, which creates value in the 
clients and shareholders. 
 
3.1.1. Stewardship theory  
As a reaction to the agency theory, at the beginning of the ninety’s stewardship 
theory emerged (Donaldson and Davis, 1991; Filkenstein and D'Aveni, 1994; 
Davis et al., 1997; 2004; Lee and O 'Neill, 2003 and Waserman, 2006). This 
perspective is a psycho-sociological vision of corporate governance, which 
considers managers as good servants of the organization, that is, assumes that 
the professional managers of any company want to do a good job and act as 
effective administrators of the resources of the company.  
Management theory describes the relationship between the principal and the 
agent, based on the assumption that managers are encouraged to carry out their 
activities in an important way (Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). Davis 
and Donaldson (1991) explain that managers under the assumption of this 
theory, instead of acting as an opportunist administrator, want to do high quality 
work. This is similar to the agency theory, in which Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
explain that the operation carried out by the managers / owners of the company 
can help them in their work. Additional, they explain that managers / owners can 
be helped to maximize their organizational values, explain the differences that 
may exist between how managers say they behave and how their behaviour is 
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perceived by the presidents, as well as with respect to the personal 
characteristics of those and their perceptions of the situation factors of the 
corporation itself. 
Based on the previous assumptions, one of the most important problems that 
arise according to this theory is how to manage successful corporate 
performance. The roots of management theory focus their perspective on 
psychology and sociological aspects, taking into account the human being has 
needs to grow personal, affiliation, self-esteem, performance and self-
actualization (Arthurs and Busenitz, 2003). This theory mentions that the 
administrator is a man who should be collectivist and pro organizational, since 
the manager seeks to achieve the objectives of the corporation. Therefore, the 
theory of administration is congruent with the interest of the organization. 
In this way, Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson points out that stewardship theory 
is similar to agency theory in terms of the owner-manager relationship and is the 
result of the behaviour that both choose. Thus, the manager chooses to behave 
as an agent or as a server based on their personal characteristics and their 
perceptions about certain situational factors. 
Likewise, the principal chooses to create a relationship of one type or another 
depending on his perceptions of those situational factors (of the environment) 
and on the personal characteristics of the manager, so in the theory of 
management assumes that the professional managers of any company want to 
perform a good job and act as effective administrators of the resources of the 
organization, in this case, this attitude will be beneficial for the main owners and 
also for the main manager, their goals and objectives will be achieved by the 
administrator. 
Following this perspective, managers seek protection and maximization of the 
main wealth by performing the best possible way, in this way functions of the 
benefits administrator are exploited (Davis Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). 
The behaviour of managers is such that the behaviours in favour of the company 
are more useful than opportunistic and individualistic ones. As this is his thinking, 
acting according to it and not in a selfish way does not imply a lack of rationality. 
In addition, while not denying that managers can try to maximize their personal 
utility; this theory proposes that the "steward" will not depart from the collective 
interests, since it considers that its objectives are aligned with those of the 
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company that runs (Lane, Cannella and Lubatkin, 1998). According to Vargas 
(2000), following this theory, it can be said that managers are more motivated to 
act as representatives, whose goals are more aligned with those of the owners, 
principal of the relationship, than with their particular interests (Donalson and 
Davis, 1991; Davis et al., 1997). 
In this theory the key artist will be the steward who performs his work with a high 
value of cooperation in the company, even though the main agent and objectives 
are not aligned (Davis Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). Thus, in corporations 
the main function of the governing council is not to ensure compliance with the 
rules and obtain the consent of professional managers, but to work together to 
improve the performance of the company. The role of the professional manager 
is primarily strategic, to add value to higher decisions. (Cornforth, 2002, Vargas, 
2000 and 2001). 
The theory holds that performance variations occur and explain that the 
effectiveness of an action executed by the manager depends on where it is 
located in the structure of the organization, hence the business structure factor 
can be used in the implementation of the strategy for a high corporate 
performance, thus focusing on cooperative societies it can be said that the main 
function of the governing council is not to ensure compliance with the rules and 
obtain the consent of professional managers, but work together to improve the 
performance of the company and the compliance with organizational objectives. 
(Davis and Donaldson, 1991). 
In addition, with respect to the role of the CEO, the design of the organization will 
help them achieve a better performance, so that the CEO is able to achieve total 
authority over their businesses and their position is indisputable and 
unambiguous. In this situation, power focuses on one person. Therefore, this 
theory focuses on empowering and facilitating structures, maintaining that the 
roles of president and CEO will improve effectiveness, producing higher returns 
for shareholders rather than separation roles between the CEO and president 
(Davis, Schoorman and Donaldson, 1997). 
According to all the above, Stewardship theory has a considerable limitation 
when it comes to studying the governance of cooperative societies and is that it 
only takes into account the partners (owners of the company) and the steward 
(the manager), thus not paying any attention to the other interest groups that 
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affect or are more or less directly affected by the cooperative society. On the one 
hand, if the behaviour manifested by the director-managers is closer to the 
model of the agent or the server, while they are assessed, as possible 
explanatory variables of such behaviour, a series of personal or psychological 
characteristics of each of them (needs, commitment and identification with the 
cooperative and the type of power they employ) and their perceptions about 
certain situational or sociological factors (specifically the management 
philosophy and the organizational culture). And on the other hand, the type of 
relationship that the principal chooses, embodied in the president of the 
corporate society, based on his perceptions about the behaviour and personal 
characteristics of the managers. 
 
3.1.2 Institutional theory  
The institutional theory has a descriptive orientation considering the institutions 
as rules of operation of the society, describes the institutions as action of 
government in the organizational fields. The institutions are focal points for 
cooperation and with agents and actors they obtain the achievement of their 
objectives. Institutionalism analyses conflict, power and politics in institutional 
change. There is cooperation between the public and private spheres, between 
the administrative and the political. 
The basic premise of Institutional theory is that institutions can induce firms to 
adopt similar strategies in response to regulatory, normative and cognitive 
pressures derived from institutions (Scott, 2007). This reveals that institutions 
have proven to have a great influence on social and economic behaviour, 
although it must be borne in mind that they can be easily ignored by companies 
(Lee, 2011). Organizations adopt forms of institutionalized behaviour in their 
effort to increase both their external and internal legitimacy (Scott, 1995). 
Fombrun and Shanley (1990) argue that the development and retention of 
institutionalized structures and procedures gives signs of credibility and 
legitimacy to external audiences. 
The central axis of the institutional theory is legitimacy, a key factor for the 
organization (DiMaggio and Powell 1983), they indicate that companies comply 
with both the rules and the belief systems that influence their environment, the 
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basis are the three institutional pillars : regulative, normative and cognitive 
(Scott, 1995), taking differentiating characteristics. 
According to Suchmam (1995), there are three types of legitimacy: pragmatic, 
moral and cognitive. Each of them has a different scope according to perception. 
Pragmatic legitimacy rests on the interests of the specific environment of the 
organization (Schuman 1995). According to this type of legitimacy, relationships 
are established with the environment that can become power relations. The 
organization takes an active role in directing its policies and objectives, which will 
be valued in a positive way in a specific environment, especially by its 
stakeholders. 
Based on moral responsibility, following the perspective of Suchman (1995), the 
organization acts according to what is expected within the social system. This 
acquires an image of adequacy and receives a positive normative evaluation of 
the organization as well as its activities (Parsons, 1960, Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). 
Schuman (1995) recognizes that this deals with a type of legitimacy that is more 
difficult to achieve and less handling. For Castelló and Lozano (2011) interest 
groups attribute this type of legitimacy to the corporation, provided that they 
perceive that they will benefit from the activities of the company. Díez, Blanco 
and Prado (2010) relate the increase of legitimacy with compliance, 
demonstration of values and beliefs of their stakeholders. 
The third type of legitimacy, cognitive, is based on knowledge, rather than 
interest or evaluation (Aldrich and Fiol, 1994). Under this type of legitimacy, the 
organization acquires as its own the belief system developed by professionals 
and scientists, providing a framework of action to the actions carried out by the 
company (Scott, 1995). Díez, Blanco and Prado (2010) identify that 
organizations can gain this type of legitimacy by adopting methods, ideas and 
practices accepted by professionals and scientists in the sector in which the 
organizations operate. The legitimacy of the cognitive organization may collapse 
if the practices are seen as unacceptable (Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). 
CSR practices can be rejected if the stakeholders perceive that they are 
developed merely with the aim of gaining reputation (Castelló and Lozano, 
2011). The same authors mention that the different forms of legitimacy are 
subject to ever more pressure due to the globalization conditions of the 
organizations. Scott (2007) points out that legitimacy is not something that can 
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be traded. On the contrary, it must reflect cultural alignment, normative support 
or consonance between laws and organization. Managers must take into account 
the importance of the long-term legitimacy vulnerability of interest groups (Post, 
Preston and Sachs, 2002, Carroll and Buchholtz 2006, Freeman et al., 2010). 
In addition to the vulnerability of legitimacy in terms of why CSR practices are 
carried out, other factors must be considered, such as the sector to which the 
company belongs as well as the institutional context of the different geographical 
areas. Companies operating in countries with weak governments face great 
challenges in terms of legitimacy, unlike those that operate in well-regulated 
countries. In the latter case, companies expose themselves to losing legitimacy 
because they do not meet the expectations of the stakeholders. The legitimacy 
of a company is evaluated based on the best contribution it could potentially 
make and not in terms of whether it contributes positively to society (Claasen 
and Roloff, 2012). For all these reasons, the care and empowerment of 
legitimacy in organizations is essential. The company can increase its degree of 
legitimacy based on its decisions in such a way that what it determines will 
condition it to gain more or less legitimacy. The performance of the company will 
be analysed, supported or not by its pressure groups. It is deduced, therefore, 
that legitimacy is handling and orientated according to the decisions and 
behaviour adopted by the company in the light of its stakeholders. 
Cognitive legitimacy has much in common with reputation; the fundamental 
difference lies in the nature of the inference, that is, in how one arrives from one 
term to another (Bitektine, 2011). Cognitive legitimacy focuses on similarity while 
reputation on existing differences (Weigelt and Camerer, 1988) compared to 
other organizations (Deephouse and Carter, 2005). Legitimacy and reputation 
are identified as multidimensional constructs (Suchman, 1995, Dollinger, Golden 
and Saxton, 1997, Ruef and Scott, 1998), in such a way that the sets that make 
up both concepts often overlap; they can be correlated as the effect of a 
coincidence to perform the analysis based on the different evaluating criteria 
(Bitektine, 2011). Legitimacy is often calculated by managers (Castelló and 
Lozano, 2011). The companies do not limit themselves to reflect institutionalized 
forms of behaviour but develop strategic responses directed at institutions, in 
order to fill institutionalized gaps proactively (Oliver, 1991).  
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The mismanagement of legitimacy can lead to duplication in it, which leads to a 
marginal decline despite obtaining positive effects. Another consequence of poor 
management is the decline in the own legitimacy that the organization has 
(Palazzo and Scherer, 2006). An excess of information, presentation of 
achievements and challenges by company managers tends to overestimate the 
expectations of stakeholders, which may imply a loss of legitimacy in the 
company (Claasen and Roloff, 2012). Dowling and Pfeffer (1975) describe three 
processes to make an organization legitimate. The first one is to adapt 
production, goals and the operating methods to adjust to the predominant 
definitions in the current legislation. 
In terms of communication, the other two forms are developed. The first through 
the modification of the definition of social legitimacy, so that it adjusts to the 
practices, production and current values of the organization. The second one is 
developed through the identification of symbols, values or institutions with a 
strong base of social legitimacy. A company that manages its legitimacy well can 
be perceived as legitimate either because it acts in accordance with the 
expected social expectations or because it is capable of successfully 
manipulating the expectations and perceptions of these interest groups. 
Company managers must be aware of those aspects that influence the 
legitimacy of the corporation, both in terms of the development of the 
organization's own activities and the scope it may have in the community 
(Claasen and Roloff, 2012). 
With regard to the regulatory pillar, culture implies adopting rules, laws and 
agreements; social structures are acquired through different systems of 
government and power; routines involve the application of standard protocols 
and procedures. The normative pillar captures the culture through shared values 
and normative expectations; the involvement of social structures faces them 
through regimes and systems of authority and routines are based on compliance 
and the performance of duties. The last of the pillars, the cognitive, faces the 
implication of culture through categories, typing and distinctions in structural 
isomorphism, identities are established using social structures and routine 
through performance programs and scripts. 
According to regulatory institutionalism, legitimate companies are those that act 
under the legal requirements, ceasing to have this condition those corporations 
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that are sanctioned. Normative institutionalism interprets that the legitimacy of 
organizations is acquired through a moral obligation, beyond legal requirements. 
This pillar is based on the appropriation of norms and values through the 
accreditation of their behaviour. Each one of the institutional pillars presents 
characteristics that are their own and differentiating from the others. These 
involve a different emphasis based on the commitment they acquire, the logic, 
the mechanisms and the indicators they present. The implications of each of the 
institutional pillars are established according to the routine, the social structures 
and the culture that each of them adopts. 
This theory considers that organizations are economic units that operate within 
contexts formed by institutions that affect their behaviour, imposing expectations 
on them (Campbell, 2007) that lead them to adopt homogeneous behaviours 
(Campbell, 2006; Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2013a; Frías-Aceituno et al., 2012). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) call this process isomorphism and argue that it 
promotes the stability and survival of organizations, facilitating greater 
institutional power and legitimacy. In addition, they estimate that such practices 
emanate from the decision to professionally make the correct normative 
isomorphism, be like other mimetic isomorphism model organizations or comply 
with rules designed by external forces or coercive isomorphism. 
In the case of the public sphere, it is the institutional factors associated with 
external forces or pressures exerted by citizens that initially provoke changes 
(Gallego-Álvarez, Rodríguez-Domínguez and García-Sánchez, 2010), and 
subsequently the behaviour becomes relevant mimetic (Marcuccio and 
Steccolini, 2005) or need to assimilate behaviours to entities of similar 
characteristics in order to avoid negative effects on their reputation. Hence, 
these assumptions reveal that there is a special attention to the environment 
based on the aspects related to the institutional context in which the 
organizations are immersed. This implies that companies are concerned about 
social relationships and the institutions with which they coexist, establishing 
compliance factors and institutional norms as success factors. 
Regarding the disclosure of risks (Di Maggio and Powell, 1983, Oliver, 1991), 
considers that they depend on first consider the cost / benefit uncertainty of the 
disclosure, understandably, managers can consider imitating the disclosures of 
other companies (Dillard, Rigsby and Goodman, 2004), particularly companies 
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with good reputations that by imitating the information in their disclosures, and 
thereby inform that their risk management systems are equivalent to the industry 
standard. 
Companies may differ in the communication of risk according to their 
characteristics, the range of commercial activities, location of activities, factors 
with respect to customers and suppliers and existing plans to deal with 
commercial risks. Ideal is for companies to reveal their risks according to their 
own characteristics because otherwise if companies only provide similar 
disclosures from other companies, they are likely to be general and not specific. 
These general disclosures (Day and Woodward, 2004) will have limited use for 
readers and, unlike analysts, it may be difficult for investors to obtain information 
about companies to assess the risks they face, appreciate the profile and the 
evaluation of the risk and therefore decrease the quality of risk disclosures. 
Company managers may consider that if disclosures are tested and have yielded 
good results they should be retained, since any variation is likely to attract 
unwanted attention. Although in short-term disclosures may seem acceptable, it 
is unlikely to be sustainable, the risks are likely to change, either in its existence 
or intensity. This leads to an important aspect of the institutional theory in risk 
reporting, although the disclosures seem non-specific, this is not necessarily 
because the organization has not been able to identify specific risks. In other 
words, it is probable that the company has adequate systems to identify risks, 
but these may not be disclosed in the reports, which leads to the preparation of 
both low-quality annual and annual reports, because the information transmitted 
is not the timely and adequate. 
The institutional theory is congruent with the cost theory in three different ways. 
First, it predicts that the revelations will be symbolic rather than substantive in 
nature. Second, as mentioned above, there is also a danger that these general 
disclosures may be disconnected from actual risk management practices (Irvine, 
2008). Third, disclosure will become routine and do not change much over time. 
Even when detailed disclosures are provided, they can simply be an exercise in 
reputational risk and management, which can increase costs for investors 
(Rubinstein, 2001), as they do not have useful information for decision making 
since they do not have real risk knowledge, which is a determining factor in the 
quality of the information. This theory considers that organizations are economic 
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units that operate within contexts formed by institutions that affect their 
behaviour, imposing expectations on them (Campbell, 2007) that lead them to 
adopt homogeneous behaviours (Campbell, 2006, Prado-Lorenzo et al., 2013a, 
Frías-Aceituno et al., 2012). DiMaggio and Powell (1983) call this process 
isomorphism and argue that it promotes the stability and survival of 
organizations, facilitating greater institutional power and legitimacy. In addition, 
they estimate that such practices emanate from the decision to professionally 
make the correct normative isomorphism, be like other mimetic isomorphism 
model organizations or comply with rules designed by external forces or coercive 
isomorphism. 
Therefore, it is necessary to consider what kind of activities the company carries 
out in terms of social responsibility, how they are selected, how they are 
evaluated and how they are applied in order to become a responsible and 
legitimate organization. For all this, this theory is useful to analyse risk 
management in the sense that corporations to be able to align legitimacy with 
their stakeholders need to comply with regulations that meet the needs of risk 
communication and compliance of the values and of the established norms to 
demonstrate the solvency of the company to its groups of interest. 
 
3.1.3. Neo institutional theory 
The neo-institutionalism constitutes a set of rules that determine the institutional 
processes from the frameworks of incentives and restrictions imposed on the 
behaviour of the different economic, social and political agents and actors for the 
formulation and implementation of public policies and that have an impact in the 
results measured in terms of growth and development. Neo-institutionalism 
studies the features of economic institutional structures that enable the 
development of people. According to Burgos (2002), neo-institutionalism defines 
legal institutionalism and economic development. He argues that the importance 
of normative reference frameworks and rules of behaviour to guide, constrain, 
and create power in organizations that are they consider consistent cognitive, 
normative and regulatory structures and activities that give meaning to social 
behaviour. The neo-institutionalism emphasizes the institutions that define the 
behaviour of the actors in front of their social environment. The neo economic 
institutionalism analyses the failures of the mechanisms of the state and its 
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inefficiencies as a mechanism of governance and coordination that guarantee 
agreements and commitments on property. 
Regarding the difference of assumptions with institutionalism in reference to the 
role of values, the neo institutionalism is more oriented to cognitive processes, 
while institutionalism emphasizes the issues of influence, coalitions and values of 
competition, along with the power and the informal structures. The new 
institutionalism emphasizes the legitimacy, the involvement of the organizational 
fields and the centrality of the classification, routines, scripts and schemes. The 
new institutionalism serves the organizational fields as units of analysis. The 
institutional processes can give some stability to the organizational fields, 
although these are always evolving and are not static, solving socially negotiated 
consensus differences of interpretation. 
The new institutionalism is based on a methodological individualism that is based 
on the principle that all the results of human actions are explained by the 
individual action whose interactions in the structures legitimize the institutions. 
This methodological individualism tends to incentivize individuals based on their 
actions. 
Most academics in international administration have a narrow view of institutional 
theory centred more on neo-institutionalism (Meyer and Rowan, 1977) and using 
the concepts of organizational field, legitimacy, isomorphism and mechanisms of 
international pressure. The neo-institutional model essentially maintains that 
organizational survival is determined by the degree of alignment with the 
organizational environment and, therefore, corporations have to comply with 
external organizational pressures. These pressures seek to gain legitimacy in 
organizations through institutional and market pressures within their business 
environment (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, Scott, 1995). In this theory, 
companies are considered part of a social system that interacts with society, and 
its objective is to reduce uncertainty and ensure survival and growth (Aguilera 
and Jackson, 2003, Chen and Roberts, 2010). The neo-institutional theory holds 
that an organization, as a community group, encompasses three main pillars: 
regulatory, mimetic and normative (Scott, 1995). 
These pillars generate pressures to which individual organizations respond, so 
taking these assumptions to organizational management as risk regulations and / 
or best practices may vary due to competition, institutional environments and the 
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intensity of those environments. The responses to these factors determine that 
the decisions of the organizations on whether to retain or disclose risk 
information, in a mandatory and / or voluntary manner, are affected by pressure 
whether institutional, regulatory, mimetic and regulatory, which originates an 
institutional context for the disclosure of companies, where managers can 
participate in a more mandatory and / or voluntary disclosure, depending on the 
context of each country. 
In this sense, regulatory or coercive pressure encourages managers to comply 
with mandatory disclosure of risks, while mimetic and / or regulatory pressures 
generate commitment to voluntary disclosure of risks. However, compliance with 
risk regulations may require companies to disclose more risk information 
voluntarily to clarify different aspects, since regulations may be ambiguous or 
context-independent (Weaver, Treviño and Cochran, 1999). Primarily, regulatory 
or coercive pressure, which derives from the legal and political power exercised 
by the state (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995: 35), is likely to affect 
companies' decisions to disclose risk information in mandatory way. The legal 
environment of the companies is a good example of such coercive pressure, 
where the authority of the law is usually above the organizational authority of the 
companies. Recently, there are changes in regulations as the legal environment 
has become more coercive, requiring structural changes in companies to enrich 
their information environments and meet the demands of risk information to gain 
legitimacy. 
In a recent paper, Abraham and Shrives (2014) argue that two competing 
approaches that could explain why companies exhibit information about risk in 
their annual reports. The mimetic aspect of institutional theory holds that 
disclosure of risk is likely to be less useful because managers engage in the 
disclosure of risk as a routine activity. Therefore, the disclosure is likely to be 
symbolic rather than substantive, and as a consequence, will not change over 
time, as any change would attract unwanted attention. In addition, they claim that 
this theory suggests the possible occurrence of decoupling, which suggests that 
the real risks are not reflected in the disclosure of risks. Because disclosure does 
not reflect reality, it is not necessary for managers to review it. 
Based on this theory, companies are unlikely to disclose risk information when 
other companies do not. The second approach has to do with the normative 
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aspect of the institutional theory which holds that the disclosure of risks should 
change over time, as the risks of companies change over time, due to political, 
social, economic and environmental factors. Therefore, the disclosure of risks 
should be discussed in light of the disclosure of the previous year to confirm their 
coherence and authenticity and the current environment. According to 
institutional theory, managers like to reveal more risk information to describe 
their ex ante risks. 
Regarding the present investigation, the estates of this theory are taken into 
account to determine if the notification of mandatory or voluntary risks and risk 
regulations and / or best practices may vary due to competition, institutional 
environments and the intensity of those environments. The responses to these 
factors determine the decisions of the organizations on whether to withhold or 
disclose risk information, in a mandatory and / or voluntary manner. 
 
3.1.4. Stakeholder theory  
The main support of this theory is framed in understanding what are the 
relationships developed between the organization and the society to which it 
belongs, seeking to describe its ways of responding and acting on other subjects 
or organizations of the external and internal environment. Freeman (1983) 
defines the stakeholders as those groups and / or individuals on which the 
organization depends for its survival and in the broadest sense includes the 
groups and / or individuals that may affect or that are affected by the 
achievement of the organization objectives, these include employees, 
customers, suppliers, shareholders, banks, environmentalists, government or 
other groups that can help or harm the corporation. 
Ochoa (2005) states that stakeholder management starts from three 
fundamental premises: 
-The organization is threatened by the continuing tension between the support 
and resistance forces of the organizational actors that constitute its environment; 
-the degree of influence of stakeholders depends on the accumulation of three 
attributes: power, legitimacy and pressing need, which are perceptual 
phenomena constituted socially by stakeholders; 
-administrators and the direction of the signatures; and 
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-the outcome of the organizational strategy is the collective result of the set of 
forces exercised by all the groups of stakeholders that seek the satisfaction of 
their objectives and interests. 
In the same way Freeman (1984) systematizes and delineates a way of 
approaching the stakeholders that gives as a final result. A whole theory of the 
company and the management that sustains that the obligations that are 
established between the organization and stakeholders, has two relevant 
constants: the analysis of the obligations that managers have, as agents or 
representatives, with respect to other interest groups and the deepening of 
representative issues with which managers face in their dealings with the various 
stakeholders. 
In the research by Fernández and Bajo (2012), reference is made to six 
characteristic features of the theory of stakeholders of important consideration 
theory for this research: 
-Any group or individual that can affect or be affected by the achievement of 
business objectives (Fernández and Bajo, 2012, p. 134); 
-The strategic direction of the company should address the achievement not only 
of the own objectives of the shareholders, but of a wider range of stakeholders: 
workers, customers, society as a whole, supplier; 
-To achieve the long-term maximization of the well-being of all stakeholders, the 
condition of allowing the achievement of an economic-financial result capable of 
sufficiently satisfying the expectations of shareholders and stakeholders must be 
met. For this, the management of the company must know what the values are, 
what the interests are, and what the expectations of the different stakeholders. 
-The constant and dynamic interrelationship between the company, business 
management and the moral dimension of business activity and managerial 
action, only this can ensure more full and human ways of life. 
-The outcome of the organizational strategy is the collective result of the set of 
forces exercised by all the groups of stakeholders that seek the satisfaction of 
their objectives and interests. 
-The company must be understood and conceptualized as a set of network 
stakeholders, interacting with each other in a constant and dynamic manner. 
These interactive relationships entail, among other things, the fact that, 
necessarily, there must be divergent and potentially conflicting interests. They 
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also imply the possibility of establishing alliances between different agents or 
groups of interest. 
-The theory of stakeholder management studies business management there are 
elements to delineate a business model and management where the ethical 
dimension can find accommodation in a natural way. 
In another aspect Wartick and Wood (1998), point out the interests of the 
stakeholders, which may be of a material nature that is all that is sought or that is 
being put at risk and question by the very nature of the business: politicians 
referred to the distribution of power and influence; interests of affiliation or 
belonging that point to the desire for belonging of human beings what leads to 
seek to be part of a social network in which to find location and meaning; 
interests related to information: refers to the interest in obtaining information, 
knowledge or opinions seeks to obtain data, relevant news, research results. 
They demand transparency in the information of the organization; the symbolic 
interests that imply fundamental concern in the reputation, the image of the 
company, the perception of the clients, the sense of belonging of the workers 
towards their company, the empathy towards cultural, religious subjects. In 
another perspective Mitchell, Agle and Wood (1997), highlight that stakeholders 
are both internal and external actors, who affect or are affected by the objectives 
or results of an organization, to the extent that they possess power, legitimacy 
and urgency. 
The stakeholder theory is composed of the ethical (moral) or normative branch 
and a positive (managerial) branch (Deegan et al., 2003). The ethical branch of 
stakeholder theory states that all stakeholders have the right to be treated fairly, 
regardless of the power of the stakeholders in the organization (Deegan et al., 
2003). Primary stakeholders are a major component of any organization, 
because the organization ceases to exist without the support of its primary 
stakeholders. 
Secondary stakeholders, on the other hand, can affect or be affected by the 
organization; the affiliation between the two is not as drastic as in the case of the 
main stakeholders. Ethically, the minimum rights of the primary and secondary 
stakeholders are the same and cannot be violated by the organization. The 
administrative branch classifies the different stakeholders into different groups 
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and evaluates the best way in which they can be managed if the organization 
wants to survive (Deegan et al., 2003). 
According to Reed (2008), the stakeholders are most of the operators for whom 
the advancement and the great welfare of the company are of great interest. 
Freeman (1984) characterizes them as any convention or person that can 
influence or be affected by the recognition of the destiny of an organization. 
Moral contemplations are what have promoted the promotion of the 
stakeholders, after having been transmitted to a method for develop your 
regularization point of view the idea is that we are all partners. 
Zellweger and Nason (2008), argue that each stakeholder wishes to be treated 
as a single and unfortunate obligation. Try everyone's event. In addition, they are 
not the owners of the company, but their support is vital for the survival of the 
company, and they have a real right over the company. The comparable thinking 
of these liability relationships applies to various types of entities. In this way, the 
organization acts in accordance with the diverse needs of the stakeholders, such 
as the legitimacy theory. The measure of control of stakeholders over the 
administration is determined by the number of shares it has. 
Stakeholders constitute one of the most important tools in the management of 
custody and control, through stakeholder-organization interaction relationships 
based on responsibility and accountability (Gray, Owen and Adams, 2010), and 
their identification with the concerns of the organization. 
Wartick and Wood (1998), talk about that these groups have interests related to 
the information related to obtaining transparent information on the organization 
and who have different expectations of the organization, and although some 
manage to exert pressure and influence so that their demands are met. In 
general, there are multiple conflicts of interests and from there the asymmetry of 
the information arises, because the manager has data that the stakeholders do 
not know. In order to overcome these difficulties, the organization needs a 
dialogue with their stakeholders to elucidate it and gain its support or approval 
and with-it legitimacy. 
In this regard, the risk report is related to the theory of the stakeholders, because 
as mentioned above, they have an influence on the content of the report that, 
according to the regulations, obliges publicly notified companies to disclose 
information on the various risks in the annual report. 
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In relation to the purpose of the investigation, stakeholder theory will allow to 
verify if there is a lack of previous systematic evidence about the nature and 
quality of the risk disclosures contained in the stakeholder reports, based on the 
fact that each stakeholder has an interest in the transparency of the risk 
information. They want to be treated as unique being your vital support for the 
survival of the company, so that they have a real right over the company and the 
institutions and the fact that the disclosures may be symbolic rather than 
substantive nature entails the danger that these general disclosures may be 
disconnected from real risk management practices and disclosure will become 
routine and does not change much over time, resulting in asymmetry in 
information. 
All these approaches and theories have been developed for understanding the 
implications that have the different stakeholders such owners, managers and 
external parties involved in the business when carrying their tasks. These 
different approaches and theories have been helpful for researchers 
investigating the effectiveness of MNC stakeholders’ reporting practices in both 
developed and developing countries. These theories are connected with 
traditional corporate theories and corporate social responsibility theories 
(Pearson et al., 2008).  
 
The following table shows the main assumption, insights as well as the relevant 
empirical evidence found for the theories discussed.  
 
Table 3.1 
Comparison between Corporate Governance and CSR Theories 
Theory 
Key 
authority 
Main assumptions-
suppositions 
Insights - 
characteristics 
Relevant 
empirical 
evidence 
Stewardship 
theory 
Davis and 
Donaldson 
(1991) 
- Managers perform to do 
a high-quality job; 
- There is not a general or 
inherent executive 
motivation; 
- Consider the human 
being as having higher 
needs for personal grow, 
- It is a principal- 
agent relationship. 
- Goals and 
objectives will be 
achieved by the 
steward. 
- The organization’s 
structure is 
Linsley and 
Shrives (2006) 
H1: there is a 
positive relation 
between firm size 
and quantity of 
risk disclosed 
 61 
 
affiliation, self-esteem, 
achievement and self-
actualization. 
fundamental for 
achieving the 
company’s 
objectives. 
Neo-
Institutional 
Theory 
DiMaggio & 
Powell, 
1991 
Firms face different levels 
of pressure generated 
from regulations and/or 
best practices by their 
competitors 
The organization 
faces different 
pressures to report 
mandatory and or 
voluntary risk 
information in 
different jurisdictions 
Elshandidy, 
Fraser and 
Hussainey (2015) 
H3: legal and 
system and 
cultural values 
explain variation 
in risk reporting 
by companies 
based in different 
countries 
Stakeholder 
theory 
Freeman 
(1984) 
-  Contribute to the wealth-
creating potential of those 
groups who affect or are 
affected by the companies’ 
business performance. 
- Companies look to 
promote a more 
democratic and 
transparent society. 
- The company's 
advancement and 
great wellbeing are 
of prime concern. 
 
Amran, Manaf 
Rosli Bin and Che 
Haat Mohd 
Hassan (2008) 
 H3: there is a 
positive 
relationship 
between size of 
the company 
and risk 
disclosure. 
Legitimacy 
theory 
Dowling 
and Pfeffer 
(1975) 
- Shows integration 
between companies and 
the society  
- Businesses require the 
permission of societies or 
gain approval from them. 
- Highlight how corporate 
management will act in 
response to society 
expectations. 
- Is related to the macro 
level social contract 
between a firm and 
community. 
- Companies obtain 
its legitimacy to exist 
from the larger 
social system 
Ntim, Lindop and 
Thomas (2013) 
H4: There is a 
statistically 
significant 
positive 
association 
between board 
diversity on the 
basis of ethnicity 
and gender, and 
the extent of 
corporate risk 
disclosures. 
Institutional 
Theory 
Meyer and 
Rowan, 
1977 
 
- Take into consideration 
the sector as a whole.  
- Focus on the capability 
of the company to 
accomplish social 
acceptance. 
- Considers regulations as 
a guide for social 
behavior. 
- Highlights the regulative 
impact of the environment 
on companies’ activities. 
- Companies are 
likely to incorporate 
external regulations 
into their businesses 
to gain legitimacy  
 
 
Dobler, Lajili, and 
Zeghal, (2011) 
 
H3: There will be 
no association 
between the level 
of firm risk and 
the quantity of 
risk 
disclosure 
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- Suggests seeking to 
place CSR explicitly within 
a wider field of economic 
governance characterized 
by different modes, 
including the market, state 
regulation and beyond 
 
3.2. Risk management framework 
The concept of risk management involves a set of processes that companies 
need to identify to produce responses in order to control, address, measure and 
evaluate future events. Risk management helps the board to achieve the 
successful performance of the company by ensuring the best practices to comply 
and inform in accordance with the law and the regulatory base of the company, 
to reduce losses and avoid reputational damage (COSO, 2004). However, 
Pritchard et al. (2014) states that shareholders fear the large amount of time that 
needs to be spent in examining and reviewing potential concerns and problems, 
which some of them may never resolve, associated with cost theory. This 
includes the ability to observe the risks mentioned by Kelliher et al. (2012) to 
identify potential opportunities to mitigate risk and increase benefits. However, 
this situation generally depends on the level of decision making to solve a 
problem or mitigate the risk, since this may vary according to the position of the 
level in the company of who identifies it and manages the risk in the different 
sectors (Kawamoto, 2001). 
Hence, there is a variety of alternative risk management frameworks established 
around the world to monitor them depending on the company. While in some 
countries these frameworks are mandatory, as is the case in the United States, 
where public companies must have a financial risk management framework to 
comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). Other countries use non-
mandatory recommended practices for risk management, evaluation and 
mitigation, such as ISO 31000 (International Organization for Standardization, 
2009). 
In this regard, COSO has adapted a framework foreseen for all US public 
companies. UU, which also apply to a number of private companies to comply 
with SOX regulations. This document is an integrated framework that helps 
companies to recognize the risk events that can affect the areas of each sector; 
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in addition, this allows companies to produce accurate and reliable corporate 
information disclosures, which promotes their quality. 
In order to optimize the quality of risk information on from the managers side, 
transparent information is needed, which must seek a balance between risks, 
performance and company growth, which is why COSO identified that risk 
management in the company must be aligned taking into account the following 
aspects: 
-The internal environment of the company; which includes the structure of an 
organization, establishing the alignments of how the risk is seen and managed 
by the employees of the companies; 
-Establish connected objectives and develop alternatives to mitigate the related 
risk; -To take advantage to efficiently identify and understand the risk of internal 
and external companies that affect different parts of the organization, as well as 
opportunities for possible events. 
- Risk assessment: risk analysis taking into account the probability and impact, to 
know how it should be managed and evaluated. 
-Improve the decision of risk responses to recognize and select between 
different responses, avoiding, reducing or sharing risks; 
-To reduce operational losses and surprises, implementing procedures and 
policies to be able to identify possible events and establish responses to control 
them effectively; 
- Be informed about the aspects of the risks, improve and evaluate the allocation 
of capital. This includes effective communication between all parties affected and 
involved in the risks of the companies, allowing employees to provide a rapid 
response. 
-Monitoring and evaluation of the risk management of the company, which allows 
the company to implement the necessary modifications. 
According to the above, business risk management should be a multidirectional 
iterative procedure that relates one component to another, considering several 
aspects to make the most efficient decision, hence the importance of its 
information and disclosure to shareholders and stakeholders in accordance with 
the stakeholder theory. 
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3.2.1 Risk management as a form of communication 
Since the second half of the twentieth century, risk has become a key concept to 
understand the social, political and economic changes that have structured the 
world today. In this regard, business risk management (ERM) is a significant way 
to identify the critical risks that the organization faces, including financial and 
non-financial risks, and then manage and optimize that portfolio in order to obtain 
the necessary financial returns by reducing the uncertainty. Hence the need for 
quality in risk information, a criterion that coincides with Anderson (2005), who 
points out that risk is a top-down approach, supported by an organizational 
strategy, which focuses on new forms of administration and risk optimization. 
In this regard, Kelliher et al. (2012) define it as the possibility of events or 
combinations of events that have an adverse impact on the economic value of a 
company, as well as uncertainty about the outcome of past events. According to 
the foregoing, managers seek new ways to add value to shareholders, for this 
they must innovate in risk management, which are not hazards to be avoided, 
but are opportunities to take advantage of and their efficient management affects 
the success of the business strategy. 
On the other hand according to ISO 31000, the risk is the effect of uncertainty in 
the objectives followed by an economic and coordinated application of resources 
to minimize, monitor and control the probability or the negative impact and 
thereby maximize the realization of opportunities, where risks can come from 
uncertainty in financial markets, threats from project failures at any stage of the 
design, development, production or maintenance of life cycles, legal 
responsibilities, credit risk, accidents, natural causes and disasters, deliberate 
attacks by an adversary, or events of uncertain or unpredictable root cause. 
In this sense, there are two types of events: the negative ones that can be 
classified as risks, while the positive ones are classified as opportunities where 
several risk management standards have been developed, including the project 
management institute, the national institute of standards and technology, 
actuarial companies and ISO standards. In this regard, Shapiro's research 
(2009) discusses about uncertainty and insecurity, pointing out that in globalized 
contexts companies are managed under these concepts and that they will have 
to adapt with the primary objective of subsisting, therefore the need to take 
precedence to the changes that may occur in these contexts after an efficient 
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risk management which is of vital importance, in order to comply with the 
objectives and goals proposed by the company. 
In the accounting area, risk is a broad concept and refers to a series of results 
that arise from a conclusion where probabilities can be assigned (Miller, 1992). 
On the other hand, uncertainty occurs when the probabilities cannot be given to 
a series of results (Watson and Head, 1998), but it also implies positive and 
negative events that in the oil area are mainly related to faults, accidents, 
exposure to losses, damages, pollution, explosions, fires (Sunder, 2015). 
For this reason, risk communication is valuable information if investors are 
provided with risk disclosures in the annual and shareholder reports based on 
previous research and in terms of quality, to avoid making decisions that affect 
the flow of cash or in the commercial operations of the company (Hope et al., 
2016). 
According to the above, risk control is fundamental to direct efforts to avoid 
potential or real damages that prevent profitability, the fundamental objective 
being to minimize the adverse effects of risks, with a minimum cost through 
identification, evaluation and control of them to avoid uncertainty, which 
originates the imperative to know and communicate the risk through strategies 
and a common language and concepts, to ensure that all employees and 
stakeholders understand the objectives and vision of the business, what 
becomes a valuable tool for decision making and in the transmission of quality 
information. 
In relation to risk communication to shareholders and stakeholders, this should 
be considered as a space that makes sense through the discussion of the 
possible threat or its associated benefits. Therefore, its processes imply, among 
others, the impact on the media, institutional information campaigns, information 
dissemination and strategies in the construction of a classification of the risk 
system that varies from one organization to another (Kelliher et al., 2012). They 
refer to how a organization defines and faces the risks, since the ambiguity will 
lead to confusion in the reports and in the risk management, which produces the 
asymmetry of the information, therefore the need for a risk classification system 
which will be analysed below. 
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3.2.2. Typologies to inform and manage risks in companies 
The administration of risks has come to occupy an important place in the modern 
institution, increasingly contributing to the fulfilment of the objectives and goals 
foreseen in the organization. In order to achieve success, any entity must have 
an organized management of risks, hence its importance, which should be based 
on a defined institutional policy and backed by senior management that is 
committed to managing the issue within the organization. This commitment 
includes raising awareness among the entity's officials, making them aware of 
the importance of their integration and participation in this process; the definition 
of a team responsible for leading the exercise and implementation of the 
proposed actions, monitoring and communication to shareholders and 
stakeholders to maximize the creation of value. 
Therefore, there are different ways of approaching the issue of risks depending 
on the size of the entity, objectives pursued, administrative culture, and 
complexity of its operations and the availability of resources, among others. 
Regarding the typology of risks, classifications are identified such as control 
risks, financial risks, operational risks, business or strategic risks, legal risks, as 
well as environmental and safety risks (Ereira, 2007; Hernández - Madrigal et al., 
2012, Höring and Gründl, 2011, Jiang, 2008, Kongprajya, 2010, Meijer, 2011, 
Michiels, 2008, Oliveira and Rodrigues, 2011, Puga, 2012, Vandemaele, 
Vergauwen and Michiels, 2009 and Yampolskaya, 2006), or even approaches 
based on the risks identified in the internal control models of international 
reference (Deumes and Knechel, 2008, Tröster, 2005). In the case of oil 
companies, they apply financial and non-financial, operational, and business 
risks, and these must be disclosed both in the shareholders' report and in the 
annual reports. 
ICAEW 1997 distinguishes between financial and non-financial risks. Financial 
risks are of high importance for financial information, insofar as they can have a 
direct effect on monetary assets and liabilities. And they are, given that they 
result from the possibility that cash flows are not managed properly to maximize 
the availability of money, to mitigate uncertainty in terms of interest rate, 
exchange rate and uncollectible and the possibility of obtaining money with total 
liquidity and without loss of value. In this category would be the price, liquidity 
and credit risks: 
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- Risk of market or price risk, which includes the risks of interest rate, exchange 
rate, variation in the price of shares, of commodities (merchandise / commodity) 
and of financial instruments; 
- Risk of liquidity that includes the risks of cash-flow, opportunity and 
concentration; and, 
- Risk of credit covering the risks of default, concentration, legal and collateral or 
subsidiary guarantees. 
B) Non-financial risks 
Non-financial risks, in accordance with the origin risk factor, are divided into 
external risks (originating from external causes of the company and over which it 
is obviously difficult to act) and internal risks (as a result of internal 
circumstances, related to the business activities and, therefore, can be controlled 
to some extent). 
The effects of external non-financial risks, also known as risks arising from 
social, political or economic phenomena, can only be mitigated through 
contingency plans or insurance policies. Their knowledge is important for 
formulating strategies, taking advantage of opportunities and avoiding threats, 
although they do not have immediate financial repercussions. 
As indicated in the previous paragraph, in the construction of a risk classification 
system in a company, its own factors include business, culture, resources, 
among others. Hence Kelliher et al. (2012), in the elaboration of a system of a 
typology of common risks, seeks to analyse them at a precise level, seeking to 
categorize it according to the types of events that may occur in opposition to the 
causes or impacts that these events may cause depending on the characteristics 
of each company. 
In this regard, it states that companies can have a consistent system to classify 
the risks that meet their own requirements, and it is unlikely that such systems 
are identical between companies. Each system represents a risk tailored to the 
company, with firms that use different terminology for the same risks, or the 
same terminology for completely different risks, based on them these authors 
identified seven types of risks that organizations usually use to inform and 
manage risks and are the following: 
- Market risk: is defined as the result of fluctuation in market prices that can 
cause any loss that affects the performance of the company. This concept is also 
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known as systematic risk or non-diversifiable risk and is assumed for an oil 
company when it decides to invest in a market. 
- Credit risk: is the probability of loss when the counterparty fails to fulfil any 
obligation acquired in the agreed terms. This concept also includes breakdowns 
in terms of losses due to category decreases, time of realization and other 
unfavourable changes in which a company, as in the case of oil companies, is 
exposed. 
- Insurance and demographic risk: It is the risk experienced by the unfavourable 
alteration in life, the general insurer and the pension found a claim. It is a threat 
that affects the financial stability of insurance companies that offer annuity life 
and business insurance. 
- Operational risk: It is the risk of loss arising from the procedures, controls, 
inadequate systems of the company, failures in its internal processes or external 
events, risk of utmost importance in oil companies because it includes the loss of 
overtime and personal temporary contract to solve a problem, in addition to 
considering health, technology, and environment. 
- Liquidity risk: Is the risk that arises from solvency problems when a financial 
asset cannot be sold or bought quickly, in order to have easy access to cash to 
meet the liabilities of the company or to minimize or prevent any loss. 
- Risk of the surplus value and strategy risk: it is the risk resulting from the 
unsuccessful plans to reduce costs, improve procedures or optimize the risk 
profile. It is related to the incorporation of values of existing assets and liabilities 
and the economic value of the company associated with goodwill in regard to 
new commercial initiatives. 
- Frictional risk: It is the risk caused by the variation in the requirements of the 
regulatory, rating and accounting agencies when analysing and evaluating the 
capital of the company. This risk of friction is not only determined by the risk of 
the performance of the commercial enterprise; this is also related to the variation 
in the economic risk profile of incurring an additional cost that may have an 
unfavourable economic value. 
The category also covers fiscal risks, such as changes in the tax regime of 
companies and the specific impacts of the portfolio, such as deferral of tax relief 
due to an adverse business combination. Finally, the category covers any 
increase in the economic capital requirements that arise in the absence of any 
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change in the economic risk profile, due to an increase in the level of confidence 
required. 
The risk classification of Kelliher et al. (2012) was chosen for the investigation of 
the quality of risk disclosure in the shareholders' report, due to the following 
considerations: (a) the classifications use different terms to refer to the same 
risk, (b) use the same nomenclature for completely different risks (Ereira, 2007; 
Hernández-Madrigal et al., 2012), (c) establishes a classification system based 
on events differentiating risk and uncertainty (d) has a bias towards financial 
services which allows evaluating the impact on profitability which influences the 
creation of value of organizations in the oil and gas sector. 
Regarding the difference, they consider that the uncertainty is a deficit of 
information about the types of results that may occur, that may influence future 
results and the probability or impact of various results such as unfavourable, 
expected or favourable; on the contrary the risk is exposure to unfavourable 
results. 
Finally the classification of Kelliher et al. (2012) classifies into six categories of 
first level and sub-categories; that in the case of the investigation regarding the 
operational risk according to the importance in the oil and gas companies, it was 
divided into general and specific taking into account the operations performed. 
Insurance and frictional risks were not considered due to the activities of the 
O&G industry. 
 
3.2.3. Principle of materiality in risk reporting  
The issue of materiality has become important in sustainability reports, because 
in the reporting guidelines of the Global Reporting Initiative, (GRI), they put it as 
the core of the reports, of which all its content depends, within the framework In 
the International Accounting Standards Board, (IASB, 2004), materiality is 
considered as a fundamental qualitative characteristic of financial information, 
and its definition underlines the impossibility of specifying a quantitative 
threshold with a general character to determine whether or not it is met with this 
feature. 
In this regard, material information is of relative importance if its omission or 
inappropriate expression can influence decisions made by users on the basis of 
the financial information of a specific reporting entity. In other words, materiality 
 70 
 
is an aspect of the specific relevance of an entity, based on the nature or 
magnitude, or both, of the items to which the information relates in the context of 
the financial report of an individual entity. 
According to GRI (2005), the aspect of materiality is the process by which it is 
intended to reach an informative level that does not leave aside any significant 
topic for the various interest groups, being considered as a key and specific 
concept that should guide the selection of topics to be included in the annual 
stakeholder report. Therefore, the sustainability report must include all those 
contents that have a direct or indirect impact on the organization's capacity to 
create, conserve or erode both the environmental and the economic and social 
environment. 
For IPIECA (2015), materiality is a management process to determine which 
problems should be reported and the priority and / or prominence of the content 
of the issue within a company's sustainability reports. The materiality process is 
designed to assist companies in communicating sustainability reports under the 
principles of relevance, transparency and integrity and also serves as the basis 
for their continuous improvement, which helps ensure that they respond to any 
major problem of concern to the company, management and / or stakeholders. In 
this way, the scope of the materiality in a sustainability report is more extensive 
than that corresponding to its application within the shareholders' reports, in 
these the materiality is considered as a quantitative threshold, in the field of 
sustainability it is sought to establish. A broader range of effects and not only 
with respect to investors but also with regard to the whole group of interest 
groups or stakeholders and that, according to the GRI, may also take into 
account their effect at the financial level, but this effect may be more diffuse in 
time. In the case of a company's reputation, the effect may be relatively 
immediate, but other effects such as environmental effects may become evident 
only after a longer period. 
The materiality as established by the GRI is something more than the generic 
declaration of complying with a certain principle to become a driving motive that 
should govern a whole process that begins with the identification of the issues 
and issues, as well as its degree of scope, which is considered necessary to be 
included in the report. This identification must be made from the impacts that the 
issues may have on the principle of the context of sustainability in its three 
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dimensions: economic, environmental and social, of the organization itself and in 
its degree of significance for the stakeholders. 
In this way, the materiality information contained in the shareholders' and annual 
report must cover all aspects or indicators that reflect the significant social, 
environmental, and economic impacts of the organization or those that could 
have a substantial influence on the evaluations and decisions of stakeholders 
(IPIECA 2015). Therefore, the coverage of descriptive information should include 
those in which the organization does not exercise control or significant influence, 
but which are related to the main challenges that arise due to significant impacts 
on profitability, therefore it should include complementary information in 
regarding legal and governance requirements (Edgley, Jones and Atkins, 2015; 
Brennan and Gray, 2005). 
 
3.3. Risk disclosure reports  
The disclosure of risk information includes its communication by managers and 
executives, stakeholders and shareholders of a company. The main public 
consists of suppliers of equity capital and debt, but also includes other 
stakeholders, such as government officials, regulatory bodies, tax authorities, 
employees and society in general. 
The information disclosed in both financial and sustainability reports, must 
comply with the fundamental qualitative characteristics of relevance, that is, that 
influences a decision, and reliability, that is, that it constitutes a faithful 
representation of economic reality. The previous described concept of 
materiality, that refers to an accounting rule under which it is determined that 
some principles of accounting do not necessarily have to be applied in case the 
items obtained from an economic activity are irrelevant. This indicates that 
information is important if its omission or misrepresentation could influence the 
decisions of the investors. 
In this way, research on the disclosure of risks to shareholders and stakeholders 
has been based on theories described, in order to explain the reasons why 
companies voluntarily present information about the risks they face. However, 
there is no complete theory that explains the factors involved in the disclosure, 
as pointed out by Abraham and Shrives (2014). 
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In this line, Cabedo and Tirado (2009) point out that the results obtained by 
Botosan (1997), Lang and Lundholm (1996), Botosan and Plumlee (2002), 
Francis, Nanda and Olsson (2008), evidencing that the disclosure of additional 
information in financial reports reduces informational asymmetries and the cost 
of capital of companies. Companies disclose information on risks to reduce 
agency costs and, in this way, reduce information asymmetry problems, as 
reflected by the work of Miihkinen (2013) and Campbell et al. (2014).  
However, according to cost theory derived from disclosure (Verrecchia, 1983), 
the decision to disclose more information can bring losses to the organization of 
competitive advantages caused by the decision to disclose private information, 
which causes competing companies. They may use such information in a 
manner that is detrimental to the interests of the company that discloses the 
information. According to Lajili and Zeghal (2005), the results of their research 
show a high degree of intensity in the disclosure of risks that reflects both, 
mandatory and voluntary risk management disclosures. However, the analytical 
power of such disclosures, as reflected in the risk assessment analysis, seems 
to lack uniformity, clarity and quantification, which potentially limits their 
usefulness and the risk management disclosed by the companies, can offer a 
private knowledge of the business with possible economic disadvantages for the 
company that offers this information. 
On the other hand, in the research of Kajüter, Woods, and Linsley (2007), on 
risks, internal control and corporate governance, in their results it was obtained 
that there is influence in the costs due to the disclosure of external and internal 
risks, likewise, They found that property costs were probably lower for external 
risks than for internal risks of the company. 
In relation to all the above, the disclosure of information is related to agency 
theory in making business decisions and in the process of control of managers 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976) and are related to the presentation of associated 
information to the improvement of the image of the company, the increase of the 
confidence of the investors, greater institutional interest and of the analysts or 
the reduction of the cost of the capital (Easley and O'Hara, 2005). The reality is 
that the disclosure of strategic information presents both a heterogeneity based 
on the geographical location of the company (Santema et al., 2005), and a high 
similarity in terms of content between the periods analyzed, between companies 
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that are quoted or not. In organized secondary markets and between typologies 
of companies serving the consumer of their product (Santema and Van de Rijt, 
2001), being positively influenced by the quotation in international markets (Gray 
et al., 1995) and by the presence of independent directors within of the Board of 
Directors or body in charge of the control of the company (Lim et al., 2007). 
 
3.3.1. Risk reports oriented to shareholders 
In recent years, there has been a substantial change in the way in which risk 
exposures, management and monitoring affect financial operations in the 
rendering of accounts of multinational corporations to shareholders, whose 
content must be a true statement about the evolution of the business and the 
situation of the entity, together with a description of the main risks and 
uncertainties that it faces. 
The demand for information on companies is justified in the need that users have 
to know the evolution, both historical and planned, to form their opinion and base 
their future decisions. Therefore, shareholders must be provided with key and 
easily accessible information on the corporate governance practices applied and 
a description of the main characteristics of the risk management and internal 
control systems related to financial information. 
That is why one of the fundamental components in the shareholder reports is the 
description of operational, financial, market, credit and liquidity risks among 
others, and mention will be made of the objectives and policies of risk 
management those that the entity is more sensitive all this depends on each 
organization, its culture and activity developed, but in a broad classification can 
be financial and non-financial risks. 
On the other hand, the information presented to the shareholders must be 
provided by a communication channel that allows its understanding by the 
shareholders by providing honest, understandable, meaningful, timely and 
openly disseminated information that provides them with a realistic perspective 
of the conditions of the company, as well as the results of the company's 
operations. 
Hence, in preparing the shareholder report, this must contain information 
regarding the risks to which the entity is exposed, in conjunction with the actions 
planned to mitigate them. The description of these risks should cover not only 
 74 
 
the exposure of the entity to negative consequences, but also the potential 
opportunities that may arise in order to properly assess what they are, or may 
be, their effects on profitability and financial situation. Since most of the risks are 
by their nature, foreseeable in advance, the management systems or tools used 
to mitigate their impacts according to their nature and importance will be 
indicated whenever possible, highlighting the priorities if they exist. 
Regarding the factor uncertainty, is one of the main variables that constitute the 
risk activity in the company, it should be noted those that are most worrisome at 
the present time or have been concerned in the year to which the management 
report refers. The entity will indicate its importance, possibilities for it to manifest 
and cause unfavourable evolution and measures that have been taken or can be 
taken in case they are presented, including the existence of contingency plans to 
contain them, in addition, these risk disclosures must report relevant, transparent 
and useful information (Che Haat Mohd et al., 2008). 
According to the above, companies need to inform not only the performance of 
their company mainly, but also the development risks they are facing and other 
actions and skills to control them (Eccles, et al., 2001). However, this area has 
not received the necessary attention from policy makers and regulatory 
authorities since the most recent developments in risk reports mainly include the 
disclosure of specific areas such as type and nature of derivatives, risk 
management policies financial. (Klumpes et al., 2014). 
For this reason, professional organizations such as the operational risk institute 
in the United Kingdom and other European countries (IOR), the Financial 
Information Council (FRC) and other associations are promoting and promoting 
guidelines to encourage companies to inform and disclose its various risks in its 
shareholder and stakeholder reports (Linsley and Shrives, 2006, The Institute of 
Operational Risk, 2014). 
This includes in the shareholder report a range of descriptions such as capital 
assets, cost, decision tree, pricing models, cash flow, the new concept of 
coverage and all the relevant information related to your business proposal. All 
this information is relevant for all parties involved in the business, to reflect and 
measure their performance to improve corporate transparency in an objective 
manner (Deumes, 2008). 
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Corporate information can be represented through a variety of voluntary sources 
of communication, including magazines, newspapers, press reports, brokerage 
boards, shareholders' letters, management forecasts, analyst presentations, 
employee reports, interim reports and annual reports (Healy and Palepu, 2001). 
In developed countries the annual or shareholder report is perceived as the 
important, frequent and main source of information among all other sources 
(Epstein and Pava, 1993, Lang and Lundholm, 1993, Cook and Sutton, 1995, 
Gray and others, 1996 Abu-Nassar and Rutherford, 1996, Bartlett and Chandler, 
1997, Botosan, 1997, Naser and others, 2003, Akhtaruddin, 2005, Alattar and Al-
Khater, 2007, Catasús, 2008, Chau and Gris, 2010). 
In addition, the annual and shareholder reports provide a source of fundamental 
public disclosure information, also the companies' websites can provide 
additional information (Patel and Dallas, 2002) and are considered as the only 
source of formal information in many countries in development (Naser and 
Nuseibeh, 2003; Al-Razeen and Karbhari, 2007), although shareholders can 
access and obtain information directly through contact with management 
companies (Naser and Nuseibeh, 2003). Annual reports are also produced 
regularly and are available to the public. 
In this regard, Lang and Lundholm (1993) argued that the disclosure of the 
annual report is positively associated with the level of disclosure provided by 
other means. Consequently, although corporate information media other than 
annual reports exist, they still serve as a good proxy for the level of risk 
disclosure provided by companies in their financial reports (Lang and Lundholm, 
1993). The financial report aims to convey useful information to the stakeholders 
of the company, especially the shareholders. (Zairi and Letza, 1994). 
In conclusion, the importance of companies publishing information on risks in 
financial reports is supported on two pillars: (a) to enable investors to make 
decisions, facilitating the ability of users to assess the risk profile in which 
companies develop their activities; (b) as a consequence of the need to obtain 
financing to carry out their investment projects, obtaining a positive perception 
among investors about the inherent risk of the company to obtain future cash 
flows that can meet the required returns. 
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3.3.2 Stakeholder risk reports  
Today, stakeholders have asked for more corporate responsibility and more 
transparency in their reports on their participation in the business (Perrault and 
Clark, 2010). However, there are very limited studies on risk reports aimed at 
stakeholders in developed and developing economies, this is due to the fact that 
it has only recently been developed and implemented. 
The stakeholder known as CSR or Sustainability report, is being considered as a 
communication tool that aims to provide information internally and externally 
about the performance of the company, highlighting its development in the 
implementation of CSR practices with the company and its interest groups (Aras 
and Crowther, 2009). Over time, CSR has been gaining importance and in the 
21st century it has become a common word in the business lexicon (Haro et al., 
2012). This report is considered a non-financial tool that demonstrates how a 
corporation deals with and measures its social responsibility problems (Noronha 
et al., 2013). 
The main objective is to provide the necessary information to make decisions 
regarding commercial operations and their development with their stakeholders 
(Tschopp, 2005), is also aimed at informing these groups how they are 
managing the CSR problems within the organization. 
The independent stakeholder report produced by companies has varied in terms 
of format and content (Owen and O'Dwyer, 2008, Shabana et al., 2016). Over 
the years, the development and publication of CSR practices have changed and 
expanded their CSR practices, covering aspects that affect the legal, ethical, 
environmental and economic development of companies towards society, in 
particular towards stakeholders (Kolk, 2008). 
During the last decade, these sustainable practices are commonly being 
disseminated to multinational companies seeking to improve their corporate 
image (Khan, et al., 2009 and KPMG, 2011). Khan, et al. (2009) also point out 
that although it is not currently a legal requirement for many countries and there 
are no established universal guidelines for reporting this type of information, 
companies are expected to do so in order to show transparency in their reports. 
Also, this report is an instrument to improve internal decision-making; the 
relationships of the stakeholders; cost savings; retention to employees and 
improve financial benefits. With the importance given by companies and 
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stakeholders to social responsibility practices, standards, standards, guidance 
and CSR protocol frameworks promulgated by various non-governmental 
regulatory bodies have begun to be a point of reference for professionals, 
actuarial, academics and regulatory bodies (Constantinescu and Kaptein, 2015). 
Since 2014, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) launched the GRI content 
Service Index in order to encourage companies to prepare their CSR reports, 
introduced in 2013 (GRI, 2014). 
This practice has emerged to standardize sustainability reports in format and 
content and to provide issues that should be addressed in the stakeholders' 
report (Shabana et al., 2016). In addition, other organizations, such as the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), have prepared a series of suggestions 
that must be considered, in order to develop the stakeholder participation 
strategy of the corporation. These include methods and frequency for preparing 
reports; the updating of the commitments registered in function of the material 
changes; monitoring of any external observation of publicly available results; and 
the easy comprehension of the publicized information about the format and the 
language. 
These practice of CSR, as well as the shareholder report, improves 
accountability, rationality and decision-making. It is considered that the practice 
of informing shareholders is a good sign to expand the goodwill and 
effectiveness of the organization impacting in the financial performance of the 
company. In business, those who try to survive in this contemporary era, must 
actively participate in social activities and is a key factor in building mutual 
understanding and achieving long-term sustainable growth (Christofi, et al., 
2012). The annual sustainability report also began to be relevant and important 
for government authorities, so much so that in some countries it has become a 
mandatory practice (Noronha et al., 2013). 
 
3.3.3 Integrated reports 
The integrated report is a modality that allows covering the details of the 
resources, their use and their results, being considered fundamental in the field 
of business (Cheng, et al., 2014). In 2010, a council was formed under the name 
of International Integrated Reporting Council with the aim of developing and 
using specific frameworks for the presentation of integrated reports. One of the 
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main motivations behind the formation of this council was to ensure that 
companies and multinationals reported their overall performance in a 
comprehensive manner. 
A template of integrated reports was proposed in Australia, which was based on 
the management of the relationship with shareholders. This was based on the 
observation that existing business reports did not include adequate consideration 
of shareholder problems. Therefore, this framework was proposed in order to 
empower shareholders and provide them with a means to analyse their 
investments through integrated reports (Abeysekera, 2013). 
The disclosure of risks and the possible results of investments is a guarantee to 
ensure that shareholders know the internal environment of the organization. In 
addition, due consideration has been given to the interests of the stakeholders. 
The disclosure of the company's activities is considered a means to achieve 
transparency and accountability to stakeholders (Feng, 2017). 
The GRI has also worked to develop a concrete framework for the development 
of a framework for the presentation of integrated reports. It has been suggested 
that MNCs around the world accept a standard and follow it strictly in their 
annual reports in an integrated form, which mainly includes the declaration of all 
financial and non-financial resources and decisions, together with due 
consideration of the interests of all stakeholders. 
In addition, environmental and ecological concerns have also been considered 
as crucial points of discussion (Fernández-Feijoo, et al., 2014). The GRI together 
with the Institute of Social Responsibility and Ethics have worked for the 
development of an integrated framework for the presentation of reports that can 
serve to provide a way to combat the neglect of social responsibility 
(Abeysekera, 2013). 
The most important objective is to develop and follow a global framework for the 
presentation of these reports, which entails an increase in transparency in the 
different business decisions made by the MNCs. It has been seen that the lack of 
a concrete framework for the presentation of risk reports is creating a gap in the 
maintenance of transparency in business. 
This can only be overcome by developing a framework of work at a global scale, 
not only for the presentation of risk reports but also for the preparation of 
integrated reports (Fernández-Feijoo et al., 2014). Since the integrated 
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information is intended to provide stakeholders and shareholders with a 
complete and clear understanding of all aspects of a particular multinational, it is 
necessary that all follow the suggested framework. In addition, this framework 
can provide the possibility of having access to all information in a single report, 
instead of reviewing several independent reports on finance, governance, 
sustainability and management (Dumay, 2016). 
An integrated information framework can help shareholders and stakeholders 
understand the relationship between financial and non-financial aspects of oil 
and gas companies. In addition, the true relationship and interdependence of 
various resources and results can be understood more clearly if all are reported 
in accordance with the integrated reporting framework. This can ensure that 
there is no room for scandals for directors and owners of MNCs and that they 
can be held responsible for their actions and decisions (Villiers, 2014). 
This standalone can provide a way to ensure that short terms, as well as 
business objectives and long-term investments are met not only for multinational 
companies, but also for stakeholders and all shareholders’ objectives to provide 
a detailed overview of all transactions and decisions of the organization in order 
to present a clear understanding of the business to all stakeholders and 
shareholders. 
It is proposed that this framework include details of each of the decisions and 
financial results, along with the discussion of non-financial aspects (Thomson, 
2015). Consideration of the environment and general ecology has also been 
emphasized in this framework. Experts have proposed that modern stakeholders 
not only include the rich and powerful but must take into account small 
businesses and customers (Sierra, 2015). 
The simplest explanation of the integrated framework can be the idea of 
providing a report that provides an overview of each and every aspect of the 
organization along with clear details about the dependence of each variable on 
the other. This can be considered as a road map or an evolutionary tree, for 
example, that tracks the dependence of different variables and also analyses the 
effects of these variables on each other (Eccles et al., 2015). 
Understanding the increased competition and changing policies of MNCs around 
the world can only be achieved if these organizations at least work to follow the 
suggested framework for integrated reporting (Martinez, 2016). It has been seen 
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that, despite the proposed frameworks and guidelines provided by the IIRC, 
there is still a lapse in the representation of stakeholders' concern (Flower, 
2015). This problem has been associated with the lack of practical guidelines 
and research in the area of integrated reporting. The main problems include the 
lack of understanding among professionals and the lack of clarity of laws that are 
considered to have little practical application (Veltri and Silvestri, 2015). The 
possible measure to overcome this problem as proposed by IIRC is to develop 
separate reports for the disclosure of the company's financial terms and non-
financial aspects (Alexander and Blum, 2016) 
Since its inception, the IIRC has been working to develop a concrete framework 
for the presentation of integrated reports and has also continuously revised the 
guidelines in order to meet the need of the moment (Adams, 2015). In the 
absence of standardized frameworks, there is great variation in the way risks are 
reported, and if companies want to understand the determinants of this variations 
to comprehend what determines the quality of risk reports and highlight the 
challenges presented by a report and that Guideline must addresses. In oil and 
gas companies is slightly different, since they have such a strong set of industry 
guidelines, due to issues of legitimacy, responsibility and risk management. 
 
3.4 Empirical studies  
According to the studies analysed in the quality of risk disclosures, it can be said 
that these are based on content analysis of the information disclosed, based on 
a prior classification of the risks in categories or types of risk. The classification 
of risks in such categories is based, fundamentally, on the creation of a 
disclosure index associated with the type of risk and the reports of shareholders 
and annuals, in a subsequent phase, then serves to the analysis of propositions 
(Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Deumes and Knechel, 2008). In a quantitative 
perspective, the ways to analyze the amount of compliance with risk disclosure, 
pass by counting sentences (Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004, Lajili and Zéghal, 
2005, Linsley and Shrives, 2006), by recording the number of words (Abraham 
and Cox, 2007, Lajili and Zéghal, 2005, Klumpes et al., 2017), or record the 
number of paragraphs. 
In other analyses, studies that classify the information related to risk, are shown 
to be consonant with the nature of the content of the information disclosed in 
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good, bad or neutral (Linsley and Shrives, 2006). In this regard, Linsley and 
Shrives (2006), especially, concluded that the nature of bad news disclosure is 
around 20%, good news 26% and neutral news about 54% of disclosures. 
According to several authors, to improve the quality of risk disclosure it is 
recommended that entities quantify, as far as possible, the risk dimension 
(Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004, Linsley and Shrives, 2006), which makes it 
possible , to the users of the information disclosed, calculate its impact on its 
public of interest. 
The agency theory and the legitimacy theory suggest that larger entities have a 
greater public interest and, as such, present additional disclosure needs, 
supporting the existence of relationship and / or association and / or significant 
differences between the dimension of the entities and the quality of risk 
disclosure (Deumes, 2008; Yampolskaya, 2006). 
Another significant body of empirical research has examined the quality of risk 
disclosures in shareholder reports, in this sense, Abraham and Shrives (2014) 
analysed the relevance of risk factors in the UK food industry during the 2003-
2007 and developed a model to assess the quality of risk disclosures. This 
model consists of three questions that managers can use to assess and evaluate 
the quality of risks (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 3.1 Model to evaluate the quality of risk reports 
 
S. Abraham, P.J. Shrives / The British Accounting Review 46 (2014) 
According to the predictions of these authors are based on the empirical 
implications of property costs theory and are considered of a general nature, 
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which can be reported for any type of company. As managers only report what is 
relevant to them, it is not useful for business stakeholders. 
On the other hand, authors such as Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) propose a 
methodology for measuring the quality of information on risks disclosed by 
companies. The proposal of Beretta and Bozzolan (2004) establishes that the 
quality of the risk information depends on the quantity of the information 
disclosed and the richness of its content. They understand wealth as the 
semantic properties that help users to evaluate the expected impact of such 
information. On the other hand, as can be seen, the quality of the information 
disclosed does not change significantly. That is, despite the pressure exerted by 
regulatory agents and users towards greater transparency, which has forced 
companies to offer a higher level of information on risks, the quality of this 
information has not increased. 
In this sense, Cabedo and Tirado (2009) present a methodology for measuring 
the degree of disclosure of risk information based on its informative content for 
the user, rather than on the quantity. The index proposed by these authors would 
be closer to the concept of quality than to quantity. In effect, the value of the 
index only increases if the published information has an increased informative 
content on which previously it has been supplied. 
Both proposals have been applied to different companies, the first of them by 
Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), to analyse whether the quality of the risk 
information disclosed by Italian companies in financial reports was related to 
various corporate variables. While the dissemination index proposed by Cabedo 
and Tirado (2014) has been used to study the disclosure of risks in the Spanish 
capital market and to analyse whether the risk information disclosed by 
companies listed on the Spanish capital market affects at the cost of own 
resources. 
On the other hand, in an empirical study of sustainability reports, Dilling (2009) 
reviewed the quality of sustainability reports in 25 countries, the results of this 
analysis show that European companies and those based in the energy sectors, 
have more odds of producing high quality sustainability reports. However, this 
study only has a positive impact on the sustainability reports (G3), which have 
been reviewed G4 and. 
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Some other empirical studies (Bachoo, Tan and Wilson 2013); Martínez-Ferrero, 
García-Sánchez and Cuadrado-Ballesteros, 2015) examined the general 
relationship between the quality of financial information and the type and extend 
sustainability reports. These studies in their results highlight that there is a 
positive relationship between the disclosure of CSR and financial reports, but 
none of these studies provide any information about the quality of risk reporting 
practices. 
 
3.4.1 Determinants of the quality of disclosure of risk: Size of the company 
The quality of risk disclosure has been studied by many authors (Salamon and 
Dhaliwal, 1980, McNally and others, 1982, Cowen and others, 1987, Cho and 
Wong-Boren, 1987, Cooke, 1989 and 1992, Wallace and others, 1994, Hossain 
and others, 1994 and 1995, Meek and others, 1995, Raffournier, 1995, Giner, 
1997 and Depoers, 2000) is the explanatory factor par excellence of information 
disclosure (Ahmed and Curtis, 1999). However, since this variable may be 
related to very different corporate attributes, the ultimate reason why larger 
companies reveal more information is unknown (Leftwitch et al., 1981 and Ball 
and Foster, 1982). Among the reasons proposed by these researchers are the 
following indicated by Laffarga, 2002: 
-In the larger companies, the unit cost of elaborating the information is smaller 
and is more probable that the systems and agents involved are more 
sophisticated (Mora and Rees, 1996 and Depoers, 2000). It is even possible that 
the processing cost is zero, since the data may be available in the internal 
information systems (Singhvi and Desai, 1971 and Malone and others, 1993). 
- Equally, the greater the company, the greater will be normally the saving of 
global costs, including those suffered by external agents, which occurs when 
centralizing the company in the elaboration of the information. 
- To a larger extent, it is more likely that society will act in different markets or 
sectors, obtain financing in different countries or have to provide more 
information to the public (Schipper, 1991 and Depoers, 2000). 
In this regard, it can be said that the size of a company is the characteristic most 
commonly analyzed in previous studies to explain the level of risk disclosure 
(Raffournier, 1995, Watson, Shrives and Marston 2002, Bozzolan, Favotto and 
Ricceri 2003, Prencipe 2004, Barako, Hancock and Izan 2006, Bronson, Carcello 
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and Raghunandan 2006, Macagnan 2007) evaluated the size proposition. Large 
companies have a greater number of contracts between managers and 
shareholders than small companies and, therefore, a greater problem in the 
principal agent. A higher level of disclosure could reduce agency costs among 
managers and shareholders. Another motivation for greater disclosure in a large 
company is the existence of a more complete information system, which would 
allow lower costs of obtaining and publishing information compared to those 
incurred by a small company (Watson et al., 2002). It is also understood that a 
smaller company is more vulnerable to a loss of competitive advantage than a 
larger company. 
It can be said according to the analysis of reviewed studies that the corporate 
size is linked to different characteristics that motivate the publication of a greater 
volume of information, such as the increase of external funds needed, 
transparency, the maintenance of a public image, among others, large 
companies resort to capital markets in search of financing more frequently, which 
conditions the quantity and quality of the information that will be disclosed. 
According to Giner (1995), one of the main reasons for the quality of information 
is the need for good relations with capital providers to obtain financing in good 
conditions and potential investors. 
In the same sense, Leftwich et al. (1981), obtain that the proportion of external 
capital tends to be higher for large companies, which are more prone to disclose 
risk to meet the information needs of lenders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In 
addition, larger companies are more visible in markets and in society in general, 
with greater coverage by analysts, and are more politically sensitive to their 
public image. This situation would lead to an increasing number of potential 
users, creating in turn a greater demand for information and pressuring 
companies to communicate truthful and transparent information that allows 
quality in the disclosure of risk. 
In this regard, other studies have found a positive relationship between corporate 
size and the amount of information about risks (Giner 1997, Chen and Jaggi, 
2000, Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Linsley and Shrives (2006), among others). 
In addition, Ahmed and Courtis (1999) and García-Meca and Sánchez (2006) in 
their findings found a positive association between the size of the company and 
the disclosure of voluntary information. 
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On the other hand, Lindsey and Shrives (2006) investigated the empirical 
implications of agency and stewardship theories, the nature of the business and 
the level of risk and the amount of risk reported in non-financial companies in the 
United Kingdom. According to the implication of management theory, they 
discovered that there is a positive relationship between the size of the 
companies and the amount of risk disclosed. However, they also found 
implications of agency theory and found that there is a positive association 
between a risk level and a risk factor for only one of two risk categories. 
Therefore, the results of this study provide support for the theory of 
administration. However, this study was carried out only in one country (UK), 
which has a strong tradition of voluntary reports based on principles. 
This research supports the findings of Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), whose 
research is related to the measurement of the amount of information in financial 
reports in Italian companies, their findings show a positive relationship between 
the company and the size of the risk, and are also consistent with the implication 
of stewardship theory. Manaf Amran Bin Mohd Rosli and Hassan Che Haat 
(2008) examined the risk disclosures in 100 Malaysian companies selected at 
random. According to the implications of stakeholder theory, the authors predict 
that there is a positive relationship between the size of the company and the 
disclosure of risk. Therefore, the results of this investigation show that the size of 
the company matters in the event that the number of stakeholder increases. 
In a comparative study among developed countries, Dobler, Lajili and Zeghal 
(2011) investigated the information on corporate risks attributes in the 
manufacturing sector predict that there is no association amount of risk in the 
companies and the level of disclosure of risks. According to the institutional 
theory, they found that there is a positive, but not statistically significant, 
relationship between these two variables. However, they also found that the 
amount of risk disclosure is highly associated with the size of the company. In 
accordance with the above, the size of the company was selected as a 
determining factor in the quality of the disclosure of risk in the present 
investigation. 
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Chapter IV 
Proposition Development 
 
The present chapter contains the propositions which consist in the tentative 
explanation of the investigated phenomenon formulated as propositions. 
In this regard, Hernandez et al. (2010), point out that within scientific research, 
propositions is the relationships between two or more variables and are 
supported by scientific and systematized knowledge. There is currently little 
systematic evidence on the nature and role of risk reporting practices between 
developed and developing countries. In addition, previous studies reflected in the 
literature did not examine the information practices that adopted the recently 
implemented voluntary guidelines that address CSR risk information practices. 
 
4.1. Proposition System 
In accordance with the above, the propositions that will be contrasted in the 
investigation to determine the quality of risk disclosures are developed. The 
findings to be found are consistent with the empirical implications of stewardship 
theory, institutional and neo-institutional theory in relation to shareholders 
reports. In contrast, the findings of these studies with respect to stakeholder 
information are consistent with stakeholder and institutional theories, theories 
studied in the literature reviewed in the previous chapter. 
 
Then the formulation of the propositions for the present study: 
 
1. Determinants of the quality of the risk disclosures based on (a) quality of risk 
and its listing stock status in developed or developing countries; (b) size of the 
company and; (c) quality of risk disclosure and its relation to industry- specific 
voluntary guidelines as a guide for the preparation of stakeholder reports. 
 
The first proposition is related to the quality of risk disclosures and the firm stock 
market listing status in developed or developing countries. This proposition is 
associated with institutional theory that argues that institutional rules affect 
organizational structures and their performance (Meyer and Rowan, 1992). 
Institutional rules will shape over time the structure of organizations that pursue 
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the goal of social and neo-institutional legitimacy. Neo-institutionalism identifies 
regulatory, cognitive and normative systems as pillars of institutions (Meyer and 
Rowan, 1977). He argues that organizational survival is determined by the 
degree of alignment with the organizational environment and, therefore, 
organizations have to comply with external organizational pressures. Therefore, 
this context of being a developed or developing country influences the quality of 
risk disclosure: 
 
Proposition 1a: There is a positive relationship between companies based in 
developed countries and the quality of the risk disclosures in the shareholders' 
reports of the O & G firms relative to developing countries 
 
 
Proposition 1b: There is a positive relationship between companies based in 
developed countries and the quality of risk disclosures in the stakeholder reports 
O&G firms relative to developing countries 
 
 
The second proposition addresses the relationship between the size of the 
company and the quality of risk disclosures in shareholder and stakeholder 
reports of the O&G companies. Based on the empirical implications of the 
stewardship theory, which assumes that professional managers of any company 
are intended to perform effectively and efficiently when develop their activities.  
 
In relation to the company size and as a result of the analysed literature and the 
results of previous studies, it can be observed that there are common 
characteristics between companies in terms of quality of the information 
disclosed in shareholders and stakeholder reports, indicating that large 
companies (Lindsey and Shrives (2006) Beretta and Bozzolan (2004), Manaf 
Amran Bin Mohd Rosli and Hassan Che Haat (2008), and those based on the 
energy sector (Dilling 2009), are more likely to disclose high-quality information. 
According to institutional theory (Dobler, Lajili and Zeghal, 2011), they found that 
the amount of risk disclosure is highly associated with the size of the company. 
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In this sense, the following propositions have been developed to show whether 
the size of the company shareholders and stakeholders reports is determinant 
company characteristic in what refers to the quality of the risk disclosures in 
developed and developing countries. Therefore, it is predicted that: 
 
Proposition 2a: There is a positive relationship between the size of the company 
and the quality of the risk disclosures in the shareholder reports of O&G firms. 
 
Proposition 2b: There is a positive relationship between the size of the company 
and the quality of the risk disclosures in stakeholder reports of O&G firms. 
 
The third proposition is related to the quality of risk disclosure and its relationship 
to follow the voluntary guidelines for the preparation of firms’ reports. This 
proposition is associated to legitimacy theory that considers that organizations 
are economic units that operate within contexts formed by institutions that affect 
their behaviour, imposing expectations on them (Campbell, 2007) that lead them 
to adopt homogeneous behaviour (Campbell, 2006, Frías-Aceituno et al., 2012). 
DiMaggio and Powell (1983) call this process isomorphism and argue that it 
promotes the stability and survival of organizations, facilitating greater 
institutional legitimacy and power. In addition, they estimate that such practices 
emanate from the decision to professionally do the right thing (normative), to be 
like other organizations (mimetic) or to comply with the rules designed by 
external forces (coercive). 
 
In the present case, the oil companies are the institutional factors associated 
with external forces or pressures that exert that initially cause changes (Gallego-
Álvarez, Rodríguez-Domínguez and García-Sánchez, 2010), after which the 
mimetic behaviour becomes relevant ( Marcuccio and Steccolini, 2005) or need 
to assimilate behaviours to entities with similar characteristics in order to avoid 
negative effects on their reputation. Therefore, it is predicted that: 
 
Proposition 3: There is a positive relationship between the companies that follow 
the voluntary guidelines and their propensity to increase the quality of the risk 
disclosures in the reports of the stakeholders. 
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Chapter V 
Research methods 
 
This chapter describes the qualitative research method that has been 
implemented to evaluate the mentioned propositions. Section 5.1 explains the 
procedures for selecting the samples used to carry out this investigation. Section 
5.2 describes the different sources of data collection used. Section 5.3 defines 
the variables utilised in this research and describes the construction of the risk 
disclosure matrix to carry out the content analysis of shareholders and 
stakeholders’ reports. Finally, section 5.4. explains the methods used to analyse 
propositions. 
Different disclosure indices have been developed to proxy the quality of 
disclosures (Chen et al., 2015; Klumpes et al., 2017). These encompass self-
constructed content analysis (Botosan, 1997; Baretta and Bozzolan, 2007, 
Klumpes et al., 2017), disaggregation quality (Chen et al., 2015), Fog Index (Li, 
2008), among others.  
As have been described by several researches (e.g. Healy, Palepu, 2001; 
Botosan, 2004, 2007) the amount of disclosures (quantity) is a sound proxy for 
measuring quality of disclosures. Thus, a weighted self-constructed index has 
been used in this study to carry out a content analysis to proxy the degree of 
quality disclosure of risk information (Lajili and Zéghal, 2003; Mohobbot, 2005; 
Linsley and Shirves, 2006; Abraham and Cox, 2007 and Klumpes et al., 2107). 
These empirical studies have taken the keywords as a variable of the degree of 
disclosure of risks, that is, the more words a company discloses in their reports, 
the more it is understood that it disclosure more information about risks. 
Considering the similarity of this research with these studies, two self-
constructed index have been elaborated, in order to carry out the stakeholder 
and shareholder content analysis to proxy the quality of risk disclosure. 
Likewise, this research has a qualitative character, based on an empirical study 
that uses content analysis as an objective, systematic and qualitative techniques  
to determine the quality of risk disclosures in shareholder and stakeholder 
reports for the studied period (2016-2017) in developed and developing countries 
in the Americas and Europe. The reports were downloaded from the web pages 
of each selected company on the internet in the period under study.  
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5.1. Sample selection procedures 
The population of the research sample includes shareholder, stakeholder and / 
or integrated reports that include MNCs in the O&G sector headquartered in 
developed and developing countries. The O&G industry was chosen for the 
present analysis for the following reasons: (a) O&G firms have relatively 
significant levels of commercial risk associated with the impact of their activities 
on the natural environment; (b) are subject to a series of strict regulatory controls 
and intense public scrutiny in relation to their compliance with relevant 
environmental, health and safety and social obligations. 
Canada, the United Kingdom and the USA were selected as the sub-sample of 
developed countries, since there is a significant presence of the O&G sector in 
these countries, which have a significant impact and influence on the global 
economy. Brazil, Argentina and Colombia were chosen as the sub-sample of the 
developing markets, since these LATAM countries have shown a significant 
increase in the last 10 years in terms of economic growth. In addition, O&G 
MNCs based in these countries also have significant requirements for national 
regulatory monitoring of their risk management systems to comply with relevant 
licensing obligations.  
Finally, the companies selected in these countries are publicly listed on the stock 
exchanges of these countries and are not state owned. O&G MNCs based in 
these countries were chosen for the following reasons: (a) they have a significant 
presence in the securities markets of these countries; (b) these MNCs have 
similar operating scales and compete directly with each other; (c) compete 
directly with each other in the rising international oil business. Finally, all selected 
countries required O&G firms to comply with harmonized international 
accounting and information standards, as well as with established national 
regulations. 
Table 5.1 summarizes the key characteristics related to the country of origin and 
age of the O&G MNCs sample that were selected for the present analysis. The 
companies were chosen because their central offices and their primary listing are 
based on the relevant national stock markets and were incorporated at least two 
years before the study period. Five companies from three developed countries 
and five companies from three developing countries were selected, with their 
 91 
 
respective shareholder, stakeholder and / or integrated reports that are publicly 
available on their websites during the 2016-2017 period. 
 
Table 5.1 
O&G Sample Firm Characteristics1 
Country 
Classification 
Country 
of origin 
Company 
name 
Year of 
incorporation 
Headquarter 
Stock Exchange 
main listing 
Developed  
Canada Suncor 
Energy 
1919 
Calgary, 
Canada 
Toronto Stock 
Exchange 
UK 
British 
Petroleum plc 
(BP) 
1908 
 
London, 
England 
London Stock 
Exchange 
Premier Oil 
plc (PMO) 
1934 
London, 
England 
London Stock 
Exchange 
USA 
Exxon Mobile 1999 Texas, USA 
The New York 
Stock Exchange 
Chevron 1911 California, USA 
The New York 
Stock Exchange 
Developing  
Argentina 
YPF 1922 
Buenos Aires, 
Argentina 
Buenos Aires 
Stock Exchange  
Petrolera 
Pampa S.A. 
(Now Pampa 
Energía 
08/2018) 
2009 
Buenos Aires, 
Argentina 
Buenos Aires 
Stock Exchange  
Brazil 
Petrobras  1953 
Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil 
Brazil Stock 
Exchange 
OGX Petróleo 
e Gás 
Participações 
S.A (Now 
Dommo 
Energy, 
09/2017) 
2007 
Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil 
Brazil Stock 
Exchange 
Colombia Ecopetrol 1951 
Bogota, 
Colombia 
Colombia stock 
exchange  
Source: Bloomberg; Reuters websites 
 
5.2. Data collection sources 
Data was collected from a range of primary and secondary research sources. 
Primary data sources comprise collected data obtained from shareholder, 
stakeholder and / or integrated reports obtained from the company's websites. 
These include disclosures related to key financial characteristics, relevant 
 
1 There were some changes in the ownership and/or name of the following companies during the 
study period: (1) The company OGX Petroleo e Gas Participacoes SA changed its name in 
September 2017 and is now called Dommo Energia (2) Petrolera Pampa SA was acquired by 
Pampa Energía in August 2018. 
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quantitative and qualitative risk disclosures, and detailed statistical information 
on IPIECA relevant disclosures related to environmental, health and safety and 
social and economic factors and the different types of risk described by Kelliher 
et al. (2012). Secondary data sources comprise a range of publicly available 
corporate governance and cultural factors (e.g. companies listing status). 
The sample period chosen for analysis is the financial reporting period 2016-
2017. This is the first year when relevant IPIECA and G4 guidelines were first 
fully implemented.  
 
5.3 Variable definitions 
This section briefly discusses the dependent, independent and dummy variables 
(companies’ characteristics) used to evaluate propositions described in chapter 
IV. Table 5.2 summarizes the definition of these variables that have been used in 
the empirical tests. 
Table 5.2 
Variable definitions 
Variable Name Label Definition Source 
Disclosure index of quality of 
environmental and financial 
information (accounting, legal or 
moral and environmental indices) 
DISC 
Researcher coded from 
content analysis 
Shareholder or 
Sustainability 
report 
Proposition 1: 
Developed or developing country 
listing status of O&G MNCs 
LIST 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
the firm is listed in a 
developed stock 
market, 0 otherwise 
Developed or 
developing country 
stock exchange 
membership 
Proposition 2: 
Size 
SIZE 
Total assets in USD 
billions as at end of 
2016 and 2017 
ORBIS database 
Proposition 3: 
IPIECA members  
VOLUNT 
Dummy variable = 1 if 
the company is using 
voluntary guidelines, 0 
otherwise 
Shareholder or 
Sustainability 
report 
 
5.3.1 Dependent variables 
Using the risk categories identified by Kelliher et al. (2012) and Based on 
Klumpes et al. (2017) empirical research, a weighted self-constructed index has 
been constructed in this study to carry out a content analysis to empirically proxy 
the quality of risk disclosures. Krippendorff (1990) defined a content analysis as 
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a research technique designed to formulate from certain data, reproducible and 
valid inferences that can be applied to its context. This method uses the 
frequency of selected words as a measure of quantity of disclosures (quality), 
which grows with its frequency of appearance. Further, Groeben and 
Rustemeyer (1994) claim that the content analysis is a tool utilised to 
systematically understand texts and document evidences. This method helps 
researcher to reduce the amount of data in order to make it manageable for 
analysis (Krippendorff, 2004).  
Hence, two separate self-constructed indexes have been elaborated in order to 
carry out the content analysis and examine the quality of the risk disclosures in 
shareholders and stakeholders’ reports. These disclosure indices were prepared 
based on a maximum of 42 points given to the analysis of the shareholder 
reports and 30 points for the stakeholder reports for each different risk identified 
by the risk classification of IPIECA guidelines (2015) and Kelliher et al. (2012). 
These scores were then reweighted to a possible maximum of 100 in order to 
ensure consistency in both matrixes.  
The reports of the shareholders and stakeholder are publicly available on the 
website of the sample of multinational companies identified in table 5.1 and 
analysed for each year 2016 and 2017, consecutively. At the time of the analysis 
the following changes were found in the stakeholder reports noted in table 5.3: 
 
Table 5.3 
Problems encountered in collecting stakeholder reports 
Company Issue 
Ecopetrol 
Produces only an integrated report that contains all shareholder and staked holder 
information consolidated. This integrated report has been used for the evaluation 
of both matrix in regards the key words table build for shareholder and stakeholder 
report and were applied for the analysis of the data    
OGX 
2016 and 2017 stakeholder reports have been revised in Portuguese as the 
English version was not available  
Suncor 
2016 stakeholder reports were not available in pdf format, however this 
stakeholder reports were available online. The revised version was the online 
version converted into PDF format 
Premier Oil 
Stakeholder reports were not available in pdf format, however this stakeholder 
reports were available online. The revised version was the online version 
converted into PDF format 
Exxon Mobile 
For the year 2017, the company reported their sustainability activities in an 
integrated report denominated 2017 Summary Annual Report. In this report was 
reflected all the sustainability activities, however Forbes (2018) claimed that the 
company published their 2016 sustainability report only as an experiment 
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The method implemented to recognize the various risk classifications for 
disclosure indices of shareholder and stakeholder is described below: 
 
The risk categories explained by Kelliher et al. (2012) were chosen to elaborate 
the self-constructed index based, who classifies risk into six major categories of 
first level and these in sub-categories. For each of these major risk categories 
(credit, liquidity, market, operational, and strategic risks), a number of equally 
weighted type of risk disclosures were identified based on keywords that are 
most closely associated with them. These types of risks have been extracted 
from the relevant risk categories identified by Kelliher et al. (2012), i.e. equity, 
default, energy, and solvency. For operational risk, it was divided into two major 
risk categories, general and specific. The general category considers operational 
risks that apply to all type of industries. The specific operation risk category 
includes those related to O&G activities, for which keywords were selected, that 
are more closely associated with the work processes of the O&G industry. Table 
5.4 summarizes the six major categories of first level and sub-categories, 
identified by Kelliher et al. (2012) in their risk classification framework. 
 
Table 5.4 
Kelliher et al. (2012) risk major categories and type of risks  
Major Risk Category Type of risk Brief description 
Market Risk 
Equity Risk of adverse movement in shares 
Property Risk of adverse movements in 
property 
Bonds Risk of adverse changes in bond 
prices 
Commodity Risk of adverse changes in prices of 
commodities and in the cost of carry 
Foreign exchange Risk of adverse changes in foreign 
currency exchange rates 
Inflation Risk of adverse changes in implied 
inflation 
Interest Rate  Risk of adverse changes in base 
rates 
Credit Risk 
Counterparty  Risk of loss through default of a 
counterparty 
Default Risk of losses as a result of default 
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Credit downgrade Risk of loss through downgrade 
Trade debtors Risk arising from default of default of 
trade debtors plus any increase in 
debt provision 
Renegotiation  Changes in debts or agreements 
agreed upon 
Operational Risk (Specific) 
Energy Fires and / or explosions that affect 
people, facilities and equipment 
Safety  Workplace safety practices 
Climate  Risk of adverse effects of 
deterioration in atmospheric 
conditions on productivity 
Environment  Risk of damage due to external 
physical, chemical and biological 
effects 
Technology Potential loss due to damages, 
interruption, alteration or faults 
derived in physical and computer 
systems 
Disaster Risk of loss due to accident caused 
by the activity of the company 
Health Risk of suffering an injury or illness in 
the exercise of their duties 
Liquidity Risk 
Liquidity strain Strains to liquidity position as a result 
of liability related outflows 
Solvency Risk of impairment of liquid 
resources available to meet outflows 
Withdraws Liquidity strains arising from 
corporate outflows 
Collateral calls Liquidity strains due to payment of 
the obligations guaranteed in the 
event of default by a debtor 
Operational risk (General) 
Internal fraud Risk of company’s own staff 
engaging in unauthorized activity, 
theft of resources 
External fraud Risk of 3rd party stealing resources 
Clients and products Risk of loss from failure to act in 
client interest, from flaws in products 
Execution  Failure to properly process 
information 
System failures Risk of loss from failure of computer 
systems 
Business disruption Risk of loss from failure of 
telecommunication systems 
Asset damage  Physical damage to an asset 
 
Strategy 
Macroeconomic Risks of wider macroeconomic 
impacts has adverse impact on 
strategy and sales 
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Competitor Risks to strategy from competitor 
actions 
Political Risk that political uncertainty 
adversely affects demand 
Regulatory Risks to strategy from regulatory 
changes 
Reputation/brand  Risk that poor reputation undermines 
strategy or that a firm brand does not 
support strategic objectives 
Fiscal  Risk of changes in regulatory, 
accounting rules adversely affecting 
firm strategy  
Tax Risk of changes in taxation and 
adverse impact on tax asset 
impairment on strategy 
Kelliher et al. (2012) 
 
On the other hand, the stakeholder risk report index was constructed based on 
the three main risk categories related to CSR that identified in the IPIECA risk 
disclosure guidelines (2015). These risks are related to the environment, health 
and safety and the social and economic problems associated with O&G 
activities. Then a keyword search was conducted to recognize it using this 
classification. Table 5.5 summarizes the various types of sustainability risks and 
their definition for research: 
Table 5.5 
Types of sustainability risks - IPIECA Guidelines (2015) 
Major Risk 
Category 
Type of risk Brief description 
Environmental Risk 
Biodiversity Variability among living 
organisms, including diversity 
within species, between species 
and ecosystems 
Climate change Change in atmospheric conditions 
that affect the activity of the 
company and the environment 
Energy Research, development, supply 
and / or use of energy from non-
fossil fuels, and alternative and 
renewable energy 
Ecosystem Ensure that potential impacts are 
appropriately mitigated, 
associated the potential risks are 
managed effectively 
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Water Essential ecosystem service for 
humans considering the needs of 
people and ecosystems 
Local environment Operations in the exploration, 
production, refining, marketing 
and transportation of oil and gas 
industry can result in impacts on 
the local environment 
Waste Control of waste and garbage 
disposed of resulting from 
operations 
Spill Number and volume of spills 
greater than one barrel (bbl) that 
reach to the environment 
Emission Emissions of greenhouse gases 
Decommission  Planning activities for asset 
forfeiture at the end of its 
operating life cycle 
 
 
Health and Safety 
Risk 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Protection Protection of the work force, 
measurement of incidents 
Health Programs and processes for the 
promotion and prevention of 
health 
Injury injury that impedes the ability to 
deliver an appropriate level of 
work 
Illness Diseases caused by work routine 
Hazardous Toxic material and flammable 
substances in circumstances 
where it could cause illness or 
injury 
Accident Risk in the labour force to suffer a 
labour accident in the labour force 
Explosion Actions that cause serious 
injuries, deaths, property damage 
and / or emissions to the 
atmosphere 
Fire Control of the risk of work 
accidents caused by fire 
Event  Prevention of events that could 
potentially result in damage to 
people, damage to the 
environment and socio-economic 
impacts 
Safety System of mandatory provisions 
that aim to prevent and limit risks 
Social and economic 
Risk 
Community Set of people who live together 
under certain rules or who have 
the same interests 
Society Organized system of relationships 
established between this group of 
people 
Local Regarding the place itself 
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Human rights  Due diligence in the field of 
human rights in the workforce and 
contractors 
Ethic  Values and norms that direct or 
value the behaviour in the 
company 
Corruption  Prevent corruption, including 
giving or receiving bribes 
Transparency  Information in a clear, 
understandable and objective 
manner and in a coherent manner 
that facilitates independent review 
in the disclosure of processes, 
procedures, assumptions and 
limitations that affect the report 
Workforce / Labour Staff / employees 
Grievance  Security of complaint mechanisms 
to promote equity and respect for 
the dignity of workers and 
effective commitment between 
management and the workforce 
Penalty/ Compensation Policies, programs and 
procedures for involuntary 
resettlement, including 
commitment processes and 
practices with communities that 
may be affected 
 
Based on the self-constructed index that used the described risk categories, then 
the dependent variable corresponds to the given total disclosure score per 
company. This was calculated based on the sum of the total score assigned to 
all major risk categories, after carried out the content analysis of every 
shareholder and stakeholder report and the respective risk punctuation given, 
depending on the words' level of occurrence. The process of assigning the 
relevant score will be explained in the following sub-section. 
 
5.3.2. Construction of risk quality index  
Two self-constructed index were elaborated to analyse the quality of the risk 
information disclosed in shareholder and stakeholder reports published by the 
O&G MNCs for the 2016-2017 financial years. Using the principle described by 
Botosan, (2004) and Baretta and Bozzolan, (2007) on their research that estate 
that quantity and quality of disclosures are not separable in some empirical 
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scenarios, then it is assumed on this investigation that quantity of risk disclosure 
can be proxy for the quality of risk disclosure.  
Based on the research carried out by Baretta and Bozzolan, (2007); Horing and 
Grundl (2011) and Klumpes et al. (2014, 2017), that used a content analysis to 
better understand and analyse companies reporting data, a self-constructed 
index for analysing shareholder and stakeholder reports has been constructed. 
This is based on the risk classification described by Kelliher et al. (2012). For 
each of the main risk categories, they were identified according to the disclosure 
characteristics of risks that are most suitable for O&G companies and weighted 
equally according to the keywords that are most closely associated with them. 
The scale of the disclosure was based on a subjective judgment related to the 
frequency of occurrence of the key words. Consistent with the adaptation of 
previous studies (Klumpes et al., 2014; 2017), tables 5.6 and 5.7 have been 
elaborated and reweighted as described in previous section, to identify each of 
the risk elements. Following the subjective judgement given by Klumpes et al. 
(2014, 2017), a score of 1 was assigned where the keyword has been disclosed 
frequently in the report (to be at least six disclosures). A score of 0.5 was 
assigned if the risk indicator is partly disclosure (between 1 and 5 times 
reported); and a score of 0 was assigned if the word was not reported at all. 
Klumpes et al. (2014, 2017) state that a word disclosed more than 6 times is 
sufficient indicative of a company risk disclosure. This approach is consistent for 
both shareholder and stakeholder reports, which resulted in a maximum score of 
7 points per category of risk for the shareholder index matrix and 10 points per 
category of risk for the stakeholder index matrix, then reweighed to 100. The 
disclosure rates given to each of the risk listed in each category is listed below:  
 
Score Condition 
0 if the word does not appear in the report 
0.5 if the word appears between 1 and 5 
1 if the word appears 6 or more times 
 
Table 5.6 shows the weighting for analysing the quality of risk disclosures in 
shareholders reports. 
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Table 5.6 
Shareholder risks disclosures weight 
ID Category Kelliher et al. 2012 items Max Score Weight % 
1 Market Risk 
1 equity risk; 2 property; 3 bond; 4 commodity; 5 
foreign exchange; 6 inflation; 7 interest rate 
7 16,67% 
2 Credit Risk 
8 counterparty; 9 default; 10 bad and/or doubtful 
debt; 11 unpaid rent; 12 credit rating; 13 overdraft; 
14 re-negotiation  
7 16,67% 
3 
Operational 
Risk (specific) 
15 energy; 16 safety; 17 environment; 18 climate; 
19 technology; 20 disaster; 21 health 
7 16,67% 
4 Liquidity Risk 
22 liquidity strain; 23 solvency; 24 withdraws; 25 
collateral; 26 impairment; 27 cash shortfall; 28 
illiquidity  
7 16,67% 
5 
Operational 
Risk (general) 
29 operational loss; 30 fraud; 31 control failure; 32 
defect; 33 system error; 34 business disruption; 
35 asset damage 
7 16,67% 
6 Strategy Risk 
36 macroeconomic impact; 37 competitor; 38 
political; 39 regulatory; 40 reputation/brand; 41 
fiscal; 42 tax 
7 16,67% 
  Total disclosure score  42 100% 
 
Regarding the stakeholder index matrix, the selected words and their weighting 
are reflected in table 5.7: 
 
Table 5.7 
Stakeholder risks disclosures weight   
 
  
Max Weight 
ID Category IPIECA (2015) items 
score % 
1 Environmental 
Risks 
1 Biodiversity; 2 climate change; 3 energy; 4 
ecosystem; 5 water; 6 local environment;7 waste; 8 
spill; 9 emission; 10 decommission  
10 33.333% 
2 Health and Safety 
Risks  
1 protection; 2 health; 3 injury; 4 Illness; 5 hazards; 
6 accident; 7 explosion; 8 fire; 9 event; 10 safety  
10 33.333% 
3 Social and 
Economic Risks 
1 Community; 2 society; 3 local; 4 human rights; 5 
ethic; 6 corruption; 7 transparency; 8 workforce/ 
labour 9 grievance; 10 Penalty 
10 33.333% 
Total disclosure score 30 100% 
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5.3.3. Independent variable 
In order to test P2, size of the company as independent variable is related is 
used, calculated by the total number of assets reported in USD billions at the end 
of 2016 and 2017. This number has been gathered by every company financial 
annual reports in USD, downloaded from OSIRIS database. The corporate size 
is linked to different factors that could lead to a greater volume of risk 
information. Previous studies such as Linsley and Shrives (2006) and Beretta; 
Bozzolan (2004) and Abid (2018), have found that the size is positively related to 
the annual risk report.  
 
5.3.4. Dummy variable / Companies’ characteristics  
Two dummy variables were also developed in this study in order to empirically 
evaluate propositions using qualitative methods and scatter plots. 
  The first company characteristic is related to the status of the O&G MNC 
country list, whether the company is listed as a membership of a developed or 
developing country. This is a categorical variable in which (Yes) has been used 
to show whether the company is listed on a stock market developed or (No) 
otherwise.  
In order to test P3, a dummy variable is used to indicate whether (Yes) if the 
stakeholder reports follow the guidelines established in the IPIECA guide or (No) 
of not following them. 
 
5.4 Data Analysis / Procedure for evaluating propositions  
Content analysis has been carried out to analysed shareholder and stakeholder 
reports of the sample of 5 companies based in developed countries and 5 based 
in developing countries for 2016 and 2017. The sample includes a total of 40 
shareholder and stakeholder reports. 20 shareholders reports; of which 10 
corresponds to firms with headquarters in developed countries for the years 
2016 and 2017 and 10 to companies with headquarters in developing countries 
for the same period; and 20 stakeholder reports, 10 for companies based in 
developed countries and 10 in developing countries for 2016-2017. The content 
of every report was analysed applying the self-constructed index matrix 
elaborated, in order to get the total quality disclosure score by risk category and 
then by company. A keyword search was done to assign the respective score 
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(according to the punctuation criteria) for each type of risks of every major risk 
category. After obtaining the total of the major risk category, the total quality of 
risk disclosure (DISC) was calculated by the sum of all major risk categories 
score result. In order to test P1, P2 and P3 this dependent variable has been 
empirically evaluated, comparing the total score at different levels: 
 
a) comparing the quality risk disclosure at company level; 
b) comparing the quality of risk disclosure by risk category; and  
c) comparing the overall quality of risk disclosure in between developed and 
developing countries.  
 
In order to study the relationship between dependent variable (DISC) index and 
independent variable (SIZE) to test P2, dispersion diagrams were elaborated for 
developed and developing countries in order to evaluate the relationship 
between both associated sets of data. The relationship between the associated 
sets of data are inferred from the shape of the clouds.  
 
Finally, in order to evaluate the last proposition, a set of charts where 
constructed classifying whether the companies follow IPIECA as a voluntary 
guideline in developed and developing countries.  
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Chapter VI 
Empirical analysis  
 
This chapter comments on the empirical analysis of the data described in the 
previous chapter in order to test the research prepositions predicted in chapter 
IV. This analysis has conducted to the following: 
 
6.1 Descriptive analysis: Risk disclosure Index 
This section reports the total quality of risk disclosures in shareholder and 
stakeholder reports of the O&G sample company headquartered in developed 
and developing countries for the analysed period. This includes a graphic 
presentation of (a) risk disclosure at company level; (b) disclosure by risk 
categories (market, credit, liquidity, operational specific / general, liquidity and 
strategy) and (c) a summary of disclosures for shareholder and stakeholder 
reports by sub-samples from developed and developing countries that enable to 
investigate the different tendencies of the risk disclosures in developed and 
developing countries for the period of study. 
 
6.1.1 Shareholder reports analysis 
 
Table 6.1 
Shareholder reports - Total DISC scores by company 2016-2017 
Company 
Kelliher et al. 
(2012) 
Score  2016 
Reweighted 
2016 
Kelliher et al. (2012) 
2017 score 
Reweighted 
2017 
Suncor 22.50 53.57 19.5 46.43 
BP 26.50 63.10 21.5 51.19 
Premier Oil 21.00 50.00 20.00 47.62 
Exxon Mobile 20.50 48.81 18.00 42.86 
Chevron 18.50 44.04 19.00 45.24 
Avg Developed 21.80 51.90 19.00 46.67 
YFP 26.00 61.90 25.50 60.71 
Petrolera Pampa 21.00 50.00 21.00 50.00 
Petrobras 19.00 45.24 13.50 32.14 
OGX 11.00 26.19 12.00 28.57 
Ecopetrol 21.00 50.00 18.50 44.04 
Avg Developing  19.60 46.67 18.10 43.09 
 
 104 
 
Table 6.1 shows the total average of quality of risk disclosures by company 
reweighted (out of a possible 100 score maximum) for shareholder reports, as 
well as the total average DISC calculated for companies based in developed and 
developing companies, separately.  
It can be observed that the average score of quality of risk disclosure (DISC) in 
shareholder reports is higher for the companies headquartered in developed 
countries than the score of the companies based in developing countries, for 
both periods analysed, however the difference between them is not significant. It 
can be also noticed that there is a decrease in the average score from 2016 and 
2017 in both sub-samples (developed and developed). 
 
a) Graphic analysis stage one: Risk disclosure at company level 
 
Figures 6.1 and 6.2 have been elaborated to illustrate the total average risk 
disclosure in the shareholder reports, described in table 6.1. These charts are 
classified by companies based in developed and developing for the years 2016 
and 2017, respectively. 
 
    
 
Figure 6.1 shows the total quality of risk disclosures in shareholder reports based 
in developed countries for 2016-2017. The chart shows that BP, company 
headquartered in the United Kingdom had the highest average of total risk 
disclosures for both periods studied. However, the total average of risk 
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disclosures decreased slightly in 2017. In contrast, the Chevron firm located in 
the US showed the lowest risk disclosure ratio for both periods. The same 
behaviour is observed for all the developed companies’ sample, which shows a 
higher score of risk disclosures in 2016 compared to 2017 (Appendix X1.1 and 
X1.2). 
 
   
 
Figure 6.2 shows the equivalent trends for the sample companies in developing 
countries for 2016-207. The company YPF based in Argentina shows the highest 
total risk disclosures for developing countries, which were nearly identical for 
both study periods. On the contrary, OGX based in Brazil, reported the lowest 
scores of risk disclosure, however, is the only company that shows a small 
improvement in the score for the year 2017 (Appendix X1.3 and X1.4).  
These results support the predictions of P1a that states that companies based in 
developed countries disclosure higher quality of risk in shareholder reports than 
the firms based is developing countries for both periods. However, it is also 
observed that the quality of risk disclosures by firms based in developed 
countries for the year 2017 have decreased and show a similar level of 
disclosure than firms based in developing countries. 
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Generally, based on the perspectives of Kelliher et al. (2012), it can be observed 
that the level of risk disclosure for the majority of the companies correspond to a 
medium level, and that this level varies among the firms and their headquarter 
country location. This is a steady pattern, except for the company OGX based in 
Brazil, which discloses the lowest risk levels in stakeholder reports. 
 
b) Stage two: Risk disclosure at risk category level  
For exploring different patterns on the risk disclosures, figures 6.3 and 6.4 have 
been elaborated, in order to show the breakdown of the average risk disclosure 
trends of the shareholders for 2016-2017, classified by type of risk, for the 
selected sample of companies in developed and developing markets, 
respectively. 
 
 
 
For the selected firms’ sample headquartered in developed countries, figure 6.3 
shows that the operational risk (specific) is consistently the highest risk 
disclosure for both sample periods in developed countries. This is an expected 
result, as have been studied in the literature; O&G companies tend to focus their 
risk disclosures on the main areas that the companies are focused on to carry 
out their operations. Market and strategy risks have also disclosed a significant 
quality of risk in their shareholder reports. These two risks category, have also a 
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significant impact for the company shareholders as these areas reveal the 
necessary information for further investors in terms of companies’ performance 
and strategy. On the other hand, the disclosures of operational risk (general), is 
relatively the lowest for 2016 and liquidity risk for 2017, showing that companies 
in developed countries tent to be less interested in disclosing information about 
their obligations and unfavourable performance. 
Figure 6.4 shows the equivalent trends for developing market sample 
companies. Similar to the trends reported in Figure 6.3 for the equivalent 
developed sample firms, operational risk (specific) is consistently high in both 
years in companies based in developing countries. Additionally, consistent with 
the results shown for companies based in developed countries, firms 
headquartered in developing countries also disclosure an important quality of 
market and strategic risks, in their annual reports for both periods. In contrast, 
the total scores of the operational risk (general), liquidity and credit category are 
relatively low, consistent in both years. However, these ratings are slightly higher 
on average than for sample companies in equivalent developed countries. 
 
 
 
c) Stage three: Overall risk disclosure in developed and developing countries  
 
Figure 6.5 illustrates the total average scores of quality of risk for shareholders 
reports, comparing the sample of companies headquartered in developed 
countries versus those in developing markets, in the 2016-2017 study years.  
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The figure 6.5 shows that the total average score of risk disclosures for the 
sample companies based in developed countries is higher compared to the firms 
based in developing companies. However, the difference between the total 
averages of risk disclosures for developed and developing countries is not 
highly. Additionally, the figure shows that there is a slightly decrease in the total 
average score from 2016 compared to 2017 for both firms’ subsamples, implying 
that there is a reduction in the quality of risk disclosures for the year 2017. 
 
6.1.2 Stakeholder reports analysis 
Table 6.2 shows the total average of quality of risk disclosures by company 
reweighted (out of a possible 100 score maximum) for stakeholder reports, as 
well as the total average DISC calculated for companies based in developed and 
developing companies, separately.  
It can be observed that the average score of quality of risk disclosure (DISC) in 
shareholder reports is higher for the companies headquartered in developed 
countries in 2016 than the score of the companies based in developing 
countries. On the contrary, for the year 2017 the score of the companies based 
in developing countries is higher than the score in developed countries, however 
the difference between them is not significant. It can be also noticed that there is 
a decrease in the average score from 2016 and 2017 in developed sub-samples. 
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Table 6.2 
Stakeholder reports - Total DISC scores by company 2016-2017 
Company 
IPIECA 
score 2016 
Reweighted 
2016 
IPIECA 
score 2017 
Reweighted 
2017 
Suncor 26.50 88.33 25.00 83.33 
BP 23.50 78.33 24.00 80.00 
Premier Oil 26.00 86.67 24.50 81.67 
Exxon Mobile 27.00 90.00 11.00 36.67 
Chevron 21.00 70.00 18.50 61.67 
Developed AVG 24.80 87.13 20.6 68.7 
YFP 22.50 75.00 23.50 78.33 
Petrolera Pampa 0 0 18.50 61.67 
Petrobras 24.50 81.67 26.00 86.67 
OGX 10.00 33.33 11.50 38.33 
Ecopetrol 28.00 93.33 27.50 91.67 
Developing AVG 17.00 56.67 21.40 71.33 
 
a) Graphic analysis stage one: Risk disclosure at company level 
Figures 6.6 and 6.7 have been elaborated to illustrate the total average risk 
disclosure in the stakeholder reports, described in table 6.1. These charts are 
classified by companies based in developed and developing for the years 2016 
and 2017, respectively. 
 
Figure 6.6 illustrates a range of relevant results for the total quality of risk 
disclosures in stakeholder reports of firms based in developed countries for 
2016-2017. The figure shows that the American company Exxon-Mobile reports 
the higher levels of total quality of risk disclosure in its stakeholder reports for 
2016. However, this decreased significantly for the year 2017, due to the 
decision of the company to not continue to produce a separate stakeholder 
report that focuses its content in the three key CSR areas. It can be observed 
that the majority of the sample companies report high levels of CSR risk 
associated in their stakeholder reports for the year 2016, according to IPIECA 
(2015) guidelines; however, the chart shows a decrease of the quality of risk 
reporting for the year 2017 in the majority of the firms except for BP that shows a 
slight increase for 2017 (Appendix X1.1 and X1.2). 
. 
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Figure 6.7 shows that the quality of risk disclosure for companies headquartered 
in developing countries for the study period. The figure shows that the risk 
disclosure score for 2016 is relatively lower in all companies compared to the 
score in 2017, except for the Colombian company Ecopetrol, which shows the 
same total of quality disclosure for both periods. This Colombian firm is the 
company with the highest quality of risk disclosure in both periods of analysis.  
 
 
 
b) Stage two: Risk disclosure at risk category 
Figures 6.8 and 6.9 report the total risk disclosure scores of the stakeholder’s 
reports by risk category for the sample companies in developed and developing 
markets, respectively. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
Exxon Mobile Premier Oil plc
(PMO)
Suncor Energy Chevron British
Petroleum plc
(BP)
Figure 6.6 Stakeholder risk disclosures by company                
Developed sample - 2016 vs 2017
2016
2017
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
80.00
90.00
100.00
YPF Petrolera
Pampa S.A
Petrobras OGX Ecopetrol
Figure 6.7 Stakeholder risk disclosures by company                
Developing sample - 2016 vs 2017
2016
2017
 111 
 
Figure 6.8 shows that companies headquartered in developed countries disclose 
higher quality of risk in the social and economic risk category, followed closely by 
environmental risk and lastly the risk category of health and safety. This pattern 
is consistent in both periods of analysis. It can be also observed that the quality 
of risk disclosure for all risk categories show a constant decrease in the total 
score per risk category comparing 2016 versus 2017.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.9 shows the average risk disclosures of the equivalent stakeholders by 
risk category for sub-sample companies in developing markets for the study 
period. In contrast to the equivalent trends for the sub-sample companies in 
developed countries, this figure shows that there is a constant increase in the 
average of the risk disclosures of the stakeholders for the three main risk 
categories of the stakeholders. Additionally, it is observed that for the year 2016 
the social and economic risk category shows the higher score, however, for the 
year 2017 health and safety and social and environmental risk categories show 
the same score. It is important to notice that companies headquartered in 
developing countries tend to increase the quality of risk disclosure among the 
years, whereas companies based in developed countries tend to decrease their 
quality. 
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c) Stage three: Overall risk disclosures in developed and developing countries 
Figure 6.10 shows the total average of quality of risk disclosure of stakeholder 
reports for 2016-2017 for the companies’ sub-sample headquartered in 
developed and developing countries. It can observe different patterns in the 
chart. Firstly, the figure illustrates that the average of quality of risk disclosures 
for developed countries in 2016 are higher than the ones in developing countries. 
On the contrary, 2017 average score for developing countries is higher than the 
score for developed countries. Generally, while the total average of quality 
disclosure decreased for sub-sample companies in developed countries, it 
increased on average for developing market sub-sample companies from 2016 
to 2017. 
 
 
 
-1.67
3.33
8.33
13.33
18.33
23.33
28.33
33.33
Environmental
Risks
Health and Safety
Risks
Social and
Economic Risks
Figure 6.9 Stakeholder risk disclosures by risk 
category Developing sample -2016 vs 2017
2016
2017
0.00
10.00
20.00
30.00
40.00
50.00
60.00
70.00
80.00
90.00
Developed Developing
Figure 6.10 Stakeholder risk disclosures averages -
Comparison developed vs developing 2016 - 2017
2016
2017
 113 
 
6.2 Descriptive statistics: DISC vs SIZE 
This section shows the descriptive statistics for the dependent and independent 
variables, quality of risk disclosure (DISC) and firm size (SIZE), respectively. 
Scatter plots have been elaborated in order to show the different patterns 
between DISC and SIZE in shareholder and stakeholder reports, of the O&G 
sample companies headquartered in developed and developing countries for the 
study period.  
 
6.2.1 Shareholder reports descriptive analysis  
Table 6.3 shows DISC score reweighted (out of a possible 100 score maximum) 
for shareholder reports and the size by company.  
 
Table 6.3 
Shareholder reports - Total DISC and SIZE scores by company 2016-2017 
Company 
Kelliher et al. 
(2012) 
Score 2016 
Size 
2016 
USD m 
Reweighted 
2016 
Kelliher et al. (2012) 
2017 score 
Size 
2017 
USD m 
Reweighted 
2017 
Suncor 22.50 66 53.57 19.5 56 46.43 
BP 26.50 263 63.10 21.5 262 51.19 
Premier Oil 21.00 6 50.00 20.00 5 47.62 
Exxon Mobile 20.50 330 48.81 18.00 336 42.86 
Chevron 18.50 260 44.04 19.00 254 45.24 
Avg Developed 21.80 180 51.90 19.00 182.6 46.67 
YFP 26.00 26 61.90 25.50 28 60.71 
Petrolera Pampa 21.00 5 50.00 21.00 2 50.00 
Petrobras 19.00 247 45.24 13.50 230 32.14 
OGX 11.00 0.63 26.19 12.00 2.57 28.57 
Ecopetrol 21.00 40 50.00 18.50 40 44.04 
Avg Developing  19.60 63.73 46.67 18.10 60.31 43.09 
 
Figure 6.11 has been elaborated to show the main pattern between DISC and 
SIZE of shareholder reports for the sample companies headquartered in 
developed and developing countries for the studied period.  
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Figure 6.11 
DISC vs SIZE on shareholder reports for companies based in 
 developed and developing countries 2016-2017 
 
 
The chart shows that there is not relationship between the size of the company 
and the quality of risk disclosures in shareholder reports in O&G firms for the 
analysed period. This result differentiates between previous research regarding a 
positive relationship between quality of risk disclosures and firms’ size as was 
predicted in P2a. 
Then, additional patterns have been explored in order to evaluate the 
relationship between DISC and SIZE in developed and developing countries, 
separately. 
Figure 6.12 illustrates the relationship between DISC and SIZE in shareholder 
reports of the sample companies headquartered in developed countries in 2016-
2017. 
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Figure 6.12 
DISC vs SIZE for Shareholder reports in developed countries 2016-2017 
 
 
It can be observed a similar pattern that the one shown in the figure 6.12, 
indicating that there is no relationship in shareholder reports of the O&G sample 
companies headquartered in developed countries for the period 2016-2017. This 
illustration also differs with previous research, indicating that there is not 
relationship between DISC and SIZE in shareholder reports in developed 
countries.  
Figure 6.13 show the relationship between DISC and SIZE in shareholder 
reports of the sample companies headquartered in developing countries in 2016-
2017. 
 
Figure 6.13 
DISC vs SIZE in shareholder reports in developing countries 2016-2017 
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It can be observed a similar pattern as the one shown in developed countries, 
illustrating that there is no relationship between DISC and SIZE in shareholder 
reports of the O&G sample companies headquartered in developing countries for 
the period 2016-2017. 
 
6.2.2 Stakeholder reports descriptive analysis 
Table 6.4 shows the total quality of risk disclosures (DISC) score reweighted (out 
of a possible 100 score maximum) for stakeholder reports. This table includes 
the sample companies based in developed and developing countries for the 
years 2016 and 2017, respectively.  
 
Table 6.4 
Stakeholder reports - Total DISC and SIZE scores by company 2016-2017 
Company 
IPIECA 
score 2016 
SIZE 
Reweighted 
2016 
IPIECA 
score 2017 
Size 
Reweighted 
2017 
Suncor 26.50 66 88.33 25.00 56 83.33 
BP 23.50 263 78.33 24.00 262 80.00 
Premier Oil 26.00 6 86.67 24.50 5 81.67 
Exxon Mobile 27.00 330 90.00 11.00 336 36.67 
Chevron 21.00 260 70.00 18.50 254 61.67 
Developed AVG 24.80 180 87.13 20.6 182.6 68.7 
YFP 22.50 26 75.00 23.50 28 78.33 
Petrolera Pampa 0 5 0 18.50 2 61.67 
Petrobras 24.50 247 81.67 26.00 230 86.67 
OGX 10.00 0.63 33.33 11.50 2.57 38.33 
Ecopetrol 28.00 40 93.33 27.50 40 91.67 
Developing AVG 17.00 63.73 56.67 21.40 60.31 71.33 
 
The previous table shows that the avg score of quality of risk disclosure in 
stakeholder reports in developed countries is higher than in developing countries 
for the year 2016. However, it can be observed that this pattern changes for the 
year 2017, showing a significant increase in the avg score of DISC, being higher 
than the avg of developed countries.    
Figure 6.14 has been elaborated to show the main pattern between DISC and 
SIZE of stakeholder reports of the sample companies headquartered in 
developed and developing countries in the studied period.  
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Figure 6.14 
DISC vs SIZE for Stakeholder report in developed and developing 2016-2017 
 
 
It can be observed in the scatter plot that there is no relationship between the 
size of the company and the quality of risk disclosures in stakeholder reports of 
O&G firms. This result is inconsistent with the predictions of P1b and the 
research carried out by Wuttichindanon (2017) and Khlif and Hussainey (2014), 
which state that there is a positive degree of association between firm size and 
CSR disclosures.   
Then, additional patterns have been explored in order to evaluate the 
relationship between DISC and SIZE in developed and developing countries, 
separately. 
Figure 6.15 illustrates the relationship between DISC and SIZE in stakeholder 
reports of the sample companies headquartered in developed countries in 2016-
2017. 
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Figure 6.15 
DISC vs SIZE for Stakeholder report in developed 2016-2017 
 
 
The graph is consistent with the patterns obtained in the previous scatter plots, 
showing that there is no relationship between the size of the company and the 
quality of risk disclosures in stakeholder reports in O&G firms.  
 
Figure 6.16 
DISC vs SIZE for Stakeholder report in developing 2016-2017 
 
 
The graph shows a slightly different pattern and illustrates a small relationship 
between the size of the company and the quality of risk disclosures in 
stakeholder reports in O&G firms. This result is inconsistent with the predictions 
of P1b and the research carried out by Wuttichindanon (2017) and Khlif and 
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Hussainey (2014), that the degree of association between firm size and CSR 
disclosures are positively associated in developing countries.  
 
6.3 Descriptive analysis: DISC vs Voluntary guidelines in Stakeholder 
reports 
This section discusses the relationship between DISC and companies following 
voluntary guidelines (VOLUNT) in stakeholder reports of the O&G sample 
company headquartered in developed and developing countries for the studied 
period. This includes a graphic presentation of (a) total avg DISC score 
companies following or not IPIECA (2015) as a voluntary risk reporting 
guidelines for the O&G sector; (b) companies base in developed countries 
following or not voluntary guidelines; and (c) companies base in developing 
countries following or not voluntary guidelines. These graphs enable to analyse 
the different tendencies of the risk disclosures in developed and developing 
countries of companies following IPIEACA as a voluntary guideline in O&G 
sector. 
Table 6.5 indicates the total DISC (reweighted) by company indicating if the firm 
follows or not IPIECA (2015) as voluntary guidelines for producing their 
stakeholder reports in developed and developing countries for the analysed 
period. 
Table 6.5 
DISC vs VOLUNT in stakeholder report in  
 the developed and developing companies’ sample in 2016-2017  
LIST Company 
DISC 
Reweighted 
2016 
VOLUNT 
2016 
DISC Reweighted 
2017 
VOLUNT 
2017 
D
e
v
e
lo
p
e
d
 
Suncor 88.33 N 66.67 N 
BP 78.33 Y 80 Y 
Premier Oil 86.67 Y 81.67 Y 
Exxon Mobile 90 Y 36.67 Y 
Chevron 70 Y 41.67 Y 
D
e
v
e
lo
p
in
g
 
YFP 75 N 78.33 Y 
Petrolera Pampa 0 N 61.67 N 
Petrobras 81.67 N 86.67 Y 
OGX 33.33 N 38.33 N 
Ecopetrol 93.33 N 91.67 N 
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It can be observed that most of the O&G companies headquartered in developed 
countries follow international voluntary guidelines IPIECA (2015) in both years, 
except the Canadian firm Suncor, that do not follow IPIECA (2015) guidelines in 
none of the analysed period. On the other hand, it can be noticed that none of 
the companies based in developing countries followed IPIECA guidelines for 
producing their stakeholder reports in 2016, however it can be observed that this 
change in 2017, were YFP and Petrobras started to follow IPIECA guidelines for 
elaborating their stakeholder report. 
 
Tables 6.6 and 6.7 show the total avg score of the sample companies, classified 
in the ones that follow (VOLUNT) IPIECA (2015) for producing stakeholder 
reports and the ones that do not follow it (No-VOLUNT) for the 2016 and 2017, 
respectively.  
 
Table 6.6 
Total avg DISC score of stakeholder reports for 2016  
of companies following IPIECA (2015) 
 
Company LIST 
DISC  
Reweighted 2016 
BP Developed 78.33 
Premier Oil Developed 86.67 
Exxon Mobile Developed 90 
Chevron Developed 70 
Total avg DISC / VOLUNT 81.25 
Suncor Developed 88.33 
YFP Developing 75 
Petrolera Pampa Developing 0 
Petrobras Developing 81.67 
OGX Developing 33.33 
Ecopetrol Developing 93.33 
Total avg DISC / No-VOLUNT 61.94 
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Table 6.7 
Total avg DISC score of stakeholder reports for 2017 
of companies following IPIECA (2015) 
Company LIST 
DISC 
Reweighted 2017 
BP Developed 80 
Premier Oil Developed 81.67 
Exxon Mobile Developed 36.67 
Chevron Developed 41.67 
YFP Developing 78.33 
Petrobras Developing 86.67 
Total avg VOLUNT  67.50 
Suncor Developed 66.67 
Petrolera Pampa Developing 61.67 
OGX Developing 38.33 
Ecopetrol Developing 91.67 
Total avg No-VOLUNT  64.59 
 
Based on previous results, figure 6.17 illustrates the relationship between the 
total avg of DISC of the companies that follow voluntary guidelines (VOLUNT) 
and the ones that not (No-VOLUNT) in the studied period.  
 
 
 
The figure shows that companies following voluntary guidelines report higher 
levels of quality of risk disclosure in both years. However, there are two 
important patterns observed in the total avg DISC in stakeholder reports in both 
sub-samples. Firstly, there is a decreased in the total avg DISC of companies 
following VOLUNT from 2016-2017. Secondly, it is observed an increase of total 
avg of DISC in companies not following VOLUNT from 2016 to 2017. 
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Then, figures 6.18 and 6.19 have been elaborated in order to analyse DISC in 
stakeholder reports for companies that follow the voluntary risk reporting 
guidelines in developed and developing countries, respectively. 
Figure 6.18 shows the total avg of DISC of companies based in developed 
countries for the study period. 
 
 
 
The chart shows that all companies based in developed countries follow IPIECA 
guidelines for voluntary risk disclosures in developed countries. It is also noticed 
that the total DISC score decreased from 2016 compared to 2017. 
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It is observed in the previous graphic that for the year 2016 the sample 
companies based in developing countries do not follow the IPIECA (2015) for 
producing their stakeholder reports. However, it is noticed for the year 2017 that 
this pattern changed, being the total avg of DISC higher for the companies that 
follow IPIECA (2015) than the ones that do not follow this voluntary guideline. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124 
 
Chapter VII 
Discussion  
 
This chapter discuss the analysis of the results obtained in the previous chapter 
and their relationship with the relevant theories evaluated and the propositions 
elaborated. This has conducted to the following observations: 
 
In relation to the quality of risk disclosures of O&G firms and their association 
with their stock listing status (LIST), various patterns have been observed in this 
research. Firstly, to what respects to shareholder reports in developed and 
developing countries, consistent with P1a it is observed that the total average of 
risk disclosures for firms headquartered in developed countries is slightly higher 
to the total avg of DISC in developing countries, however total avg DISC 
between both are very similar for both periods.  
But it can be argued that the marginal difference between the total averages of 
risk disclosures in developed and developing countries is associated to 
accounting standards. Firstly, it is associated to the standardization and 
globalization of accounting principles in developing countries and the increase in 
the requirements for reporting transparent, relevant and useful disclosures in 
firms’ annual reports. In the last decade, Latin American countries such as Brazil, 
Argentina and Colombia have changed from their local accounting principles 
(GAAP) adapted from the US, to international accepted accounting standards 
(IFRS), norms which align companies to report under globalised standardised 
accounting principles. GAAP are considered to be more ruled-based whereas 
IFRS are considered to be a more principle-based, meaning that capture and 
represent economic transitions in a better manner than GAAP. This economic 
transition is mainly related to accounting methods such as classification of 
liabilities, accountability of intangible assets, intangible and fixed assets 
measures, cost classification, among others, undoubtedly affect firms' economic 
transition, which consequently affects risk exposures and financial disclosures in 
the companies. This includes the studied liquidity, strategy, market, credit and 
operational risks identified by Kelliher et al. (2012). 
Different patterns can be noticed in relation to the quality of risk disclosure in 
stakeholders’ reports in each year analysed. In regard 2016, it is observed that 
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the total average DISC for companies based in developed countries is higher 
than the score for the companies based in developing countries, showing an 
inconsistent result in relation to proposition P1b. However, it is also noticed that 
in 2017 the total average of DISC is higher in developing countries than in 
developed countries, being this result consistent with the mentioned proposition.  
It can be said that the results obtained show that the quality of the information in 
annual and stakeholder reports in developed and developing countries are 
consistent with the assumptions of the neo-institutional theory, which show that 
companies based in developed and developing countries respond to high levels 
of regulatory, mimetic and regulatory pressures to reveal their different types of 
risks, in this sense it can be said that in the coercive aspect of Argentina and 
Brazil where the change of government could influence the problem of legitimacy 
in their organizations, therefore through isomorphic processes these 
organizations are socially rewarded with legitimacy. 
In the case of Colombia, the company Ecopetrol is the company with the highest 
quality of disclosure of risks in both periods of analysis, this may be because the 
primary objective of the Colombian company at present is to achieve greater 
growth and competitiveness (Haro et al., 2016), which stimulates isomorphic 
processes in order to be successful in its sector. 
It is also observed that the total average risk disclosures for companies based in 
developed countries is slightly higher, this may be due to a response to 
uncertainty, which is a powerful force that stimulates imitation (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983). Currently, in a globalized world where competition is on first order; 
to survive oil companies must be profitable, which causes imitation to be 
successful, being the result that these companies are increasingly homogeneous 
and highlight the structural isomorphism as an important consequence of both, 
competitive and institutional processes. 
Competition is an approach that could explain why companies exhibit information 
about risk in their annual and stakeholder reports. In this last aspect, CSR is 
considered a voluntary practice for all the countries in the sample, so, based on 
the results obtained, it can be argued that the quality of the risk disclosures of 
O&G companies in the sample depends mainly on the voluntary guidelines 
adopted by each company in the sample for stakeholders reports, as well as the 
increase in pressures from stakeholders. 
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Additionally, firms' internal strategies have been changing, such as is the case of 
the firm Petrobras, which launched a social and environmental program in order 
to focus in the environmental and social areas to develop and improve activities 
with communities, government organizations and civil society. Also, the OGX 
rebranding plan from September 2017 orientated to its commitments with its 
stakeholders.   
It is also seen a decreased in the total average score for the companies based in 
developed countries for the year 2017, being lower than the total average score 
for companies based in developing countries. This result is inconsistent with the 
proposition P1b, as there are various institutional forces that influenced the 
stakeholder reporting practices in the firms for this year. Such as is the case of 
the decision of Exxon Mobile to no produce a separate report to disclosure 
sustainability aspects. Further, an additional external factor influencing 
companies’ strategies is the increases in the oil prices for the year 2017, that 
encourage the business to be more focused on their shareholders than in their 
stakeholders. 
On the other hand in what refers to propositions P2a y P2b and the relationship 
between DISC and SIZE in shareholder and stakeholder reports, the scatter 
plots elaborated for the analysis show that there is no relationship between 
quality of risk disclosures and corporate size for the O&G companies in the 
sample, neither in developed nor in developing countries. This result is 
inconsistent with P2a and P2b and with the findings of Linsey and Shrives 
(2006); Abraham and Cox (2007), and Khlif and Hussainey (2016), who state 
that organisations’ size influences the quality of disclosures. Additionally, this is 
also inconsistent with Botosan (1997), Hail (2002), Botosan and Plumlee (2005), 
Hail and Leuz (2006) and Rakow (2010) results, who noticed a negative 
relationship between the size and quality of risk information. Reverte (2015) 
considers that the size is measured through many indicators that reflect the 
dimension such as the total assets, number of shareholders, number of 
employees among others. Due to the present investigation only utilises total 
assets for measuring the company size, it can be said that this is not considered 
the only indicator for measuring the company size and that other factors also can 
influence in this characteristic and the quality of risk disclosures. 
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In the present investigation, this no relationship is related to the assumptions of 
corporate governance, which indicate that corporate governance policies in 
companies and their effectiveness can lead to a better reporting by showing 
transparency, accountability and fairness. It can be observed in the investigation 
in regard to shareholder reports DISC of the companies with the smallest SIZE 
has a total DISC score over the average of the companies in the sample, but 
relatively close. On the other side, the companies in the sample with the highest 
SIZE have the total DISC under the total average score. With these inconsistent 
results it can be said that SIZE measured in terms of total assets is not an 
indicator for the DISC in shareholder reports. Regarding the proposition P2b a 
similar pattern is observed, being the companies in the sample with small sizes 
such as Ecopetrol and Premier Oil one of the companies that disclosures 
relatively high quality of risk in its stakeholder reports and companies with the 
one of the biggest size in the sample, such as Petrobras and Exxon Mobile 
(2017) companies with score under the total average of DISC score. 
These results also provide support for stewardship theory, as it is assumed that 
the professional managers of any company want to perform professionally and 
act effectively in spreading the risks with the interest placed in the organization. 
In relation to the present study based on these points, the theory of management 
and corporate governance assumes that the professional directors of O&G 
companies want to perform efficiently and act as effective administrators of the 
resources of the organization, which benefit the owners and directives in the 
goals and objectives that will be achieved by the administrator, independently of 
the firm size.  
In relation to the last proposition, it can be observed in both periods analysed the 
main source used for voluntary sustainability reporting for all companies in the 
sample in both periods are the G4 guidelines issued in 2016, which are 
guidelines that asses sustainability reporting addressed to all industries. 
Additionally, it is noticed that in both periods all the companies in the sample 
headquartered in developed countries used IPIECA (2015) as voluntary 
guidelines for their stakeholder reporting. In contrast this O&G voluntary 
guideline has not been used in any of the companies in the sample in developing 
countries for producing their sustainability reports in this year. Based on the 
previous discussion it can be said that institutional pressures and the no 
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adoption of industry specific voluntary guidelines (IPIECA) has influenced the 
DISC in companies based in developing countries. However, another pattern is 
observed for 2017, since the average DISC score obtained by the stakeholder 
reports, as there is an evident increase in the score of the companies in the 
sample based in developing countries. 
This year it can be noted that one of the companies based in Argentina (YPF) 
and one of the companies based in Brazil (Petrobras), began to implement the 
specific guidelines of the industry to prepare their sustainability reports, which 
produces a significant increase in the total average DISC score of the 
stakeholders. Based on the above discussion, it can be said that the non-
adoption of industry-specific voluntary guidelines that cause a decline in 
business development this year as IPIECA guidelines is a focused guide for 
O&G in terms of CSR reporting. 
It can be said that, when developing certain pressures from stakeholders, the 
strategies for companies to increase the quality of their reports affect the 
strategies. For example, it is observed that both Argentine companies have 
significantly increased their score. It can be argued that this is also associated 
with recent changes in government, which has generated more institutional 
pressures on companies to show transparency and accountability to their 
stakeholders. On the other hand, both Brazilian companies have also increased 
their total DISC score due to the same factor, since there was a new 
transactional government since September 2016 that generates institutional 
pressures among the companies. 
In addition, internal strategies have been changing among companies, as is the 
case of the firm Petrobras, which launches a social and environmental program 
to focus on environmental and social areas to develop and improve activities with 
communities, government organizations and civil organizations. society. The 
OGX brand change plan from September 2017, oriented to its commitments with 
the interested parties, has also been a factor that influenced the increase of the 
DISC. 
There is also a decrease in the total average score for companies based in 
developed countries for the year 2017, being lower than the total average score 
for companies based in developing countries. This result is consistent with 
proposition P1a, since there are several institutional forces that influenced the 
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information practices of those interested in companies for this year. Such is the 
case of Exxon Mobile's decision not to produce a separate report to reveal 
aspects of sustainability. An additional external factor that influences is the 
increase in oil prices for 2017, which encourages the business to focus more on 
its shareholders than on its stakeholders. 
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Chapter VIII 
Conclusions 
 
This research compares the quality of risk disclosures in shareholder and 
stakeholder reports for O&G listed companies based in developed (UK, US and 
Canada) and developing countries (Colombia, Brazil and Argentina). The study 
evaluated the relationship between the quality of risk disclosures and the 
company headquartered status (firm size) and their propensity to follow IPIECA 
(2015) as a voluntary industry guideline for producing stakeholder reports. It 
utilises the quantity of risk key words as indicative of quality of risk disclosures 
following Baretta and Bonzolan (2004) approach. Different factors influencing the 
quality of risk disclosures in shareholder and stakeholder reports between 
developed and developing countries have been found in this multi-country 
research. This investigation provides contribution to exiting literature on this topic 
by identifying some of the influencing factors of the quality of risk disclosures in 
O&G companies. 
 
A framework for the analysis shareholder and stakeholder reports is proposed in 
order to measure the quality of risk disclosures that provides voluntary and 
mandatory dimensions. For each type of report (shareholder and stakeholder) 
and relevant type of risk, the discussed index has been calculated for measuring 
the intensity of those risk aspects communicated by firms. The overall index 
result of each report can help stakeholders to profile risk disclosures of every 
company in regards the information supplied. This overall result provides 
relevant information to internal key strategic decision makers within 
organizations and support them in the decision-making process by looking at the 
presented analysis method discussed in this investigation. Therefore, it is 
contended that the index calculated, provides also a forward-looking picture and 
an alternative perspective for external parties that can be of interest in the 
analysis of the business  
 
Risk disclosures in O&G firms are associated to a various internal and external 
factors that influence the company way of reporting their financial and non-
financial risks to their stakeholders. In what refers to the shareholder reports, it 
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can be concluded that companies based in developed countries tend to report 
higher quality of risk disclosures, however the quality of risk disclosures is not 
significantly different due to the accounting standards followed for presenting 
financial reports. Firms based in developed and developing countries which 
report under international accepted accounting standards (IFRS) such as is the 
case of Canada, the UK, Colombia, Argentina and Brazil, tent to approach and 
disclose their financial risks in a similar way and produces higher quality of risk 
disclosure. The fact of being principle based allows the companies to clarify 
more financial areas that are unclear, in order to minimize the company risks 
exposures and report them to the company shareholders.  
The findings of the evaluation of the stakeholder reports suggest that the quality 
of risks disclosures is highly associated with the adoption by companies to report 
their non-financial risks through the use of industry-specific voluntary guidelines 
for their sustainability reporting. IPIECA has developed its guidelines orientated 
to the principal risk exposures in the O&G sector, being these associated with 
the activities that companies perform. This makes that companies that report 
their principal non-financial risks disclosures are highly focused to environmental; 
health and safety and social; and economic in the O&G industry which in some 
cases might differ from other industries.  
Additionally, the findings also show that the quality of risk disclosure can be also 
influenced for stakeholders’ pressures that cause businesses to change their 
reporting approach, in both developed and developing countries. These have a 
significant impact in the companies’ internal strategies, at the time of reporting 
transparency and accountability of their risks. 
Company size in terms of total assets is not an influencing company 
characteristic for quality of risk disclosure neither for shareholder reports nor for 
stakeholder report for companies, independently of their firm listing status. These 
findings were not expected, as previous studies proved that that as bigger is the 
size of the firm more stakeholders would be interested in the companies’ 
transparent and accountable information (Lindsey and Shrives, 2006; Amran et 
al., 2009). However, as earlier studies presented by Botosan (1997), Hail (2002) 
and Botosan and Plumlee (2005), and consistent with stewardship theory and 
corporate governance, it can be concluded that professional managers of O&G 
businesses perform as best possible and act as effective resource managers of 
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the organization. This, to benefit owners, directives and other shareholders, in 
the goals and objectives that will be achieved by the administrator, independently 
of the firm’s size or if the company is headquartered in a developed or 
developing country. These finding were observed in both type of reports and for 
financial and non-financial risks disclosures. 
Findings suggest that the use of O&G voluntary guidelines (IPIECA), develop 
and promote industry good practices in terms of risk reporting and enhance the 
quality of companies’ risk reporting. This O&G sustainability guide supports 
companies to better understand and improve their social and environmental 
performance, providing constant improvements for the industry performance to 
what CSR and its risks associated refers. This applies for all companies in the 
O&G sector, independently of their location.    
Finally, future lines of research can be proposed, among which can refer when 
analysing the performance of companies that have opted to follow an 
isomorphism in the disclosure of the quality of risk information. 
On the other hand, another suggested line of research is to analyse more deeply 
the strength or influence that organizations have to follow the guidelines of 
IPIECA. 
In this context, it should be examined why companies in developed countries 
such as BP obtain a higher average of risk disclosures in contrast, with the US 
Chevron firm based in USA, which showed the lowest risk disclosure index. This 
is possible to focus on if Chevron does not carry out isomorphic processes and if 
BP uses them. 
Another line of research is to examine in depth the causes of the reduction in the 
quality of the risk disclosures for the year 2017 in stakeholder reports in 
developed countries, in contrast with the companies based in developing 
countries which tend to increase the quality of risk disclosure. The query would 
be: why developing countries tend to increase the quality of risk disclosures in 
stakeholder reports? 
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Appendix X1.1 
Shareholder report index disclosure by company and risk category  
developed countries – year 2016 
Disclosure index construction -  Max Weight Suncor Energy British Petroleum plc 
(BP) 
Premier Oil plc 
(PMO) 
Exxon Mobile Chevron 
Avg StdDev 
Shareholder Reports 2016 Canada United Kingdom  United Kingdom  United States United States 
ID Category Kelliher et al. items score score Kelliher et al Kelliher et al Kelliher et al Kelliher et al Kelliher et al score score 
1 Market Risk 1 equity risk; 2 property; 3 
bond; 4 commodity; 5 
foreign exchange; 6 
inflation 7 interest rate 
7 14.29% 
5.5 6 6 5.5 4.0 
5.4 0.82 
2 Credit Risk 8 counterparty; 9 default; 
10 bad and/or doubtful 
debt; 11 unpaid rent; 12 
credit rating; 13 overdraft; 
14 re-negotiation 
7 14.29% 
3 3 1.5 1.5 1 
2.0 0.94 
3 Business Risk 15 energy; 16 safety; 17 
environment; 18 climate; 
19 technology; 20 disaster; 
21 health 
7  28.57% 
6.5 7 6 6 6 
12.6 0.89 
4 Liquidity Risk 22 liquidity strain; 23 
solvency; 24 withdraws; 25 
collateral; 26 impairment; 
27 cash shortfall; 28 
illiquidity 
7 14.29% 
2.5 3.5 2 2 2 
2.4 0.65 
5 Operational Risk 29 operational loss; 30 
fraud; 31 control failure; 32 
defect; 33 system error; 34 
business disruption; 35 
asset damage 
7 14.29% 
0 1.5 1 0.5 1 
0.8 0.57 
6 Strategy Risk 36 macroeconomic impact; 
37 competitor; 38 political; 
39 regulatory; 40 
reputation/brand; 41 fiscal; 
42 tax 
7 14.29% 
5 5.5 4.5 5 4.5 
4.9 0.42 
 
TOTAL ALL 
 
49 100% 22.5 26.5 21 20.5 18.5 28.1 3.42 
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Appendix X1.2 
Shareholder report index disclosure by company and risk category  
developed countries – year 2017 
Disclosure index construction  Max Weight Suncor Energy British Petroleum plc (BP) Premier Oil plc (PMO) Exxon Mobile Chevron 
Avg StdDev 
Shareholder Reports 2017 Canada United Kingdom  United Kingdom  United States United States 
ID Category Kelliher et al items score score Kelliher et al score Kelliher et al Kelliher et al Kelliher et al score score 
1 Market Risk 1 equity risk; 2 property; 3 bond; 4 
commodity; 5 foreign exchange; 6 
inflation 7 interest rate 
7 14.29% 5.5 5 6 5.5 4 5.1 0.85 
2 Credit Risk 8 counterparty; 9 default; 10 bad 
and/or doubtful debt; 11 unpaid rent; 
12 credit downgrade; 13 overdraft; 14 
re-negotiation  
7 14.29% 2 1.5 2 0.5 0.5 1.1 0.75 
3 Business 
Risk 
15 energy; 16 safety; 17 environment; 
18 climate; 19 technology; 20 disaster; 
21 health 
14 28.57% 6 7 6 6 6 12.3 0.50 
4 Liquidity 
Risk 
22 liquidity strain; 23 solvency; 24 
withdraws; 25 collateral calls; 26 
impairment liquid; 27 cash shortfall; 28 
illiquidity  
7 14.29% 1 1.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.8 0.50 
5 Operational 
Risk 
29 operational loss; 30 fraud; 31 
control failure; 32 defect; 33 system 
error; 34 business disruption; 35 asset 
damage 
7 14.29% 0.5 1.5 1 1 1 1.1 0.25 
6 Strategy 
Risk 
36 macroeconomic impact; 37 
competitor; 38 political; 39 regulatory; 
40 reputation/brand; 41 fiscal; 42 tax 7 14.29% 4.5 5.5 4.5 4.5 4 4.6 0.63 
  TOTAL ALL   
49 100% 19.5 21 20 18 18 25.0 2.58 
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Appendix X2.1 
Shareholder report index disclosure by company and risk category  
Developing countries – year 2016 
Disclosure index construction  
Max Weight 
YPF Petrolera Pampa S.A Petrobras OGX Ecopetrol 
Avg StdDev 
Shareholder Reports-developing markets 2016 Argentina Argentina Brazil Brazil Colombia 
ID Category Kelliher et al items score score Kelliher et al Kelliher et al Kelliher et al Kelliher et al Kelliher et al score score 
1 Market Risk 1 equity risk; 2 property; 3 bond; 4 
commodity; 5 foreign exchange; 6 
inflation 7 interest rate 
7 14.29% 
6 5.5 5 3.5 2.5 
4.5 1.46 
2 Credit Risk 8 counterparty; 9 default; 10 bad and/or 
doubtful debt; 11 unpaid rent; 12 credit 
rating; 13 overdraft; 14 re-negotiation  
7 14.29% 
4 3.5 2 1 2.5 
2.6 1.19 
3 Business Risk 15 energy; 16 safety; 17 environment; 
18 climate; 19 technology; 20 disaster; 
21 health 
14 28.57% 
6 5.5 3 1.5 6.5 
9.0 4.30 
4 Liquidity Risk 22 liquidity strain; 23 solvency; 24 
withdraws; 25 collateral; 26 impairment; 
27 cash shortfall; 28 illiquidity  
7 14.29% 
3 1.5 2.5 1.5 3 
2.3 0.76 
5 Operational 
Risk 
29 operational loss; 30 fraud; 31 control 
failure; 32 defect; 33 system error; 34 
business disruption; 35 asset damage 
7 14.29% 
2 1 1.5 1 1.5 
1.4 0.42 
6 Strategy Risk 36 macroeconomic impact; 37 
competitor; 38 political; 39 regulatory; 40 
reputation/brand; 41 fiscal; 42 tax 
7 14.29% 
5 4 5 2.5 5 
4.3 1.10 
  TOTAL ALL   49 100% 26 21 19 11 21 24.1 7.39 
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Appendix X2.2 
Shareholder report index disclosure by company and risk category  
developing countries – year 2017 
Disclosure index construction  
Max Weight 
YPF Petrolera Pampa S.A Petrobras OGX Ecopetrol 
Avg StdDev 
Shareholder Reports-developing markets 2017 Argentina Argentina Brazil Brazil Colombia 
ID Category Kelliher et al items score score Kelliher et al Kelliher et al Kelliher et al Kelliher et al Kelliher et al score score 
1 Market Risk 1 equity risk; 2 property; 3 bond; 
4 commodity; 5 foreign exchange; 
6 inflation 7 interest rate 7 14.29% 
6 5.5 2 5 3 
4.3 1.72 
2 Credit Risk 8 counterparty; 9 default; 10 bad 
and/or doubtful debt; 11 unpaid 
rent; 12 credit downgrade; 13 
overdraft; 14 re-negotiation  
7 14.29% 
3.5 3 1 1.5 1.5 
2.1 1.08 
3 Business Risk 15 energy; 16 safety; 17 
environment; 18 climate; 19 
technology; 20 disaster; 21 health 7 28.57% 
6.5 6 4 1.5 
 
7 
9.7 4.38 
4 Liquidity Risk 22 liquidity strain; 23 solvency; 24 
withdraws; 25 collateral calls; 26 
impairment liquid; 27 cash 
shortfall; 28 illiquidity  
7 14.29% 
1.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 1 
0.8 0.45 
5 Operational 
Risk 
29 operational loss; 30 fraud; 31 
control failure; 32 defect; 33 
system error; 34 business 
disruption; 35 asset damage 
7 14.29% 
2 1.5 1 1 1.5 
1.4 0.42 
6 Strategy Risk 36 macroeconomic impact; 37 
competitor; 38 political; 39 
regulatory; 40 reputation/brand; 
41 fiscal; 42 tax 
7 14.29% 
6 4.5 5 2.5 5 
4.6 1.29 
  TOTAL ALL   
49 100% 25.5 21 13.5 12 19 22.9 7.54 
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Appendix X3.1 
Stakeholder report index disclosure by company and risk category  
Developed countries – year 2016 
 
   Max Weight 
Exxon Mobile British Petroleum plc (BP) Premier Oil plc (PMO) Suncor Energy Chevron Avg StdDev 
ID Category IPIECA items 
United States United Kingdom  United Kingdom  Canada United States 
score % score  score score score score score score 
1 Environmental 
Risks 
1 Biodiversity; 2 climate 
change; 3 energy; 4 
ecosystems 5 water; 6 local 
environment; 7 waste; 8 spill; 9 
emission; 10 decommission  
10 25.00% 9.0 7.5 9.0 9.0 7.5 8.4 0.82 
2 Health and 
Safety Risks  
1 protection; 2 participation; 3 
health; 4 injury; 5 Illness; 6 
hazardous; 7 recycling; 8 
stewardship; 9 accident; 10 
toxic; 11 incident; 12 explosion; 
13 fatality; 14 fire; 15 
discharge; 16 event; 17 
deviation; 18 safety 19 
exposure; 20 hygiene 
20 50.00% 13.0 11.0 11.5 15.5 9.5 12.1 2.27 
3 Social and 
Economic 
Risks 
1 Community; 2 society; 3 
local; 4 human rights; 5 ethic; 6 
corruption; 7 transparency; 8 
workforce/labour 9 grievance 
10 Penalty/compensation 
10 25.00% 9.5 9.0 9.0 9.0 7.0 8.7 0.97 
TOTAL ALL IPIECA items 
40 100% 32 28 30 34 24 29.2 3.67 
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Appendix X3.2 
Stakeholder report index disclosure by company and risk category  
Developed countries – year 2017 
 
   Max Weight 
Exxon Mobile Premier Oil plc (PMO) Suncor Energy Chevron British Petroleum plc (BP) 
Avg StdDev 
ID Category IPIECA items 
United States United Kingdom  Canada United States United Kingdom  
score % score score score score score score score 
1 
Environmental 
Risks 
1 Biodiversity; 2 climate 
change; 3 energy; 4 
ecosystem; 5 water; 6 local 
environment;7 waste; 8 spill; 9 
emission; 10 decommission  
10 25.00% 
4 8 7 7 8 
6.8 1.64 
2 
Health and 
Safety Risks  
1 protection; 2 participation; 3 
health; 4 injury; 5 Illness; 6 
hazardous; 7 recycling; 8 
stewardship; 9 accident; 10 
toxic; 11 incident; 12 
explosion; 13 fatality; 14 fire; 
15 discharge; 16 event; 
17deviation; 18 safety 19 
exposure; 20 hygiene 
20 50.00% 
4 12.5 10.5 10.5 8.5 
9.2 3.23 
3 
Social and 
Economic 
Risks 
1 Community; 2 society; 3 
local; 4 human rights; 5 ethic; 
6 corruption; 7 transparency; 
8 workforce/labour 9 
grievance 10 
Penalty/compensation 
10 25.00% 
4 8.5 6.5 6.5 9 
6.9 1.98 
TOTAL ALL IPIECA items 40 100% 12 29 24 24 26 22.9 6.43 
 
 
 
 158 
 
 
Appendix X3.3 
Stakeholder report index disclosure by company and risk category  
Developing countries – year 2016 
 
 
  
Max Weight 
YPF Petrolera Pampa S.A Petrobras OGX Ecopetrol 
Avg StdDev 
ID Category IPIECA items Argentina Argentina Brazil Brazil Colombia 
score % Score Score Score Score Score score score 
1 Environmental 
Risks 
1 Biodiversity; 2 climate 
change; 3 energy; 4 
ecosystem; 5 water; 6 
local environment;7 waste; 
8 spill; 9 emission; 10 
decommission  
10 25.00% 8.0 0.0 8.0 1.5 9.5 5.4 4.32 
2 Health and 
Safety Risks  
1 protection; 2 
participation; 3 health; 4 
injury; 5 Illness; 6 hazards; 
7 recycling; 8 stewardship; 
9 accident; 10 toxic; 11 
incident; 12 explosion; 13 
fatality; 14 fire; 15 
discharge; 16 event; 
17deviation; 18 safety 19 
exposure; 20 hygiene 
20 50.00% 11.0 0.0 13.0 8.0 15.5 9.5 5.98 
3 Social and 
Economic Risks 
1 Community; 2 society; 3 
local; 4 human rights; 5 
ethic; 6 corruption; 7 
transparency; 8 
workforce/labour 9 
grievance; 10 
Penalty/compensation 
10 25.00% 8 0.0 9.0 4.5 10.0 6.3 4.09 
TOTAL ALL IPIECA items 
40 100% 27 0 30 14 35 21.2 14.17 
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Appendix X3.3 
Stakeholder report index disclosure by company and risk category  
Developing countries – year 2017 
 
  
Max Weight 
YPF OGX Petrolera 
Pampa S.A 
Ecopetrol Petrobras 
Avg StdDev 
ID Category IPIECA items Argentina Brazil Argentina Colombia Brazil 
score % Score Score Score Score Score score score 
1 Environmental 
Risks 
1 Biodiversity; 2 climate 
change; 3 energy; 4 
ecosystem; 5 water; 6 
local environment;7 waste; 
8 spill; 9 emission; 10 
decommission  
10 25.00% 
7 2 7 9 7.5 
6.5 2.65 
2 Health and 
Safety Risks  
1 protection; 2 
participation; 3 health; 4 
injury; 5 Illness; 6 hazards; 
7 recycling; 8 stewardship; 
9 accident; 10 toxic; 11 
incident; 12 explosion; 13 
fatality; 14 fire; 15 
discharge; 16 event; 
17deviation; 18 safety 19 
exposure; 20 hygiene 
20 50.00% 
10.5 8 11.5 15 13.5 
11.7 2.71 
3 Social and 
Economic Risks 
1 Community; 2 society; 3 
local; 4 human rights; 5 
ethic; 6 corruption; 7 
transparency; 8 
workforce/labour 9 
grievance; 10 
Penalty/compensation 
10 25.00% 
6.5 5 5 9 8.5 
6.8 1.89 
TOTAL ALL IPIECA items 
40 100% 24 15 24 33 30 25.0 6.85 
 
